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California Supreme Court Survey
June 1992 - December 1992
The Callfornia Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent deci-
sions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of
the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and judi-
cial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
I. APPELLATE REvIEw
A. Summary denial of a petition for extraordinary
relief will not preclude reconsideration of an issue
on appeal following final judgment even where the
court denied the writ petition without issuing an
alternative writ and the "sole possible ground" for
denial was that the court had acted on the merits of
the case; however, the issue may be precluded from
reconsideration on appeal if an appellate court is-
sues an alternative writ, the matter is fully briefed,
opportunity for oral argument exists, and the cause
is decided by written opinion:
Kowis v. Howard ............................. 1567
B. Absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate
court shall grant a stipulated request made by all
parties pending appeal to reverse a trial court
judgment in order to effectuate their settlement:
Neary v. Regents of the University of
California ................................... 1573
II. ARBITRATION
Subject to a few limited exceptions, an arbitral
award is not reviewable by the judiciary for either
factual or legal errors, even when the error appears
on the face of the award and causes substantial
injustice: Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase ............. 1582
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Ill. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Expert witness fees awarded under subdivision (c)
of section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure consti-
tute non-routine fees that are not automatically
stayed on appeal, absent an appeal bond or other
undertaking: Bank of San Pedro v. Superior
Court ....................................... 1592
B. Parents who knowingly and voluntarily plead 'no
contest" to allegations under section 300(e) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code waive their right to
appeal the applicability of the section to their con-
duct: In re Troy Z ............................. 1595
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Section 57103 of the California Government Code,
which limits the right to vote on issues of munici-
pal reorganization to residents within the area to be
reorganized, does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Board of Su-
pervisors v. Local Agency Formation ............. 1598
V. CONTRACT LAW
When experienced business parties place a
choice-of-law provision in their contract, the chosen
law applies to all contractual claims that arise, as
well as any noncontractual causes of action that
stem from the underlying contract: Nedlloyd Lines
B.V. v. Superior Court ......................... 1602
VI. CRnmNAL LAW
A. A defendant may challenge a conviction and sen-
tence when ineffective assistance of counsel results
in the rejection of a plea bargain offer more favor-
able than the result achieved at a subsequent fair
trial:
In re Alvernaz ............................... 1610
B. Under Penal Code section 12022.7, a jury may con-
clude that a victim has suffered "great bodily inju-
ry" even though no '!permanent, prolonged, or pro-
tracted disfigurement, impairment, or loss of bodily
function" resulted: People v. Escobar .............. 1619
C. Section 1202.1 of the California Penal Code, which
requires a sexual offender to submit to an AIDS test,
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does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on the
grounds that an AIDS test does not constitute pun-
ishment: People v. McVickers ................... 1624
D. A criminal defendant has no right to an arraign-
ment on charges pending in one county when the
defendant has been caught previously in another
county and proceedings are still pending: Ng v.
Superior Court ............................... 1626
E. The amendment to California Penal Code section
190.2 by Proposition 115, including the changes in
subdivisions (a). and (b) and the addition of subdi-
visions (c), (d) and (e), is not preempted by Propo-
sition 114, which received more votes, inasmuch as
the changes made to section 190.2 by Proposition
114 were nonsubstantive: Yoshisato v. Superior
C ourt ....................................... 1628
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A trial court is required to give a jury instruction
that a rape defendant's actual and reasonable mis-
taken belief of consent is a defense to rape only if
there is substantial- evidence of the prosecutrix'
equivocal conduct which would lead a person to
reasonably believe she had consented:
People v. Williams ............................ 1635
VIII. EVIDENCE
The psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to
statements made in confidence regardless of whether
they are confidential or later disclosed; only the pa-
tient has the power to waive or invoke the privilege;
the "dangerous patient" exception to the privilege
applies when the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient is dangerous and
disclosure is necessary to prevent harm; no actual
disclosure, however, is required to trigger the excep-
tion: Menendez v. Superior Court ................ 1640
IX. LABOR LAW
Under Government Code sections 20020 and
20020.9, detention officers may not claim "local
1565
safety" status for purposes of retirement benefits
unless the city elects to treat the officers as local
policeman: City of Huntington Beach v. Board of
Administration .............................. 1646
X. TORT LAW
Under Harbors and Navigation Code section 658,
the operator of a water ski boat owes a duty to
avoid endangering the lives or property of third
persons; however, the vessel operator owes no corre-
sponding duty to a water skier other than the duty
not to engage in conduct that is either intended to
injure or is so reckless as to be outside the scope of
the sport: Ford v. Gouin ........................ 1649
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I. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Summary denial of a petition for extraordinary relief will
not preclude reconsideration of an issue on appeal following
final judgment even where the court denied the writ petition
without issuing an alternative writ and the "sole possible
ground"for denial was that the court had acted on the merits
of the case; however, the issue may be precluded from
reconsideration on appeal if an appellate court issues an al-
ternative writ, the matter is fully briefed, opportunity for
oral argument exists, and the cause is decided by written
opinion: Kowis v. Howard.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Kowis v. Howard,' the California Supreme Court considered wheth-
er an issue in a pretrial motion for extraordinary relief that was sum-
marily denied by the court of appeal could be raised again on final ap-
peal of the case.2 The court concluded that summary denial of an ex-
traordinary writ does not establish the law of the case, and thus, does
not operate as a bar to raising the same issue on appeal.'
The plaintiff slipped ona patch of oil on defendant's property, alleged-
ly suffering damages. The defendant failed to make a timely response to
the plaintiffs request for admissions.4 The plaintiff moved that the ad-
missions be deemed admitted and the trial court granted the motion.
After the defendant dismissed his first attorney and retained new coun-
1. 3 Cal. 4th 888, 838 P.2d 250, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (1992). Justice Arabian
wrote the opinion for the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Baxter, and George. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion, concurring and
dissenting. Id. at 901, 838 P.2d at 257, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
2. Id. at 891, 838 P.2d at 251, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
3. Id. The court did not attempt to rule on the merits, instead concluding that
the matter should be heard on appeal. Id. at 901, 838 P.2d at 257, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 735. For a discussion of the law-of-the-case doctrine, see 5 CAL Jun. 3D; Appe/ate
Review §§ 634-54 (1973 & Supp. 1992).
4. Plaintiff requested that the defendant admit the following: "(1) that plaintiff
was injured when he slipped on defendant's property, (2) that plaintiff injured his
lower back as a result of the fall, (3) that defendant was negligent in not inspecting
the property, and (4) that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury." Kowin, 3 Cal. 4th at 891-92, 838 P.2d at 251, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
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sel, he moved for relief on the grounds of attorney neglect. The trial
court denied the motion and the defendant filed a petition for writ of
mandate with the court of appeal. The court of appeal summarily denied
the defendant's petition and the case was continued to trial.'
The jury rendered a special verdict on the issues of damages and val-
ued the total injury at $210,000, for which the defendant was twenty-one
percent at fault. On appeal, the defendant again attempted to raise the
admissions issue. The court of appeal held that the earlier denial of the
petition for writ of mandate had been made on the merits, and thus,
precluded reconsideration under the doctrine of law of the case.' The su-
preme court granted review solely on the issue of preclusion under this
doctrine.7
II. TREATMENT
The court began by analyzing the law-of-the-case doctrine. The law-of-
the-case doctrine bars litigants from further litigation of any issue that
has already been decided on appeal by means of an extraordinary writ.8
In this case, the supreme court faced the issue of whether the doctrine
applied to a pretrial writ
The court analyzed the three ways in which a court of appeal may
address an extraordinary writ. First, the court can summarily deny the
writ, either immediately or upon consideration of any opposition." Sec-
5. "The Court of Appeal denied the petition with the following order. The peti-
tion for writ of mandate and request for stay and the opposition have been read and
considered by Presiding Justice Kremer and Justices Wiener and Huffman. The peti-
tion is denied.'" Id. at 892, 838 P.2d at 251, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729 (citing Carroll v.
Abbott Labs., Inc. 32 Cal. 3d 892, 654 P.2d 775, 187 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1982)).
6. A different panel of the same division of the court of appeal determined that
the earlier denial for the writ of mandate was on the merits. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 893, 898 P.2d at 251-52, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729-30. The court, however,
did not find it necessary to consider all of the exceptions to the doctrine. Id. at 893
I.1, 838 P.2d at 252 n.1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730 n.1. For further study, see Clemente
v. California, 40 Cal. 3d 202, 707 P.2d 818, 219 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1985) (finding law-of-
the-case doctrine merely a rule of procedure that does not go to the power of a
court and inapplicable where it will result in an unjust decision); and Searle v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425, 696 P.2d 1308, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1985) (hold-
ing law-of-the-case doctrine applicable to the California Supreme Court even though a
previous appeal was before the court of appeal). See also 8 B. WUN, CAuFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §§ 142-49 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
9. The court considered it unnecessary to distinguish between writs of mandate
and writs of prohibition. Kouis, 3 Cal. 4th at 893, 838 P.2d at 252, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 730.
10. Id. (citing Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 24(a) (West 1992); Bay Dev., Ltd. v. Supe-
rior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990)). The court in
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ond, the court can issue an alternative writ commanding the respondent
to act in conformity with the order, or to show cause why it should not
be so ordered." Third, the court can issue a peremptory writ under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1088, provided the parties are given
proper notice.'
In this case, the court of appeal employed the first course of action
and summarily denied the petition without issuing an alternative writ or
a peremptory writ. The court declined to hear or decide the cause of ei-
ther party"9 because the parties did not fully brief the matter nor were
they given the opportunity for oral argument. The court cited precedent
that clearly recognized that law of the case is established in a pretrial
proceeding where (1) a court of appeal has issued an alternative writ; (2)
the matter was fully briefed; (3) there was opportunity for oral argument;
and (4) the court issued a written opinion." The court found that the
law-of-the-case doctrine generally does not apply to summary denials of
writ petitions," but noted a line of cases that recognized an exception
to the general rule. 6 The exception is known as the "sole possible
Bay found an exception to the general rule that court of appeal decisions become
final as to that court thirty days after filing, unless an alternative writ or order to
show cause is issued. The court stated that the general rule applies only to summary
denials of writ petitions, not to cases in which the court of appeal sets a writ matter
for oral argument, hears oral argument, and resolves the matter by full written opin-
ion. Id.
11. Kow", 3 Cal. 4th at 893, 838 P.2d at 252, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730 (citing
Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 177-78, 681 P.2d 893, 896-97, 203
Cal. Rptr. 626, 629-30 (1984)).
12. Id. Section 1088 states:
When the application to the, court is made without notice to the adverse par-
ty, and the writ is allowed, the alternative must be first issued; but if the
application is upon due notice and the writ is allowed, the peremptory may
be issued in the first instance. With the alternative writ and also with any
notice of an intention to apply for the writ, there must be served on each
person against whom the writ is sought a copy of the petition. The notice of
the application, when given, must be at least ten days. The writ cannot be
granted by default. The case must be heard by the court, whether the ad-
verse party appears or not.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1088 (West 1992).
13. Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 894, 838 P.2d at 252, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
14. Id. (citing Palma, 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681 P.2d 893, 203 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984)
(holding law-of-the-case doctrine inapplicable where no notice provided and merits
not considered)).
15. Id. at 894, 838 P.2d at 253, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (citing People v. Medina, 6
Cal. 3d 484, 492 P.2d 686, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1972)).
16. Id. at 895-97, 838 P.2d at 253-55, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731-33. See, e.g., Consum-
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ground" exception and the plaintiff in this case argued that the court of
appeal had properly applied it.'
The "sole possible ground" exception was derived from an interpreta-
tion of language used in Hagan v. Superior Court." In Hagan, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court discussed the law-of-the-case doctrine and found
that
[t]he rule is well settled that a denial by this or the appellate court of an appli-
cation for a writ without opinion 'is not res judicata of the legal issues presented
by the application unless the sole possible ground of the denial was that the court
acted on the merits, or unless it affirmatively appears that such denial was intend-
ed to be on the merits."'
The Kowis court analyzed this statement as giving rise to two implica-
tions.' First, the Kowis court felt this language reiterated "the general
rule that a summary denial does not establish law of the case."" Sec-
ond, "if a summary denial is on the merits, either because there is no
other possible ground or because it affirmatively appears that the denial
was intended to be on the merits, then it comes within an exception to
the general rule, and establishes law of the case."'
While the court agreed with the first point, it took issue with the sec-
ond. Although many cases have cited to the "sole possible ground" ex-
ception, there has never been an actual need to apply the exception.'
Thus, all of these references remain, dicta.'
In Richer v. Superior Court,' a court of appeal effectively applied the
exception without citing to the "sole possible ground" rule.' In Richer,
an occupant of real property moved in superior court to abate a petition
filed in probate court on the ground that the probate action was similar
ers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41,
160 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d
247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972); Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry &
Berry, 219 Cal. App. 3d 9, 267 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1990); Donla v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Bd., 167 Cal. App. 3d 588, 213 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985); People v. Pipes,
179 Cal. App. 2d 547, 3 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1960); Confidential, Inc. v. Superior Court, 157
Cal. App. 2d 75, 320 P.2d 546 (1958).
17. Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 897, 838 P.2d at 255, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733.
18. 57 Cal. 2d 767, 371 P.2d 982, 22 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1962).
19. Id. at 770, 371 P.2d at 984, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (quoting McDonough v. Garri-
son, 68 Cal. App. 2d 318, 325, 156 P.2d 983, 987 (1945) (emphasis in original)).
20. Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 896, 838 P.2d at 254, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. But see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24. Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 897, 838 P.2d at 254, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732.
25. 63 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 52 (2d Dist 1976).
26. The Richer court actually considered all actions an appellate court must take
prior to invoking the law-of-the-case doctrine and found an exception where the law-
of-the-case doctrine might result in injustice. Id. at 758, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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to the superior court action. The motion was granted and the executrix
of the decedent's estate, who allegedly owned the property, filed for writ
of mandate." The court of appeal held that a previous denial of the
occupant's prior petition for prohibition was a decision on the merits,
even though no alternative writ or order to show cause was entered.'
The Richer court concluded that denial of the writ established the law of
the case, and thus, the superior court should not have granted the
occupant's motion.'
The California Supreme Court found the dicta in prior cases and the
holding in Richer unpersuasive.' Instead, the court applied a bright line
rule which would "serve to preserve scarce judicial resources."" The
court was primarily concerned with the fact that the "sole possible
ground" exception might result in unnecessary litigation.' The court's
concern focused on the uncertainty that might result when attempting to
decide whether a summary denial was resolved on the merits, thus estab-
lishing law of the case.' In short, parties would be forced to second-
guess whether a pretrial order would ultimately become law of the
case.3
Upon consideration of these factors, the court stated that "[t]he firm
rule that a denial without an alternative writ and written opinion does
not establish law of the case is clear and would rarely, if ever, cause
uncertainty. " ' The court reasoned that such a rule would strengthen the
principle that a right to oral argument exists before any appeal can be
decided on the merits.' Justice Arabian pointed out that this merely
ensured the opportunity for oral argument, which may be, and often is,
waived.3
27. Id. at 751-56, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 53-58.
28. Id. at 756, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
29. Id. at 758-59, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
30. "A summary denial does not decide a 'cause' and should therefore not be
given law of the case effect. Sound policy reasons also support this conclusion."
Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 897, 838 P.2d at 255, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 898, 838 P.2d at 255, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. "Thus, judicial economy would be hampered, not furthered, by recognition of
an exception to the general rule." Id.
35. Kouns, 3 Cal. 4th at 897, 838 P.2d at 255, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733.
36. Id. (citing People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 489-90, 492 P.2d 686, 689, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 633 (1972)).
37. Id. at 899 n.3, 838 P.2d at 256 n.3, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 734 n.3.
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The plaintiff relied on Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot,' in which
the California Supreme Court determined that law of the case could be
established without a written opinion. The Pigeon Point court held that
denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss without written opinion was a
final determination of appealibilty.' The court based its decision on the
law-of-the-case doctrine rather than res judicata4
In Kowis, the supreme court felt compelled to reconsider Pigeon Point
in light of recent decisions." In doing so, the court expressed its con-
cern that should Pigeon Point be followed, parties would be reluctant to
bring motions to dismiss when they could be denied without a full hear-
ing, in effect, denying the party supporting the motion from any future
argument.' Thus, the supreme court overruled Pigeon Point, reasoning
that motions to dismiss were of significant value in reducing litigation.'
The court concluded that "[a] summary denial of a writ petition does
not establish law of the case whether or not that denial is intended to be
on the merits or is based on some other reason."" The court decided
that in future cases, for the law-of-the-case doctrine to apply, the appel-
late court must issue an alternative writ; the matter must be fully briefed;
opportunity must exist for oral argument, and the cause must be decided
by written opinion.' The court remanded the case to the court of ap-
peal to decide whether the admissions should be set aside based on the
merits.'
III. CONCLUSION
Kowis establishes a bright line test for the application of the law-of-
the-case doctrine. Summary denial of a petition will not be sufficient to
establish law of the case. Rather, the court of appeal must hear, or at
least provide an opportunity for, oral argument, and issue a written opin-
ion before the doctrine may be invoked to bar future debate on an issue.
38. 59 Cal. 2d 227, 379 P.2d 321, 28 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1963).
39. "The court [of appeal], however, was presented with only one question, namely,
appealability of the judgment, and, in the interests of orderly administration of jus-
tice, the denial of the motion, made without qualification, should be interpreted as a
final determination." Id. at 231, 379 P.2d at 323, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
40. Id. at 231, 379 P.2d at 322, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
41. Kowis, 3 Cal. 4th at 900, 838 P.2d at 257, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 901, 838 P.2d at 257, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735. Justice Mosk disagreed
with this part of the opinion. Id. at 901-02, 838 P.2d at 257-58, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
735-36 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
44. Id. at 899, 838 P.2d at 256, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
45. Id. at 894, 838 P.2d at 252, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
46. The supreme court expressed no opinion on the merits of the claim. Id. at
901, 838 P.2d at 257, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
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This rule will ultimately serve to reduce litigation by creating greater
certainty in the effect of a peremptory writ. Further, the Kowis ruling
ensures that the rights of litigants will be protected by providing an the
opportunity to be heard.
DAN O'DAY
B. Absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court shall
grant a stipulated request made by all parties pending appeal
to reverse a trial court judgment in order to effectuate their
settlement: Neary v. Regents of the University of
California.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Neary v. Regents of the University of California,' the California
Supreme Court decided whether an appellate court may grant a stipulat-
ed request by all the parties to reverse a trial court judgment in order to
effectuate a settlement.' The court held that an appellate court should
grant such a request by the parties absent extraordinary circumstances.'
On the ground that no extraordinary circumstances existed, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the appellate court below erred in failing to
grant the parties' stipulated request.
4
The petitioner, Neary, obtained a judgment for seven million dollars in
a libel action against the respondents, the Regents of the University of
California.' The respondents appealed the judgment, and the petitioner
cross-appealed.6 While their appeals were pending, the parties reached a
settlement.7 Their agreement provided that the respondents pay three
1. 3 Cal. 4th 273, 834 P.2d 119, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (1992). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and
George concurring. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Kennard wrote a
dissenting opinion.
2. Id. at 275, 834 P.2d at 119-20, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859.
3. Id. at 285, 834 P.2d at 126, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 275-76, 834 P.2d at 120, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860. The respondents in this
action were three veterinarians employed by a Regents University. The jury verdict
was entered against all respondents. Id,
6. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 276, 834 P.2d at 120, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
7. Id.
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million dollars to the petitioner, both appeals be dismissed with preju-
dice, and the court of appeal vacate the trial court's judgment. 8
Subsequently, the parties filed a joint application to the court of appeal
requesting reversal of the trial court's judgment and asking that the ac-
tion be remanded for dismissal with prejudice.' The court of appeal,
however, denied their application.0 The California Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that, absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate
court should grant a stipulated request to vacate a trial court judgment in
order to effectuate the parties' settlement."
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Authority of the Appellate Courts
The court proclaimed that an appellate court has the authority to re-
verse a trial court's judgment in order to give effect to a mutual settle-
ment by the parties.'" The court reasoned that no California statutory or
constitutional provision denied the appellate courts this power.' In fact,
the court noted that the opposite was true: the California Constitution
expressly vests in the appellate courts the power to control judicial pro-
ceedings.'4 In addition, California Code of Civil Procedure section
128(a)(8) gives courts the power "to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.""5 The court con-
cluded that where the parties wish to terminate their dispute by settling,
a stipulated reversal is consistent with the courts' authority to conform
to justice.'
2. Presumption Favoring Settlement
The court next determined that when all parties involved in an action
have requested a stipulated reversal for the purpose of effectuating the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 275, 834 P.2d at 120, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
12. Id. at 276, 834 P.2d at 120, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1).
15. Id (quoting CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 128(a)(8) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993)).
16. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 277, 834 P.2d at 120, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860 (citing CAL
CIV. PRoc. CODE § 128(a)(8) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993)). See also B. WrrN, CAL-
IFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 519 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (discussing appellate settle-
ments).
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settlement, their request should be granted absent extraordinary circum-
stances." The court provided several justifications for this general rule.
a. Efficiency
The court first recognized that while pre-judgment settlements are
more efficient than post-judgment settlements, the latter are still more
efficient than allowing the litigation to continue needlessly.8 The court
reasoned that although a post-judgment settlement does not spare the
judiciary and the parties the costs of a trial, it does avoid the additional
costs of an appeal and a possible retrial on remand. 9 Furthermore, the
court noted that both California and federal appellate courts have consis-
tently granted such requests by parties for stipulated reversals.'
The court rejected the respondents' contention that allowing stipulated
reversals effectuating post-judgment settlements will discourage parties
from settling pre-judgment. " First, the court reasoned that initially the
high monetary costs of litigation will continue to encourage parties to
settle pre-judgment. 2 Second, the court reasoned that in addition to the
monetary costs there are several other burdens of litigation, such as
negative publicity, which will provide further incentives for parties to
settle pre-judgment.' Third, the court posited that parties often find
post-judgment settlements to be less favorable than pre-judgment set-
tlements after having reconsidered the strengths and weaknesses of their
17. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 277, 834 P.2d at 121, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
18. Id. at 277, 824 P.2d at 121, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
19. Id. at 278-79, 834 P.2d at 121-22, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-62. The court recog-
nized that forcing parties to engage in further litigation over a matter that is no
longer in dispute "is wasteful of the resources of the judiciary." Id. at 277, 834 P.2d
at 121, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859 (quoting Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods.
Group, 819 F.2d 277, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring an administrative agency to va-
cate its decision upon settlement of the parties)). In the present case, continuing the
litigation would be quite costly where the transcripts alone totaled more than 13,000
pages. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 278, 834 P.2d at 122, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
20. Id. at 278, 834 P.2d at 121, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861. See also Federal Data
Corp., 819 F.2d at 280; Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d
Cir. 1985) (vacating judgment due to post-judgment settlement).
21. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 279, 834 P.2d at 122, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
22. Id. The court criticized a law review article relied upon by the respondents as
failing to consider the significance of the considerable initial litigation costs. Id.
(citing Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decision-
al Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L REV. 589, 596 (1991)).
23. Id.
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cases.' Finally, the court observed that despite the fact that many ap-
pellate courts have granted stipulated reversals, the number of pre-judg-
ment settlements have not decreased.'
b. Fairness
The court's second justification for its holding was that strong consid-
eration should be given to the interests of the parties to the action since
they are the ones most affected by the judgment.' The court noted the
many risks of litigation, such as adverse publicity and potential liability
for a large judgment.' Thus, if the parties to an action mutually agree to
avoid such risks, a court should respect the agreement and aid them in
effectuating a settlement.' The court stressed that this was especially
true in the present case where a complex defamation action with high
monetary and psychological costs had been pending for thirteen years.'
The court concluded that it would be unfair to deny the parties their
mutual desire to end such a long-standing dispute.'
c. Avoiding arbitrary distinctions
The court rejected the court of appeal's conclusion that a post-judg-
ment settlement would constitute a waste of the time and expense spent
on the trial below.3' The court posited that the costs of trial are not al-
ways an issue with post-judgment settlements because pre-trial judg-
ments can be rendered by motion, and thus, there would be no need for
a trial.' Moreover, the court reasoned that many parties who settle dur-
ing trial often do so just prior to judgment,' thus, any time and money
saved by denying post-judgment settlements would be insignificant. Final-
ly, the court concluded that any line drawn at judgment would be arbi-
trary and without justification.'
24. Id.
25. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 279-80, 834 P.2d at 122, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862.
26. Id. at 280, 834 P.2d at 122-23, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (citing Federal Data
Corp., 819 F.2d at 280 (discussing the importance of fairness to the parties)). "The
courts exist for litigants. Litigants do not exist for courts." Id. at 280, 834 P.2d at
123, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
27. Id. at 280, 834 P.2d at 123, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
28. Id.
29. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 280-81, 834 P.2d at 123, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
30. Id
31. Id. at 281, 834 P.2d at 123, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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d. Integrity of the judiciary
Next, the court rejected the court of appeal's argument that stipulated
reversals txivialize the work of trial courts and undermine the integrity of
the judiciary.' The court criticized the court of appeal's conclusion that
the primary purpose of the judiciary is to search for "legal truth"' and
opined that the ultimate goal of the judiciary is to provide the public
with a forum to peaceably settle their disputes.' The court stated that
when a dispute is resolved the goal of the judicial process has been at-
tained, even if the resolution comes from a post-judgment settlement.3
In addition, the court asserted that a trial educates the parties as to the
value of settlement, and thus, resolution by post-judgment settlement
achieves the ultimate end of the judicial process.'
e. Public interest
The court rejected the rationale adopted by the court of appeal that
stipulated reversals should be denied whenever the public interest would
be adversely affected.' Furthermore, the court rejected the argument
that a judgment must stand as a "'commentary' on the performance of
public officials" such as the respondents.4 Rather, the court advocated a
strong presumption in favor of allowing stipulated reversals, rebuttable
only when the reversal adversely affects a "specific, demonstrable, well-
established and compelling" public interest.'
The supreme court concluded that the settlement did not adversely
affect any such public interest.43 The court, in fact, observed that the
contrary was true in commenting that this settlement weighed strongly in
35. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 281, 834 P.2d at 124, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863-64.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 281-82, 834 P.2d at 124, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (quoting Vecki v.
Sorensen, 171 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393, 340 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1959)).
38. Id. at 282, 834 P.2d at 124, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
39. Id.
40. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 283, 834 P.2d at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865.
41. Id. at 285, 834 P.2d at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866. The court believed that
the public interest in having this "commentary" was outweighed by the public interest
in the monetary savings resulting from the settlement. Id,
42. Id. See also Anne-Thdr~se Bchamps, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When
Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NoTRE DAME L REV. 117 (1990) (discuss-
ing the public interest against confidentiality of settlements).
43. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 285, 834 P.2d at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
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favor of the public interest by saving the Regents of the University of
California, as well as the taxpayers, four million dollars. '
f Conclusion
The court held that absent extraordinary circumstances, there is a
general presumption in favor of allowing stipulated reversals to effectu-
ate post-judgment settlements.' Without any extraordinary circumstanc-
es to address in the present case, the court stopped short of instituting a
clear a rule for determining exactly what constitutes extraordinary cir-
cumstances.' The court's only comment on the issue was that any such
determination of extraordinary circumstances must be made on a case-
by-case basis. 7
3. Applying the Presumption
In holding that the presumption should be applied unequivocally in the
present case," the court reasoned that permitting post-judgment settle-
ments would save the parties, as well as the judiciary, a substantial
amount of time and money, whereas denial of such settlements would
not only be unfair to the parties, it could potentially jeopardize the integ-
rity of the judiciary by foregoing resolution of an existing dispute. ' In
addition, the public interest would be furthered by such a large monetary
savings. Thus, the court concluded that there were no extraordinary
circumstances to justify not applying the presumption in this case.'
B. Concurring Opinion
While Justice Mosk concurred with the majority based on the facts of
the case, he was nevertheless concerned with the court's decision to
create a presumption for granting stipulated reversals absent extraordi-
nary circumstances stating that such a rule was much too broad.5 Jus-
44. Id, at 283, 834 P.2d at 124-25, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864-65.
45. Id. at 284, 834 P.2d at 125-26, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865. The court explained
that a negative presumption, one denying stipulated reversals absent a showing that
the stipulation should be granted, would be unnecessarily burdensome on' parties and
the appellate courts alike. Id. at 284, 834 P.2d at 126, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865. Ac-
cording to the court, under a presumption favoring stipulated reversals, the parties
need not make a showing that the stipulations should be granted unless a nonparty
objects to the settlement. Id.
46. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 284, 834 P.2d at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 285, 834 P.2d at 126, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 286, 834 P.2d at 126, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 (Mosk, J.,
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tice Mosk posited that the better rule would be to leave the decision of
whether to grant a stipulated reversal to the discretion of the appellate
courts.' Justice Mosk reasoned that, in some circumstances, a stipulat-
ed reversal might actually be against public policy, and the public policy
may not be strong enough to overcome the majority's presumption.'
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard criticized the majority opinion by attacking the -court's
assertion that the main purpose of the judiciary is to serve as a dispute
resolution service." Justice Kennard stated that while that might be one
goal, the ultimate purpose of the judiciary is "to administer the laws of
th[e] state, and thereby... do substantial justice."'
Next, Justice Kennard supplied several rationales in support of her
critique of the majority's presumption in favor of granting stipulated
reversals.' First, Justice Kennard asserted that stipulated reversals nega-
tively affect the public's perception of the judiciary." She reasoned that
by allowing a defendant who lost at trial to "pWchase" a stipulated rever-
sal, the majority, in effect, fosters the perception that justice is directly
proportional to a party's financial means." Justice Kennard stated that
the trial courts are the cornerstone of the judicial process and deserve
respect.' She believed that allowing stipulated reversals without a
showing of legal error would sacrifice the integrity of judges and ju-
concurring).
52. Id. at 286, 834 P.2d at 127, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 (Mosk, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). For example, Justice Mosk was concerned that in a
products liability action the defendant might seek a post-judgment settlement with the
plaintiff to ensure the confidentiality of the result and avoid being sued by other
plaintiffs. Where the plaintiff needed the money badly enough to settle, Justice
Mosk's concern was that other victims of the defective product would be adversely
affected. Id.
54. Id. at 286, 834 P.2d at 127, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
56. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 287, 834" P.2d at 127, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id (Kennard, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 287, 834 P.2d at 127-28, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L REV. 589 (1991).
59. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 288, 834 P.2d at 128, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
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rors.® Justice Kennard posited that when appellate courts disrespect
trial courts they cannot expect the public to do any differently."
Second, Justice Kennard asserted that a strong presumption in favor of
stipulated reversals will discourage pre-trial settlements, reasoning that
motivation for pre-trial settlement is virtually nonexistent when the par-
ties know they can get a stipulated reversal.' Thus, according to Justice
Kennard, allowing stipulated reversals actually encourages parties who
might have settled pre-trial to go forward with their trials thereby wast-
ing the judiciary's resources.' Justice Kennard concluded that while
granting stipulated reversals might encourage post-judgment settlements,
any resulting benefits would not be worth the toll on the number of pre-
trial settlements.'
Third, Justice Kennard contended that judgments with value to
nonparties to an action should always be preserved.' Justice Kennard
noted that because this was a libel suit against a public entity involving
public employees and a publication funded by public tax dollars, the
judgment clearly had value to nonparties, namely the public in general.
Finally, Justice Kennard asserted that appellate courts should require
the parties to provide a legitimate reason for conditioning their settle-
ment on a stipulated reversal before granting their request.67 Justice
Kennard reasoned that if the parties could produce no legitimate reason,
they should not be permitted "to dictate an appellate court's actions" and
possibly damage the dignity of the judiciary.' In this instance, Justice
Kennard believed that the reason provided, to protect the respondents'
60. Id.( Kennard, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 290, 834 P.2d at 130, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
See also In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
proscribing stipulated reversals encourages pretrial settlement).
63. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 290, 834 P.2d at 130, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (citing Jill E. Flsch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating
Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L REV. 589
(1991)).
64. Id. at 291, 834 P.2d at 130, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). See also In re Marriage of Shapiro, 39 Cal. App.
3d 460, 464, 114 Cal. Rptr. 277, 279 (1974) (refusing to reverse a judgment because
of its possible "consequences affecting interests not directly involved in thfat] pro-
ceeding"). For a good discussion of stipulated reversals, see generally B. WrrEIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 644 (1985 & Supp. 1992); RONALD M. GREENBERG,
CALIFORNIA CIVIL APPELLATE PRAcTICE, Decision on the Merits; Retrial After Reversal
§ 16.24 (1985).
66. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 292-93, 834 P.2d at 130-31, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-71
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 293-94, 834 P.2d at 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 293, 834 P.2d at 131, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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reputation, was not sufficiently legitimate given the fact that the jury
found the respondents liable for defamation.'
Justice Kennard concluded her analysis by recognizing the benefits of
post-judgment settlements, but continuing to criticize the majority for
adopting such a broad rule which created a strong presumption in favor
of stipulated reversals. ' According to Justice Kennard, parties should
always be allowed to settle post-judgment, but they should not be al-
lowed to condition such a settlement upon destruction of the judgment,
especially where the judgment is a matter of public interest and the par-
ties have not set forth any legitimate reason for requiring the stipulated
reversal."
III. IMPACT
In Neary v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court created a presumption in favor of granting stipulated
reversals to effectuate post-judgment settlements absent extraordinary
circumstances, which the court failed to clearly define.' This decision is
indicative of California's strong public policy preference for settlements.
It is evident that the court now favors settlement at any stage in the
litigation process, even post-trial.
Ultimately, will granting stipulated reversals to effectuate post-judg-
ment settlements increase judicial efficiency and fairness? Or instead, is
the court; "cutting off its nose to spite its face" by discouraging pre-trial
settlements, and thereby, going against its own preference for public
policy? Justice Kennard warned that Neary's effect will be the latter,
stating that the court is, in actuality, permitting unsuccessful parties to
69. Id. at 294, 834 P.2d at 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-72 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard indicated that granting such a stipulated reversal would encourage
and assist the respondents in the practice of deception. Id, at 294, 834 P.2d at 132,
10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
70. Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 294, 834 P.2d at 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-72 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 295, 834 P.2d at 132-33, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 284, 834 P.2d at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865.
73. This case is indicative of the trend in California whereby courts are trying to
reduce the huge backlog of cases awaiting trial and appeal. See, e.g., Moncharsh v.
Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 33, 832 P.2d 899, 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 203 (1992)
(holding that arbitration decisions are reviewable only in very narrow circumstances).
See also Gail D. Cox, Innovation-Or Just Court Triage?, NAT'L U., Oct. 5, 1992, at
1 (discussing the court's acute interest in efficiency).
buy their way out of a "bad" judgment, while simultaneously trivializing
the work of trial courts.74
In creating such a strong presumption, the California Supreme Court
has given appellate courts permission to grant stipulated reversals with
only minimal scrutiny of the circumstances of the case. However, it re-
mains to be seen whether this will hasten or hinder judicial efficiency.
NANCY G. DRAGUTSKY
II. ARBITRATION
Subject to afew limited exceptions, an arbitral award is not
reviewable by the judiciary for either factual or legal errors,
even when the error appears on the face of the award and
causes substantial injustice: Moncharsh v. Helly & Blase.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,' the California Supreme Court decided
the circumstances in which a trial court may review an arbitrator's deci-
sion for errors.' Based on case law, the court determined that California
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2 and 1286.6 provide the only
grounds on which a trial court may review a private arbitration award.3
The court held that because these statutes do not provide for judicial
review of private arbitral awards based on errors of law or fact, an
arbitrator's decision is not reviewable for the type of error at issue.'
74. See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text. See also Bob Rossi, Appellate
Court Must Give Up Settled Case; First District Had Resisted Request For Stipulated
Reversal, THE RECORDER, Aug. 14, 1992, at 2.
1. 3 Cal. 4th 1, 832 P.2d 899, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion with Justices Paneili, Arabian, Baxter, and George concur-
ring. Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part in which Justice Mosk joined.
2. Id. at 6, 832 P.2d at 900, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184.
3. Id. at 33, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203. Section 1286.2 sets forth
the grounds for vacating an arbitral award. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982
& Supp. 1993). Section 1286.6 sets forth the grounds for correcting an arbitral award.
CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). [All further references to
code sections are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified].
4. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 33, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203.
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A. Background
The issues of arbitral finality and the availability of review of arbitral
awards have been the subject of much California case law for more than
one hundred years." The common-law rule prior to statutory enactment
was that while an arbitrator's decision was considered final, review was
permitted for gross errors of law or fact appearing on the face of the
award.' Shortly after the adoption of this common-law rule, the Civil
Practice Act of 1851, section 386, was enacted, which listed the grounds
for vacating an arbitral award. However, the Act failed to provide review
for gross error on the face of the award.7 For the next seventy years,
courts relied upon the common-law rule in their decisions, while merely
mentioning the statute in dicta.8
In the 1920's, arbitration became unpopular because disputants could
revoke their arbitration submissions prior to a final arbitration determi-
nation.' In 1927, section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which codi-
fied, verbatim, The Cure Practice Act of 1851, was renumbered as section
1288 and amended slightly in an attempt to encourage private arbitra-
tion." Since then, the courts have followed the statute, asserting that
5. Id. at 14-27, 832 P.2d at 906-15, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-99. See infra notes 6,
8, 11, and 13 for examples of cases dealing with judicial review of arbitrator's deci-
sions.
6. Id. at 14-16, 832 P.2d at 906-07, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-91 (citing Muldrow v.
Norris, 2 Cal. 74 (1852)). See also Tyson v. Wells, 2 Cal. 122, 131 (1852) (finding that
"the Court will not disturb the award of an arbitrator... unless the error... ap-
pears on the face of the award"), overruled by Cappe v. Brizzolara, 19 Cal. 607
(1862).
7. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 16, 832 P. 2d at 907-08, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92.
8. Id. at 16-18, 832 P.2d at 908-09, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192-93. For example, in
Peachy v. Ritchie, 4 Cal. 205 (1854), the court construed the statute narrowly and
decided to perpetuate the common-law rule. Id. at 16-17, 832 P.2d at 908, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 192. Cf. In re Connor, 128 Cal. 279, 282, 60 P. 862, 863 (1900) (upholding
an arbitral award, reasoning that no statutory ground for vacation was available). See
also Utah Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 160, 162 P. 631, 633 (1916),
overruled by, Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 27-28, where the court boldly proclaimed,
"[T]he code provisions are in aid of the common-law remedy of arbitration, a
reaffirmance thereof, and do not alter its principles," holding an arbitral award caus-
ing substantial injustice reviewable for errors on its face. Id. at 160-61, 162 P. at 633.
9. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 20, 832 P.2d at 910, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194.
Arbitration's unpopularity was partly due to the unenforceability of contractual arbi-
tration clauses. Id.
10. Id. at 20-21, 832 P.2d at 910-11, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95. Former § 1288 pro-
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the legislature intended to "adopt a comprehensive all-inclusive statutory
scheme applicable to all written agreements to arbitrate."" The statute
has since been renumbered as section 1286.2, but remains today substan-
tially the same as its predecessor." Modernly, many courts agree that
statutory grounds provide the only means by which an arbitral award
may be reviewed. A line of recent cases, however, uphold the common-
law rule.'"
vided in pertinent part,
In either of the following cases the .. . court. . . must make an order va-
cating the award, upon the application of any party... : (a) Where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. . . (b) where
there was corruption in the arbitrators. . . (c) Where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct... (d) where the arbitrators exceeded their pow-
ers ....
Id. See generally Eddy S. Feldman, Arbitration Law in California: Private Tribunals
For Private Government, 30 S. CAL L REv. 375, 471-90 (1957) (discussing former
§ 1288).
11. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 23, 832 P.2d at 912, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196 (quoting
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 182, 260 P.2d 156, 169 (1953)
(holding arbitral decisions reviewable only as provided by statute)). The Crofoot court
relied in part on Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 174 P.2d
441 (1946), where the supreme court refused to vacate an arbitral award where no
statutory ground applied. Pacific Vegetable, 29 Cal. 2d at 239-40, 174 P.2d at 448-49.
The fact that the Pacific Vegetable court made no mention of the common-law rule is
significant. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 22, 832 P.2d at 911, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195.
12. Section 1286.2 provides, in pertinent part
[T]he court shall vacate the award if... (a) The award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b) There was corruption in any of
the arbitrators; (c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by
misconduct of a neutral arbitrator, (d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers
and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the deci-
sion upon the controversy submitted; or (e) The rights of such party were
substantially prejudiced ....
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). For an in-depth analysis of
§ 1286.2, see 6 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1194 (1988 & Supp.
1992); 11 B. WrrKGN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Equity § 40 (1990 & Supp. 1992); 6
CAL JuR. 3D, Arbitration and Award §§ 65, 75, 76, 83-85 (1988 & Supp. 1992). CJ. 6
CJ.S. Arbitration § 154 (1975) (discussing guidelines on the reviewability of arbitral
awards for error). See generally Comment, Some Problems Relating To Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards Under the New California Arbitration Act, 9 UCLA L. REv. 422
(1962) (discussing developments in the statutory law regarding arbitration).
13. For cases upholding the statute exclusively, see Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 26,
832 P.2d at 914, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (citing Severtson v. Williams Constr. Co., 173
Cal. App. 3d 86, 220 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Guleserian, 28 Cal. App. 3d 397, 104 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1972)). For cases upholding the
common-law rule, see Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 27, 832 P.2d at 915, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 199 (citing Schneider v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1311, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 227 (1989); Abbott v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 68 Cal. App. 3d 763, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1977)).
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B. Statement of the Case
Moncharsh was hired as an attorney by the law firm of Heily & Blase
subject to an employment agreement that provided he would not cause
clients of the firm to terminate their relationship, and if such should hap-
pen, Moncharsh would be required to reimburse the firm." The agree-
ment also contained an arbitration clause providing that an arbitrator
would not have the power to change the terms of the agreement, with
any arbitrator's decision being final and binding on the parties. 6
Less than two years later, Moncharsh terminated his employment with
Heily & Blase. The senior partner of the firm notified Moncharsh's clients
that he would be representing them in Moncharsh's absence. 8 Six cli-
ents, however, decided to continue being represented by MoncharshY
As a result, the firm sought to enforce the provision providing for reim-
bursement, and Moncharsh offered to settle for a lesser amount.18 The
firm refused the offer and the parties submitted the dispute to an arbitra-
tor. Based on the briefs of both sides and two days of testimony, the arbitra-
tor decided that Moncharsh was bound by the terms of the agreement. 9
Moncharsh moved to have the award vacated on the ground that the
14. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 6, 832 P.2d at 900-01, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184-85. The
relevant provision in the employment agreement, paragraph X-C, provided in pertinent
part
Employee ... agrees not to do anything to ... cause or contribute to any
of firm's clients terminating the attorney-client relationship with firm .... In
the event that any firm client should terminate the attorney-client relationship
with firm... then, in addition to any costs which client owes firm up to
the time of such substitution, as to all fees which employee . . . may actu-
ally receive from that client or that client's successor attorney on any such
cases, Blase will receive eighty percent (80%) of said fee and employee ...
will receive twenty percent (2096) of said fee.
Id.
15. The arbitration clause read in part "Any dispute arising out of this Agreement
shall be subject to arbitration .... No arbitrator shall have any power to alter,
amend, modify or change any of the terms of this agreement. The decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and binding on [firm] and [employee] .... " Id. at 7 n.1, 832
P.2d at 901 n.1, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185 n.l.
16. Id. at 6, 832 P.2d at 901, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
17. Id, Moncharsh had represented five of the six clients prior to his employment
at Helty & Blase. The sixth client had retained Moncharsh shortly before Moncharsh
left the firm. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 6, 832 P.2d at 901, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
18. Id at 6-7, 832 P.2d at 901, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
19. Id. at 7-8, 832 P.2d at 901, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86.
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arbitrator erred. The trial court denied his petition because, under sec-
tion 1286.2, the claimed error was not a legitimate ground for vacation,
nor did the case fall under the common-law exception permitting review
for error appearing on the face of the award.' Moncharsh appealed the
trial court's decision. Both the court of appeal and the supreme court
affirmed.2
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Arbitral Finality
The California Supreme Court first acknowledged the general rule that
when parties agree to submit to arbitration, they are impliedly agreeing
that the decision of the arbitrator is final.' The court also recognized
'that public policy strongly favors arbitration because it saves the parties
time and the courts are relieved of some burdensome cases.' As suggest-
ed, the purpose of arbitration is to "put the dispute to rest".' The court
explained that parties who contractually agree to submit their disputes to
arbitration are presumed to know that the decision will be final and
binding.' The court believed that permitting judicial review of arbitral
decisions would deprive the parties of the advantages of the arbitration
process, especially the benefit of ending the dispute promptly.' The
court further reasoned that arbitrators possess the unique advantage of
basing their decisions on broad principles of equality and justice rather
than on formal legal principles.' Thus, arbitral awards are commonly
immune from judicial review.'
20. Id. at 8, 832 P.2d at 902, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
21. Id.
22. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 10, 832 P.2d at 903, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187. The
court further noted that, in this case, the arbitration clause in the agreement made
the implied agreement express. The clause served as even stronger evidence that the
parties intended to dispose of the dispute by arbitration. Id.
23. Id. at 9, 832 P.2d at 902, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186. The purpose of the policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration decisions is to encourage parties to resolve their
disputes privately. Id. at 9, 832 P.2d at 903, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 (citing Utah
Constr. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631 (1916)).
24. Id. at 10, 832 P.2d at 903, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 (citing Jonathan Yarowsky,
Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and
Finality, 23 UCLA L REV. 936, 948-49 (1976)).
25. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 9, 832 P.2d at 903, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187.
26. Id. at 10, 832 P.2d at 903, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 (citing Victoria v. Superior
Court, 40 Cal. 3d 734, 710 P.2d 833, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985)).
27. Id. at 10-11, 832 P.2d at 904, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188.
28. Id. at 11, 832 P.2d at 904, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188 (citing Case v. Alperson, 181
Cal. App. 2d 757, 5 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1960)).
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Although the court recognized that, despite its many benefits arbitra-
tion can result in a mistake, the court believed that the risk was rea-
sonably mitigated by the parties' acceptance of that risk when they con-
tracted to submit to arbitration. In addition, limited statutory grounds
exist for judicial review of an arbitration award.' Thus, the general rule
is that arbitral decisions are final and binding upon the parties.3 ' The
petitioner in the instant case unsuccessfully argued three exceptions to
this general rule.'
2. Errors on the Face of the Award
Moncharsh first contended that judicial vacation of an arbitral award is
permitted under common law where an error of law or fact appears on
the face of the award and where the error causes substantial injustice.'
Upon analyzing the case and statutory law in this area,' the court deter-
mined that recent decisions indicated a split of authority, with some
courts upholding the common-law rule and others upholding the
statutory grounds for review exclusively.' The court ultimately held that
the only bases for vacation of an arbitrator's decision are those listed in
section 1286.2.' The court commented on the fact that many decisions,
both in California and in other jurisdictions, follow this rule.' The court
further reasoned that because statutes in other states governing arbitra-
tion include error as a ground for review, the specific exclusion of such
a ground in California's statute reveals the intent of the legislature that
error not be a sufficient basis for vacation under section 1286.2.' In ad-
dition, the court observed that the Law Revision Commission, when con-
sidering the proposed adoption of section 1286.2, recommended that
29. Id
30. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 12, 832 P.2d at 905, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. See also
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2, 1286.6 (West 1990). See supra note 12 for the lan-
guage of §§ 1286.2 and 1286.6.
31. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 13, 832 P.2d at 905, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
32. Id at 13, 832 P.2d at 905-06, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189-90.
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
36. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 27-28, 832 P.2d at 915-16, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199-200.
37. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
38. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 25-26, 832 P.2d at 914, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198. For
example, the court observed that § 1296, a statute governing public construction con-
tract arbitration, allows for judicial review of errors of law. Id (citing CAL CIrv.
PROC. CODE § 1296 (West 1982 & 1992)).
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"'[e]ven a gross error or mistake in an arbitrator's judgment is not suffi-
cient grounds for vacation, unless the error amounts to actual or con-
structive fraud,'"' and that "'no good reason exists to codify into the
California statute the case law as it presently exists. '"' The court recog-
nized that while Moncharsh's assertion was consistent with the early
common-law rule, error was not one of the grounds specifically listed in
the statute."' Thus, the court concluded that error could not be a proper
basis for vacation of the award regardless of whether it is on the face of
the award or causes substantial injustice. 2
3. Scope of Arbitrator's Power
Moncharsh next argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers on the
ground that his decision was not properly based on legal principles.'
The court recognized that when an arbitrator exceeds his powers, such is
a ground for vacating an award under section 1286.2(d)." The court,
however, stressed that arbitrators who "merely... assign an erroneous
reason for their decision" have not exceeded their powers, and any hold-
ing to the contrary would, in effect, allow for judicial review of almost
every arbitration award.' Furthermore, the court asserted that statutory
law allows an arbitrator to resolve the entire merits of the matter submit-
ted, which is precisely what the arbitrator did in this case.' The court
concluded that since the arbitrator did not exceed his power, the award
was not reviewable. 7
39. Id. at 25 n.10, 832 P.2d at 913 n.10, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197 n.10 (quoting
Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration, 3 CAL L REVISION COMM'N
REP. G-65 (1961)).
40. Id. at 25, 832 P.2d at 914, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198 (quoting Recommendation
and Study Relating to Arbitration, 3 CAL L REVISION COMM'N REPORTS G-54 (1961)).
41. Id. at 26, 832 P.2d at 914, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198. The court viewed this ex-
clusion as intentional by the legislature, illustrating that only limited judicial review
was intended for private arbitration decisions. Id.
42. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 27-28, 832 P.2d at 915-16, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199-200.
43. Id. at 13, 832 P.2d at 906, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190. The court noted, however,
that Moncharsh failed to argue that the arbitrator went beyond the scope of the arbi-
tration clause; instead, Moncharsh contended that the arbitrator exceeded his standard
powers. Id. at 28, 832 P.2d at 916, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200.
44. Id. (citing CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(d) (West 1982 & 1992)). See also 6
CAL JUR. 3D Arbitration and Award § 80 (1988) (discussing when an arbitrator has
exceeded his or her powers and the consequences of such action under § 1286.2(d)).
45. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 28, 832 P.2d at 916, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200 (quoting
O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 48 Cal. 2d 107, 111, 308 P.2d 9, 12 (1957)).
46. Id. (citing CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2(d), 1286.6(b),(c) (West 1982 & Supp.
1992)).
47. Id.
1588
[Vol. 20: 1563, 1993] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
4. Illegality of the Contract Providing for Arbitration
Moncharsh argued finally that a vacation of the award was proper
because a material clause of the employment contract was illegal and
against public policy.' The court addressed this contention, noting that
Moncharsh's failure to object to arbitration, in itself, did not waive fur-
ther review of the issue.' The court next addressed Moncharsh's argu-
ment that the arbitral award should be reviewable simply on the illegality
of the employment agreement.' In distinguishing the authority cited by
Moncharsh, the court noted that the contracts in those cases were illegal
in their entirety, whereas Moncharsh had only alleged that one clause in
his contract was illegal.i Although the court recognized the possibility
of judicial review on such a ground, because of the strong public policy
favoring arbitration, the court concluded that review should occur in
only the most limited of circumstances.' The court held that this was
not such a circumstance and denied review on that ground.'
B. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Kennard concurred with the result of the majority's
opinion, she expressed strong disagreement with the court's analysis. She
based her criticism on what she saw as the court's misjudgment of its
charge to uphold justice over and above all legal principles." According
to Justice Kennard, to uphold justice was the initial and overriding duty
of the judiciary.m Accordingly, she reasoned that by applying the statute
48. Id. at 13, 832 P.2d at 906, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190.
49. Id. at 29-31, 832 P.2d at 916-18, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200-02.
50. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 31-32, 832 P.2d at 918-19, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-03
(citing Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 204 P.2d 23 (1949); All Points Trad-
ers, Inc. v. Barrington Assocs., 211 Cal. App. 3d 723, 259 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1989)).
Moncharsh relied on these cases because they allowed for judicial review of arbitra-
tion decisions involving contracts that were illegal. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 32, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203. For example, the court be-
lieved that review might be appropriate in cases where arbitral finality would lead to
a result contrary to a party's statutory rights. Id.
53. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 33, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203.
54. Id. at 34, 832 P.2d at 920, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
55. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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regardless of whether it resulted in substantial injustice, the court had
erred, and thus, misjudged its duty.'
Justice Kennard asserted that while parties who agree to arbitration
are "deemed to have accepted the increased risk of error," reasonable
contracting parties should never be expected to accept the risk of being
bound by a substantially unjust result.7 Justice Kennard sharply criti-
cized the court for equating substantial injustice with mistake.' She
agreed with the majority, however, that routine judicial review of arbitral
awards based on mere mistake would be contrary to the policy of arbi-
tration.' Nevertheless, she believed that substantial injustice was a prop-
er ground for judicial review.'
Next, Justice Kennard criticized the authority cited by the majority to
support its decision.6' She believed that the majority relied on "subtle
shifts" in the case law, rather than on the bulk of cases holding that
"courts will not knowingly perpetuate and enforce an arbitration award
that is substantially unjust."a Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the
majority misinterpreted the case law as narrowing the circumstances
which would allow review to a degree greater than the cases actually
required.'
56. Id. at 34-35, 832 P.2d at 920, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
57. Id. at 35, 832 P.2d at 920, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Kennard described the potential risk of being bound by a substan-
tially unjust result as "unnecessary and self-destructive." Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 35,
832 P.2d at 920, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
58. Id. at 35, 832 P.2d at 920-21, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204-05 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (only unjust judgments may be
vacated for error)).
59. Id (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
60. Id, at 35, 832 P.2d at 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
61. Id.. at 36, 832 P.2d at 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
62. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 36-37, 832 P.2d at 921-22, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205-06
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard implied that the court had
to search for authority to overrule the common-law principle allowing for judicial re-
view of substantially unjust arbitral awards. Id. at 37, 832 P.2d at 922, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 206 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). According to the dissent, the ma-
jority misplaced its reliance on Pacf'w Vegetable, a case that, in actuality, reaffirms
the cominon-law principle that arbitral awards are reviewable to prevent "'misuse of
the proceeding, where ... gross error, or mistake has been carried into the award
to the substantial prejudice of a party to the proceeding.'" Id (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (quoting Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d
228, 240, 174 P.2d 441, 449. (1946)).
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Lastly, Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the legislative intent behind section 1286.2." She did not believe that the
statute was intended to alter the common-law grounds for judicial review
of arbitration decisions.' Justice Kennard believed that the majority had
quoted from the Law Revision Commission out of context,' in that the
commission was not attempting to codify the judicial scope of review.'
Justice Kennard made clear that her concurrence with the majority's
result was grounded solely in her perceptionthat this case did not result
in substantial injustice.'
m. IMPACT
In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, the court ruled that, subject to a few
limited exceptions, arbitration awards are generally held to be final and
binding on the parties and the only grounds for judicial review are set
forth in sections 1286.2 and 1286.6 of the California Civil Procedure
Code.' In so holding, the court reconciled a growing split in judicial
authority. The court effectively overruled the use of a long-standing com-
mon-law rule, and mandated exclusive use of the statute.
This decision affords arbitrators significantly more power to render
decisions grounded solely on general principles of justice with little if
any reliance on legal principles. While on the one hand this departure
64. Id. at 38, 832 P.2d at 922-23, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206-07 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
65. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 38, 832 P.2d at 922-23, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206-07
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Justice Kennard claimed that the
quote used by the majority was not a part of the commission's recommendations on
judicial review, but instead, was derived from another area of the recommendations.
Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 38, 832 P.2d at 923, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
67..
'Nothing in the California statute defines the permissible scope of review by
the courts .... Neither the Uniform Arbitration Act nor other state statutes
attempt to express the exact limits of court review of arbitration awards.
And no good reason exists to codify into the California statute the case law
as it presently exists.'
Id, (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Recommendation and Study Relat-
ing to Arbitration, 3 CAL L REVISION COmm'N REPorms G-53-G-54 (1961)).
68. Id at 40, 832 P.2d at 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
69. Id. at 33, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203.
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from traditional legal analysis might provide an added incentive for con-
tracting parties to employ an arbitration clause, this increased power to
render a decision fraught with legal errors might result in some abuse by
arbitrators. Nevertheless, this case serves to clarify the law regarding
judicial review of arbitration decisions, and thus, eliminates much of the
uncertainty in this area.
NANCY G. DRAGUTSKY
HLI. CVIL PROCEDURE
A. Expert witness fees awarded under subdivision (c) of
section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitute non-
routine fees that are not automatically stayed on appeal,
absent an appeal bond or other undertaking: Bank of San
Pedro v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme
Court determined the effect of a party's appeal on expert witness fees
awarded under section 998(c).' The court concluded that when expert
1. 3 Cal. 4th 797, 838 P.2d 218, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1992). In Bank of San
Pedro, Wallace A. Goodstein brought suit against the Bank of San Pedro ("Bank"). Id,
at 799, 838 P.2d at 219, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697. The Bank offered to settle and
Goodstein rejected the offer. Id. The trial court granted a nonsuit against Goodsteim
Id. Consequently, the Bank sought costs and fees pursuant to section 998 of the
Code of Civil Procedure [all further references to code sections are to the Code of
Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated]. Id. The trial court ultimately awarded the
Bank $116,184.05 in expert witness fees and $22,237.62 in other costs on the ground
that the trial's outcome was less favorable to Goodstein than the settlement offer he
had previously rejected. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th 799, 838 P.2d at 219, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 697.
Goodstein appealed the award, but failed to file a bond or arrange for any
payment of the award. Id. The Bank sought to recover the expert witness fees and
Goodstein refused, believing that the judgment was automatically stayed while his
appeal was pending. Id. The trial court refused to order collection of the fees and
costs and the court of appeal subsequently granted a writ of mandamus fied by the
Bank. Id. The court of appeal declared that the expert witness fees were extraordi-
nary, and thus, not automatically stayed on appeal under section 998. Id. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court affirmed. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th 799, 838 P.2d at 219, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
2. Id. at 804-05, 838 P.2d at 223, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701. Section 998(c) requires.
that a plaintiff pay the costs incurred by the defendant when a reasonable settlement
offer is rejected and a more favorable judgment is not obtained. CAL Civ. PRoc.
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witness fees are awarded under section 998(c), they are considered non-
routine and are therefore not automatically stayed upon the filing of an
appeal.'
I. ANALYSIS
The court articulated several reasons why the execution of section
998(c) costs are not automatically stayed upon the filing of an appeal.!
The court first determined that the section 998(c) expert witness fees
awarded by the trial court were of a non-routine nature.6 A losing party
as well as a prevailing party may recover costs when a prior settlement
offer ultimately proves higher than the judgment.' Such costs, however,
are not considered routine. In addition, because the award of expert
witness fees is completely within the discretion of the trial court, they
can be distinguished from routine costs which are awarded as a matter
of right!
The court looked to the legislature's intent in affirming the court of
appeal's rationale.8 The supreme court reasoned that because expert
CODE § 998(c) (West 1980).
3. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 804-05, 838 P.2d at 222-23, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 700-01.
4. Id. at 803, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. Section 917.1 states that
an appeal will not stay the enforcement of a judgment that directs the payment of
money. CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 917.1 (West 1980). Practically all judgments, however,
involve the payment of money, therefore, the court looked to whether the judgment
at issue was for routine costs before determining whether the execution of such
costs should be stayed. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 801, 838 P.2d at 220-21, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698-99. See also Vadas v. Sosnowsld, 210 Cal. App. 3d 471, 474, 258
Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1989) (holding that a judgment for costs alone is not a judgment
directing the payment of money and may properly be stayed); Chamberlain v. Dale's
R.V. Rentals, Inc., 188 Cal. App. 3d 356, 362, 232 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1986) (setting
forth the principle for distinguishing routine costs from nonroutine costs).
5. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 803, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700.
6. Id. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b), routine costs may not
be awarded to a losing party. Id. Section 1032(b) states in relevant part that
"[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as
a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." CAL CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1032(b) (West 1980). See generally 3 B. WrTHIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions
§ 286 (3d. ed. 1985) (right to recover attorney fees and costs); 16 CAL JuR. 3D Costs
§ 62 (1983) (right to recover witness fees); 6 CAL PRACTICE Costs and Attorneys'
Fees §§ 52:2-6 (1980) (factors affecting recovery of costs); 20 AM. Jun. 2D Costs
§ 4-25 (1965) (discussing an individual's right to recover costs).
7. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 803, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700.
See supra text accompanying note 5.
8. Id. at 804, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. It was necessary for the
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witness fees awarded under section 998(c) direct the payment of money,
such fees fall within the purview of section 917.1(a),9 and thus, are not
automatically stayed upon the filing of an appeal.'0 The court concluded
that the legislature's intended policy of encouraging settlement was satis-
fied by holding that expert witness fees are not automatically stayed
pending an appeal.1' To permit a party to stay the execution of such
fees by filing an appeal, the underlying policy of encouraging settlements
by awarding the costs of an opposing party's expert witness would be frus-
trated.12
Ill. CONCLUSION
In holding that expert witness fees awarded under section 998(c) are
nonroutine fees which are not automatically stayed on appeal, the court
has effectively encouraged litigants to accept settlement offers." The re-
quirement of an appeal bond or other undertaldng serves to further rein-
force the potential penalty a party may face should they decide to de-
cline a settlement offer.1
4
KIMBERLY WOSICKI DAVIS
court to look to the legislative intent behind the enactment of the relevant statutes
because the issue addressed relied solely on statutory law, not common law princi-
ples. Id. at 800, 838 P.2d at 219, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
9. Section 917.1(a) states in relevant part:
The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or
order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for money or directs the
payment of money, whether consisting of a special fund or not, and whether
payable by the appellant or another party to the action, unless an undertak-
ing is given.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.1(a) (West Supp. 1993). See generally 9 B. WITIN, CALIFOR-
NIA PROCEDURE Appeal §§ 205-07 (3d ed. 1985) (defining automatic stay of judgment); 8
CAL PRACTICE Costs § 61:372 (i968) (discussing right to costs on appeal).
10. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 800, 838 P.2d at 219, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
A literal reading of section 917.1 could lead to the inclusion of practically all judg-
ments, thereby abolishing the existence of an automatic stay for any judgment based
on the filing of an appeal. Id. The court however, determined the critical factor to
be whether the costs in question were routine, because only nonroutine costs require
an appeal bond or other undertaking in order to stay execution. Id.
11. Id. at 804, 838 P.2d at 222-23, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700-01.
12. Id. at 804, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700.
13. Id. at 803, 838 P.2d at 222, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. See supra note 7.
14. Bank of San Pedro, 3 Cal. 4th at 805, 838 P.2d at 223, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701.
An undertaking is defined as a "promise or security in any form." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 794 (Abr. 5th ed. 1983).
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B. Parents who knowingly and voluntarily plead ' no contest" to
allegations under section 300(e) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code waive their right to appeal the appli-
cability of the section to their conduct: In re Troy Z.
I. INTRODUCTION
In re Troy Z.,' presented the California Supreme Court with the ques-
tion of whether parents entering a "no contest" plea to a petition which
alleged that their child came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
due to their conduct may appeal on the ground that their conduct does
not constitute the required neglect.2 The supreme court held that parents
1. 3 Cal. 4th 1170, 840 P.2d 266, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 724 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion. Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurred.
2. Id. at 1172, 840 P.2d at 267, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
In 1989, the defendants' son, Troy, was admitted to a hospital. Physicians con-
cluded that he was suffering from emaciation caused by starvation, and that such
starvation would continue if the child was sent home with his parents. The hospital
placed a protective hold on Troy and contacted the police and the San Diego County
Department of Social Services [hereinafter DSS]. The DSS filed a petition to have
Troy declared a dependent of the court Id. at 1174, 840 P.2d at 268, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 726.
In order to determine whether Troy's parents' conduct fell within § 300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, the court held a jurisdictional hearing at which both
parents entered pleas of "no contest." Id. Having established that these pleas were
made knowingly and voluntarily, the court. concluded that it had jurisdiction. Id. Sub-
sequently, at a disposition hearing for the purposes of determining whether Troy
should be reunified with his parents, the court denied reunification. In re Troy Z., 3
Cal. 4th at 1174, 840 P.2d at 268, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
Both of Troy's parents filed motions to withdraw their "no contest" pleas, claim-
ing that they misunderstood the meaning of the section. Id. However, the court found
no mistake of law and denied the defendants' motions because counsel revealed that
their pleas were tactical decisions entered into only after extensive discussion of the
consequences. Id, at 1178, 840 P.2d at 271, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
At the subsequent selection and implementation hearing, the court found that
adoption would be in Troy's best interest. Id. at 1179, 840 P.2d at 271, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 729. Accordingly, all parental rights were terminated and Troy was referred to
the DSS for permanent adoption.
Both parents appealed, alleging that the § 300(e) finding was erroneous and that
insufficient evidence was presented to support the termination order. The court of
appeal concluded that starvation did not constitute "severe physical abuse" under
§ 300(e), and reversed in part the jurisdictional finding below. Id. at 1179, 840 P.2d
at 271, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729-30. In addition, the court of appeal reinstated the
parental rights of the defendants, and remanded the case to the trial court with
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who knowingly and voluntarily plead "no contest" to allegations under
section 300(e) of the Welfare and Institutions Code waive their right to
appeal the applicability of the section to their conduct.'
II. ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the
well-established rule4 that in a criminal proceeding, a defendant may not
appeal the issue of guilt after having plead either "nolo contendere" or
"guilty."5 The court stated that the same rule applies in the event of a
"no contest" or "nolo contendere" plea.
The court extended this rule to the case at hand, finding that in a juve-
nile proceeding a "no contest" plea is an admission and is equivalent to
instructions to offer reunification services. In re Troy Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1179, 840 P.2d
271-72, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
3. Id. at 1181, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. Section 300(e) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code states that "[ainy minor.., is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court . . . [if the minor) has suffered severe physical abuse by a par-
ent . . . . '[Slevere physical abuse' means ... the willful, prolonged failure to pro-
vide adequate food." CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(e) (West 1984 & Supp. 1993)
[hereinafter section 300(e)].
See generally 9 B. WmUN, CA LFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 143 (3d ed. 1985);
32 CAL JuR. 3D, Family Law §§ 177-80 (1977) (custody, protection, and welfare of
minors); 32 CAL JUR. 3D, Family Law § 210 (1977) (cruel treatment and neglect by
parents); 10 B. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child §§ 3, 156-7
(9th ed. 1989) (neglected and abused children and parental authority); 10 B. WrrKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 182, 188-90 (9th ed. 1989) (depen-
dency proceedings, cruelty, and neglect).
4. In re Troy Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1179-80, 840 P.2d at 272, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
5. Id. In People v. Pinon, 96 Cal. App. 3d 904, 158 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979), the
defendant entered a plea of guilty to violating the statute that prohibits possession of
a firearm by anyone who has been convicted of a felony. Id. at 907, 158 Cal. Rptr.
at 427. The defendant appealed, claiming that he was convicted only of a misdemean-
or and not the required felony. The court of appeal stated that "these issues may not
be raised on appeal: since they go to the question of guilt or innocence, they have
been 'removed from consideration' by the guilty plea." Id. at 909-10, 158 Cal. Rptr. at
428. The Pinon court went on to say that a defendant's guilty plea operates "to
remove such issues from consideration as a plea of guilty admits all matters essential
to the conviction." Id. at 910, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (citing People v. DeVaughn, 18
Cal. 3d 889, 895-96, 558 P.2d 872, 875, 135 Cal. Rptr. 786, 789 (1977)).
See generally 6 B. WmuN & N. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Appeal
§ 3141 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that a judgment of conviction on a plea is ordinarily
not appealable).
6. In re Troy Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1181, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. See
People v. Shults, 151 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718-19, 199 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35-36 (1984) (stating
that a plea of nolo contendere admits the evidence before the court and an appeal
cannot subsequently be filed contesting the sufficiency of that evidence).
7. 10 B. WrIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child § 686 (9th ed.
1989 & Supp. 1993) (stating that a plea of no contest is an admission of the allega-
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a plea of "guilty" or "nolo contendere" in a criminal proceeding.8 Upon
review of the record, the court found that the parents had knowingly and
voluntarily entered a plea of "no contest" and consequently had admitted
all the elements required for application of the statute.' In light of the
plea entered by the defendants, the court found that the defendants had
effectively waived their right to an appeal of the applicability of the stat-
ute to their conduct."
H. CONCLUSION
In denying parents the right to appeal the applicability of section
300(e) once a plea of "no contest" has been knowingly and voluntarily
entered, the court has promoted the legislative intent of expediting the
adoption of children who will not benefit from reunification with their
natural parents." In addition, the court's holding extends to the juvenile
courts, the criminal law principle that a guilty or no contest plea waives
the right to file an appeal based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
In either context, the court's holding equates a plea of "nolo contende-
re" or "no contest" to an admission of guilt. As a practical matter, the
holding of the court may actually create a chilling effect by dissuading
parents from entering pleas of "no contest" as a tactical move. Although
ions).
8. In re Troy Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1181, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. The
court specified that a plea of "no contest" during a jurisdictional hearing admits all
matters required for the court to exercise jurisdiction. Id.
9. Id. In order to determine whether the pleas were made "voluntarily and know-
ingly," the court inquired whether counsel had explained the consequences of such a
plea to their respective clients and both answered affirmatively. The court then asked
the parents if they understood the consequences of their pleas and they both an-
swered affirmatively. Id. at 1176, 840 P.2d at 269, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727. See gener-
agly 9 B. WmuN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDUmE, Appeal § 143 (3d ed. 1985) (stating that
judgment entered with consent of defendant cannot be appealed); 10 B. WinN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child § 686 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993)
(stating that a no contest plea admits allegations of the petition).
10. In re Troy Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1181, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731.
11. Id. at 1182, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 273. See Adoption of Alexan-
der S., 44 Cal. 3d 857, 750 P.2d 778, 245 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
12. In re 7-ton Z., 3 Cal. 4th at 1181, 840 P.2d at 273, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. See
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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such pleas may prove advantageous in the parents' subsequent criminal
case, the court's current holding attaches a price: the loss of the right to
deny culpability and the attendant risk of losing one's child.
KIMBERLY WosICKI DAVIS
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Section 57103 of the California Government Code, which
limits the right to vote on issues of municipal reorganization
to residents within the area to be reorganized, does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Forma-
tion.
I. INMODUCTION
In Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation' the California
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether section 57103 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code2, which denies county residents the right to
vote on municipal incorporation unless they are residents of the area to
be incorporated," violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 The court held that sec-
1. 3 Cal. 4th 903, 838 P.2d 1198, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (1992). Justice Mosk deliv-
ered the unanimous opinion of the court. Id. at 906, 838 P.2d at 1199, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 246. Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurred. Id. at 925, 838 P.2d at 1212, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259.
2. Section 57103 states in pertinent part- "any resolution ordering a change of
organization or reorganization subject to confirmation of the voters, the conducting
authority shall call an election: (a) Within the territory of each city or district or-
dered to be incorporated . . . ." CAL Govr CODE. § 57103 (West Supp. 1993).
[Hereinafter all statutory references are to the California Government Code].
3. "Incorporation" is defined in the California Government Code as "the incorpora-
tion, formation, creation, and establishment of a city with corporate powers." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 56043 (West Supp. 1993). See generally 45 CAL. JuR. 3D Municipalities
§ 2 (1978) (defining municipal corporation, such as an incorporated city, as a speci-
fied region created by government for a public purpose).
4. For an overview of voting restrictions effecting incorporation elections, see
generally 7 B. WrrUN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 229 (9th
ed. 1988) (discussing classifications of voters for elections concerning incorporation of
a city or annexation).
5. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 906-07, 838 P.2d at 1199, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 24647. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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tion 57103 was constitutional because it bore a fair relationship to a
legitimate government purpose.'
The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."7 Al-
though the Equal Protection Clause does not expressly confer a right to
vote, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as establishing a
fundamental right to vote.' Therefore, the restriction on the right to vote
present in section 57103 raises equal protection issues.'
In 1986, residents of Citrus Heights seeking municipal incorporation
petitioned the Sacramento County Agency Formation Commission (here-
inafter the Commission). ° In accordance with section 57103, the Com-
mission ordered a confirming election to be held only within the pro-
posed city's territory." The plaintiffs" filed a complaint alleging that
the statute deprived them of their right to vote on the incorporation is-
sue, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.'3 The trial court
found the limitation on voting rights constitutional.'4 The court of ap-
peal disagreed and declared section 57103 unconstitutional." After re-
6. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 923, 838 P. 2d at 1211, 13 Cal. Rptr. at
258.
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 913, 838 P.2d at 1204, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
251 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 907-08, 838 P.2d at 1200, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
11. Id. at 908, 838 P.2d at 1200, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-48. See supra note 2 for
statutory tex1L
12. The plaintiffs included the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, the Sacra-
mento County Deputy Sheriffs' Association, and other county sponsored organizations.
Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 908, 838 P.2d at 1200, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
13. Id. at 908, 838 P.2d at 1200-01, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-48. See also, Ethan B.
Lipsig, Comment, Annexation Elections and the Right to Vote, 20 UCLA L REv. 1093,
1113 n.96 (1973) (stating "When tax rates, service levels, and traffic patterns may
change in the city, the territory, or the county, . . . those living on the land to be
annexed are not the only individuals who have a substantial stake in the outcome of
the election."); Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L REV.
1571, 1578-79 (1975)(asserting that residents of an annexing city, as well as the group
to be annexed, care about the welfare of their area, and therefore, forbidding either
region an election would appear invalid).
14. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 908, 838 P.2d at 1202, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
248.
15. Id. at 908-09, 838 P.2d at 1201, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. The court of appeal
determined that the potential voters had a significant interest in the incorporation,
and therefore, disenfranchisement of the voters was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at
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view, the California Supreme Court held that section 57103 was a ratio-
nal means of achieving a legitimate state purpose, and therefore, did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."
II. TREATMENT
In determining the constitutionality of section 57103, the court first
addressed the issue of whether to apply the strict scrutiny or rational
basis standard of review.'" The court noted that, in general, regulations
impairing the fundamental right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny re-
view." In this case, however, the court determined that the rational ba-
sis test should apply." The court reasoned that because a state has wide
discretion in boundary modification, the method of municipal incorpora-
tion used justified a finding that "city and noncity residents possessed genu-
inely different relevant interests." ' Further, the court noted that the
United States Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to review a
similar statute.' Therefore, the court concluded that the rational basis
909, 838 P.2d at 1201, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248.
16. Id. at 923-24, 838 P.2d at 1211, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258.
17. Id. at 913, 838 P.2d at 1204, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251. The strict scrutiny test
requires that the "classification bears a close relation to the promoting of a compel-
ling state interest, the classification is necessary to achieve the government's goal,
and the classification is narrowly drawn to achieve the goal by the least restrictive
means possible." Id.
In contrast, the rational basis test is a lower standard necessitating only a classi-
fication "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. (quoting
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
.18. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 913, 838 P.2d at 1204, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
251. See generally California Supreme Court Survey, Citizens Against Forced Annex-
ation v. Local Agency Formation Comm.; Fu//erton Join Union High School District
v. State Board of Education, 11 PEPP. L REv. 187, 212 (1983) (reviewing the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's affirmation that franchise restrictions affecting annexation are
subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review).
19. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 917, 838 P.2d at 1206, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
The court concluded that section 57103 "touches on the right to vote," but is "insuffi-
ciently implicated" to require strict scrutiny. Id. But see Curtis v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 955, 501 P.2d 537, 546, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1972) (holding
that classifications affecting voting rights are subject to a strict standard).
20. Id. at 916, 838 P.2d at 1206, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253. The court cited Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907), where the Supreme Court declared that "the
state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitu-
tion, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States." See also The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, supra note 13,
at 1579-81 (discussing courts' willingness to find annexation laws valid under a ratio-
nal basis test after Hunter).
21. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 916, 838 P.2d at 1206, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
253 (citing Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977)). In
Lockport, a statute required separate mojorities of both city and noncity residents to
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standard of review should be applied."
The court then examined Whether section 57103 satisfied rational basis
scrutiny.' The court found that the statute promoted a legitimate public
purpose' by limiting the election to those residents of the area seeking
to incorporate.n Therefore, the court held that section 57103 did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.'
III. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held that section 57103 of the California
Government Code does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because
it bears a rational basis to a legitimate public purpose.' The court ap-
plied the rational basis standard of review, thereby setting a low stan-
dard for a state to justify denying county residents outside the incorpo-
ration area the right to vote in local municipal incorporation elections.
vote in an election to approve a new county charter. Lockport, 430 U.S. at 261-62. A
group of county voters claimed they were being denied equal representation. Id, at
263. The Supreme Court concluded that the classification did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 272-73.
22. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 917, 838 P.2d at 1206, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
253. In addition, the court concluded that its plurality opinion in Fullerton Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of Education, 32 Cal. 3d 779, 654 P.2d 168,
187 Cal. Rptr. 398)(1982)(plurality opinion) lacked authority as precedent. Board of
Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 918, 838 P.2d at 1207, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254. In Fullerton,
the court applied the strict scrutiny test to an education board's decision to hold an
election only within an area attempting to break away from the county school dis-
trict. Fullerton, 32 Cal. 3d at 803, 654 P.2d at 184, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The court
concluded that excluding county residents was unconstitutional because no compelling
state interest existed. Id. at 806, 654 P.2d at 186-87, 187 Cal. 7 Rptr. at 416-17.
23. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th. at 923, 838 P.2d at 1211, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
The court indicated that the statute must have a "fair relationship to a legitimate
public purpose." Id.
24. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 56001 (West Supp. 1993) (finding the state's purpose in
enacting the statute is "to encourage orderly growth and development which are
essential to the social, fiscal, and economic well-being of the state").
25. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. 4th at 923, 838 P.2d at 1211, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
258.
26. Id at 924, 838 P.2d at 1211, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258.
27. Id. at 923, 838 P.2d at 1210, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
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As a result, county residents outside the incorporation area cannot cast
an opposing vote to an incorporation, but instead, must persuade city
residents to do so for them.
KIMBERLY J. HERMAN
V. CONTRACT LAW
When experienced business parties place a choice-of-law
provision in their contract, the chosen law applies to all
contractual claims that arise, as well as any noncontractual
causes of action that stem from the underlying contract:
Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
California courts have generally followed the Second Restatement
approach to conflict of laws problems when adjudicating disputes arising
from contractual relationships.' In Nediloyd- Lines B.V. v. Superior
Court,2 the issue before the California Supreme Court was whether a
choice-of-law provision in a contract between sophisticated multi-nation-
al parties should be enforced, and if so, whether the provision should
also apply to a related noncontractual cause of action.' The supreme
1. 1 B. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Contracts § 40 (9th ed. 1987) (not-
ing that California has adopted the Second Restatement approach). California courts
generally defer to the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws when reviewing freely
negotiated choice-of-law clauses contained within parties' contracts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Compare Harold W. Horowitz, The Law
of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L REv. 719, 758-79 (1974)
(describing the procedural analysis employed in California under the Second Restate-
ment) with Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law in California-A ' Prestatement," 21
UCLA L REV. 781, 784-93 (1974) (viewing the approach employed by California courts
as merely inchoate specific rules and not general principles).
2. 3 Cal. 4th 459, 834 P.2d 1148, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330 (1992). Justice Baxter
authored the court's opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian and
George concurring. Justice Panelli wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which
Justice Mosk joined. Id. at 472-74, 834 P.2d at 1156-57, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338-39
(Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote a separate concurring
and dissenting opinion. Id. at 474-94, 834 P.2d 1157-71, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-53
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
3. Id. at 462, 834 P.2d at 1149, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331. The court noted that the
issue of the enforceability of a choice-of-law clause was one of first impression. Id.
at 464, 834 P.2d at 1150, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. See generally John Prebble, Choice
of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of English
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court held that freely negotiated choice-of-law clauses are enforceable
pursuant to the approach discussed in section 187 of the Restatement
Second of Conflict of Laws.! Upon reaching this conclusion, the majority
did not hesitate to extend the applicability of the choice-of-law clause to
a related noncontractual cause of action.5
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendants, Nediloyd Lines B.V., entered into a shareholders'
agreement with the Plaintiff, Seawinds Limited,7 to purchase Seawinds
stock.' The stated purpose of the agreement was to establish a joint ven-
ture company to engage in the trans-oceanic shipping business."
Seawinds subsequently sued Nediloyd, alleging three causes of action
based on the shareholders' agreement." Nediloyd demurred, arguing
and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L REv. 433, 436-40
(1973) (providing a thorough history of conflict of laws and choice of law rules).
4. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 464-65, 834 P.2d at 1150-51, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332-33.
5. Id. at 468-69, 834 P.2d at 113-54, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335-36. The court rea-
soned that the parties should have expected Hong Kong law to apply to all causes of
action "arising from or related to their contract" after they explicitly provided that
the agreement "shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Hong Kong
law." Id. See a/so CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (West 1985) (deriving the intention of the
parties from the written contract if at all possible); CAL CIV. CODE § 3513 (West
1970) (allowing for the waiver of a privilege or advantage of a law).
6. Defendants [hereinafter "Nedlloyd"] consisted of several interrelated shipping
companies, an Oregon corporation, a Hong Kong corporation, a British corporation,
and several California residents. NedUoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 462, 834 P.2d at 1149, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 331.
7. Plaintiff, Seawinds Limited, [hereinafter "Seawinds"] a shipping company in-
corporated in Hong Kong, was undergoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization at
the time this case was litigated. Id,
8. Id.
9. The shareholders' agreement obligated the parties to use "means reasonably
available" to ensure the success of the business. Id. at 463, 834 P.2d at 1150, 11-Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 332. The agreement also contained a choice-of-law/choice-of-forum clause
which stated, "This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with Hong Kong law and each party hereby irrevocably submits to the non-exclusive
jurisdiction and service of process of the Hong Kong courts." Id. at 475, 834 P.2d at
1158, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 463, 834 P.2d at 1150, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. In its
original complaint, Seawinds claimed. (1)' breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 475, 834 P.2d
at 1158, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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that under Hong Kong law, the complaint failed to state a cause of ac-
tion.1 The trial court applied California law and sustained Nedloyd's de-
murrer with leave to amend all three claims.
Nedlloyd petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandate, directing
that Hong Kong law be applied, but the petition was denied." The court
of appeal reasoned that Hong Kong had no substantial relationship with
the litigation." Seawinds filed an amended complaint, and the trial court
again overruled Nedlloyd's demurrer and applied California law to all
causes of action.5 Nediloyd petitioned for a writ of mandate which the
court of appeal summarily denied."
The California Supreme Court granted review, limited to determining
the enforceability of a choice-of-law provision.7 The court reversed and
remanded with instructions to the court of appeal to issue a peremptory
writ directing the trial court to apply Hong Kong law and reconsider its
ruling on Nedloyd's demurrer to Seawinds' amended complaint. 8
I. TREATmENT
A. Justice Baxter's Majority Opinion
Justice Baxter, writing for the court, began by outlining the proper test
for analyzing choice-of-law provisions." The court recognized that, un-
der the Second Restatement, parties to a contract are generally able to
specify the terms of their contract, including both the applicable law and
forum for any disputes that may arise.' Section 187 of the Restatement
11. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
12. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
13. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. App. 4th 299, 277 Cal. Rptr. 822
(1991), revVd, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 834 P.2d 1148, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330 (1992).
14. Id. at 307, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
15. NedUoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 476, 834 P.2d at 1159, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
16. Nedloyd, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 303 n.2, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 824 n.2.
17. Nediloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 464, 834 P.2d at 1150, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332.
18. Id. at 471-72, 834 P.2d at 1156, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
19. Id. at 464-66 834 P.2d at 1150-52, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332-34. Despite the appar-
ent novelty of the choice-of-law issue, the court analogized the requisite analysis to
that invoked in cases involving the enforceability of choice-of-forum provisions. Id at
464, 834 P.2d at 1150-51, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332-33.
20. Id. at 464-65, 834 P.2d at.1151, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. See Mencor Enter., Inc.
v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 435, 235 Cal. Rptr. 464, 466 (1987)
(reaffirming the general rule that contracting parties may choose the specific law gov-
erning their contract in advance, and California courts will respect such choice pro-
vided enforcement does not result in an evasion of public policy or California law).
See generaUy 12 CAL JuR. 3D Conjict of Laws §§ 69, 75 (1974 & Supp. 1992) (ex-
plaining that contracting parties may expressly specify the law governing their con-
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Second of Conflict of Laws' provides that "[tlhe law of the state chosen
by the parties to govern their contractual ights and duties will be ap-
plied." ' Lower California courts have consistently embraced the Re-
statement approach when reviewing choice-of-law issues.'
tract and such choice will be respected subject to a few limitations; EUGENE F.
SCOLES & IarER HAY, CoNFucr OF LAWS § 18.1 (1982) (defining party autonomy as
allowing parties to select the law that will govern their contracts).
21. All further section references are to the Restatement Second of Conflict of
Laws.
22. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Section 187 pro-
vides in fulk
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractu-
al rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the
parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement direct-
ed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractu-
al rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which
the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agree-
ment directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice,
or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under
the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of
an effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is
to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
Id.
23. Nedoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 464, 834 P.2d at 1151, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333 (citing
Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 495-96, 551 P.2d
1206, 1208-09, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376-78. (1976) (finding no public policy reason to
deny enforcement of a freely negotiated choice-of-forum provision)). See S.A. Empresa
De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1981)
(indicating that California should apply the- law selected by the contracting parties
uness either the chosen state's law has no substantial relationship to the parties or
transaction, or application of such law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of
the state.) Accord RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 187 cmts. f & g
(1971). See idso Beck v. American Health Group Int'l, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 3d 1555,
1561-62, 260 Cal. Rptr. 237, 241-42 (1989) (finding objective intent of parties, evi-
denced by their explicit words, as paramount to an analysis of their subjective intent
when determining whether a contract is reasonably susceptible to a construction that
satisfies a cause of action for breach); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aiknman Corp.,
25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 995 n.6, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353 n.6 (1972) (noting that
choice-of-law provisions are usually honored by California courts). See generally 12
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Next, the court applied section 187(2) to determine whether the cho-
sen jurisdiction, Hong Kong, had a substantial relationship to the parties
or their transaction or whether the parties had a reasonable basis for
choosing Hong Kong law.' In so doing, the court addressed each of
Seawinds' causes of action.' As for the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, Justice Baxter found that Hong Kong possessed a sub-
stantial relationship to the parties and presented no apparent conflict
with any fundamental California policy.'
However, the fiduciary duty cause of action presented a more difficult
question.' Justice Baxter declined to accept Nedlloyd's argument that
CAL. JuR. 3D §§ 69-76 (1974 & Supp. 1992) (detailing the policy considerations under
the Second Restatement approach).
24. NedUoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 466, 834 P.2d at 1152, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334. The
court noted that should either question be met, the next step is to determine wheth-
er a fundamental conflict exists with California policy. Id. In other words, if Califor-
nia possessed a substantially greater interest than Hong Kong in the parties or their
transaction, California would not recognize the chosen law. Id. See generally EUGENE
F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18.8, 18.9 (1982) (summarizing the
Second Restatement approach and the public policy reasons behind this second step).
25. Ned oyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 467-68, 834 P.2d at 1152-53, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334-35.
The court summarily dismissed the breach of contract claim on the ground that the
court granted review on the limited issue of the appropriateness of applying Hong
Kong law when ruling on the demurrers. Id. at 467, 834 P.2d at 1152, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 334.
26. Id. at 467, 834 P.2d at 1153, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335. The court reasoned that
Seawinds was incorporated under Hong Kong law and maintained a registered office
there, thus connecting the parties to the chosen forum's law. Id. at 467, 834 P.2d at
1153, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335. The court viewed the covenant as an implied promise,
placed in the contract to ensure fulfillment of the parties' intentions. Id. (citing Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 689-90, 765 P.2d 373, 393-94, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 231-32 (1988) (explaining that when courts enforce implied covenants, they
protect the parties' mutual interest in having promises performed)).
27. Justice Panelli, joined by Justice Mosk, noted that Seawinds' breach of fiducia-
ry duty claim was predominately noncontractual in nature, and thus, concluded that
this cause of action was outside the scope of the choice-of-law clause in the con-
tract. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 472, 834 P.2d at 1156, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338 (Panelli,
J., concurring and dissenting). Both Justice Kennard and the court of appeal acknowl-
edged the significant differences in Hong Kong and California law. Id. at 476, 834
P.2d at 1159-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341-42 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Under Hong Kong law shareholders owe no apparent fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion, whereas under California law, a controlling or majority shareholder owes a
fiduciary duty to both the corporation and other shareholders. Id. at 476, 834 P.2d at
1159, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Jones
v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108-11, 460 P.2d 464, 471-74, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 599-602 (1969) (reaffirming the established rule that majority shareholders owe a
fiduciary duty to both minority shareholders and to the corporation); see generally 9
B. WrIMN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAw, Corporations §§ 189, 240 (9th ed. 1989)
(discussing the general fiduciary duties imposed on controlling and majority share-
holders).
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Seawinds' fiduciary duty claim was outside the scope of the
choice-of-law clause in the shareholders' agreement.' Instead, the court
determined that any fiduciary duties that Nedlloyd might owe to
Seawinds could only be derived from the shareholders' agreement, and
thus, were subject to the law and forum governing that agreement.' The
court reasoned that a rational businessperson entering into a contract
would logically expect that the governing law specified in the contract
would apply to any and all disputes arising from the transaction or rela-
tionship.'
Justice Baxter concluded that a valid choice-of-law provision should
apply to all causes of action "arising from or related to" a particular
agreement.' In addition to Hong Kong's substantial interest the court
found that application of California law would subvert California's policy
of respecting the decisions of parties who freely negotiate choice-of-law
provisions into their contracts.'
28. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 468, 834 P.2d at 1163, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
29. Id. at 469, 834 P.2d at 1154, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336.
30. Id. at 469-70, 834 P.2d at 1154, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. The general policy
underlying contract law is the protection and preservation of justified party expecta-
tions. See B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Contracts § 43 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1992) (supporting such a position, unless some state interest substantially
outweighs the value of protecting party expectations); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971) (presenting the various policy consider-
ations and tradeoffs between potential state interests, the justifiable need to protect
the expectations of parties, and the desire to achieve predictability and certainty of
outcomes); see generally Michael Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial
Agreements-New York's Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 323, 323-26 (1979)
(emphasizing commercial parties' need for certainty and predictability in their contrac-
tual relationships).
31. Ned~loyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 470, 834 P.2d at 1153, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337. The
court could not find any reason to ignore the law chosen by the parties in their
shareholders' agreement See id. at 468-70, 834 P.2d at 1153-55, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
335-37. In dicta, the court went on to state that even if no choice-of-law clause
existed, there was overwhelming evidence to support the application of Hong Kong
law to the claims at issue. Id at 470-71, 834 P.2d at 1155, 11 CaL Rptr. 2d at 337.
32. Id. at 471, 834 P.2d at 1155, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337. See Ury v. Jewelers
Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (1964) ("Parties
naturally expect that the obligations of a contract will be fulfilled."); see generally
RussELL J. WEITRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 7.3C (3d ed 1986)
(describing commercial convenience and fulfillment of party expectations as justifying
the validation of a contract when reasonable).
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B. Justice Kennard's Dissenting View
Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion expressing her view that,
unless expressly provided for, noncontractual causes of action flowing
indirectly from the underlying agreement should not be adjudicated un-
der the specified law.' Justice Kennard summarized the facts in
Nedlloyd' prior to engaging in a lengthy discussion of the significance
of party autonomy and predictability in the commercial setting.'
Under Justice Kennard's analysis, California's interest in respecting the
contracting parties' choice of law was as great as the state's interest in
applying its own law to the transaction.' Justice Kennard believed that
33. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 491, 834 P.2d at 1169, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting). In distinguishing the forum-selection clause validated in
Smith, Justice Kennard relied on the limiting nature of the language employed in the
Nediloyd choice-of-law clause. Id. at 490, 834 P.2d at 1168, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing in reference Smith, Valentino &
Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 497, 551 P.2d 1206, 1210, 131 Cal. Rptr.
374, 378 (1976)).
In Smith, the defendant argued that the forum-selection clause was limited to
breach of contract actions and did not extend to tort claims arising from the con-
tract. Smith, 17 Cal. 3d at 497, 551 P.2d at 1210, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The Smith
court rejected the defendant's argument, and instead interpreted the language of the
forum selection clause electing to employ Pennsylvania law for any actions "arising
under or growing out of the contract" as encompassing all causes of action arising
directly from the contractual relationship. Id. (emphasis in original)
Justice Kennard found the Nediloyd choice-of-law provision ambiguous and inter-
preted the language to apply only to those causes of action based in contract.
NedUoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 490-91, 834 P.2d at 1168-69, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-51
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
34. See supra notes 9-12, 15 and accompanying text; Ned oyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 474-76,
834 P.2d at 1158-59, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340-41. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissent-
Ing).
35. Id. at 485-87, 834 P.2d at 1165-66, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347-48 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Party autonomy protects the justified expectations of the par-
ties thereby promoting contract predictability. Id. at 486, 834 P.2d 1165-66, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 347-48 (Kennard, J. concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard further
recognized the compelling state interest in respecting the choices of sophisticated in-
ternational business entities. Id. at 487, 834 P.2d at 1166, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally Thomas W. Pounds, Comment,
Party Autonomy-Past and Present, 12 S. TEx. LI. 214, 228-30 (1970) (addressing the
effect of the Restatement Second on party autonomy); Morris J. Levin, Party Autono-
my: Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo. LI. 260, 270-80
(1957-58) (examining party autonomy in the United States); Note, Conflict of Laws:
"Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 CoLuM. L REV. 553, 562 (1957) (noting that the
international commercial shipping industry frequently contains choice-of-law provi-
sions).
36. Nedloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 487, 834 P.2d at 1166, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard evaluated the parties' choice-of-law
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the majority's application of Hong Kong law to both the contractual and
noncontractual causes of action was overbroad because there was no
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent regarding noncontractual causes
of action."
Justice Kennard ultimately concluded that the choice-of-law clause
should apply only to the contractual cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but not to the noncon-
tractual cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Nedloyd holds that a court should enforce a freely entered
choice-of-law clause contained within a contract to all causes of action
arising from or related to that contract despite how the cause of action
is characterized or phrased.' While Justice Kennard expressed a legiti-
mate concern regarding the potential abuse inherent in the majority's
clause under the same Second Restatement approach employed by the majority. Id.
at 479-87, 834 P.2d at 1161-66, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343-48 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Kennard's determination that the choice-of-law provision was
applicable to Seawinds' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was consistent with the majority opinion. Id, at 348, 834 P.2d
at 1166, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). However,
Justice Kennard concluded that the breach of fiduciary duty claim fell outside the
scope of the choice-of-law provision. Id. at 491, 834 P.2d at 1169, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
351 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
37. Id. at 494, 834 P.2d at 1171, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). According to Justice Kennard, the majority's rationale, when ad-
vanced to its fullest logical extent, would lead to the inescapable dilemma that once
two sophisticated commercial parties enter into a contract with a choice-of-law provi-
sion, they are thereafter limited to the specified law for noncontractual causes of
actions as well. NedUoyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 492, 834 P.2d at 1169, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard further opined that a party
attempting to resist the application of such a clause would be unable to present any
evidence revealing an intent contrary to the language of the contract Id,
38. Id. at 494, 834 P.2d at 1171, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
39. Id. at 470, 834 P.2d at 1155, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337. California courts will hon-
or choice-of-law clause whether the cause of action sounds in contract or tort, or
whether it is characterized as noncontractual in nature, provided the parties freely
negotiate the clause and the claim 'arises from or is related to" the parties' agree-
ment. Id. See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 497,
551 P.2d 1206, 1210, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374, 378 (finding no independent significance in
the characterization of a cause of action, whether contractual or tortious, when
determining the applicabilit- of a choice-of-law clause).
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holding, her view may ultimately be shortsighted. The approach that she
offered is not without its own disadvantages.'
In applying the expressly chosen law perhaps the majority has the
better approach. 1 Under such circumstances the parties are not left to
indiscriminately hypothesize about which law the courts will choose to
apply. Instead, they may conform all future decisions regarding conduct
with a known and readily ascertainable law because they have chosen
the applicable law in advance.'
JAMES J. MOLONEY
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A defendant may challenge a conviction and sentence when
ineffective assistance of counsel results in the rejection of a
plea bargain offer more favorable than the result achieved at
a subsequent fair trial: In re Alvernaz.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel ensures a criminal defendant
the fundamental right to a fair trial.' When ineffective assistance of
40. In advocating a Restatement type analysis every time parties leave an ambigu-
ous choice-of-law clause in their contract, Justice Kennard actually does injustice to
the penultimate goal of promoting and protecting the expectations of parties to a
contract. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Direc-
tions for the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 1, 17 (1977) (describing the desired
predictability of choice-of-law decisions as attainable primarily through rules which
are of significant value to parties entering contracts).
41. By laying down a bright line rule, the court "best accords with the need of the
commercial community for certainty and predictability in interstate and international
transactions." Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IOwA L REv. 399,
407-08 (1968). See also Daniel C.K Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of Interna-
tional Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74
IOWA L. REv. 165, (1988) (advocating the adoption of a uniform system of rules for
conflict of laws problems occurring in international commercial transactions).
42. See II E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & ALFRED MCCORMAcIK FARNSWOirH ON CONTRAcTS
§§ 5.3a, 5.4a (1990) (providing several examples in which contracting parties want to
know the applicable law before entering an agreement; see generally Michael Gruson,
Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements-New York Approach, 18 COLum.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 323-26, 351, 378 (1979) (commenting on the need for certainty
in commercial transactions and New York's strides toward adopting a uniform policy).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86
(1984) (interpreting the criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel as
1610
[Vol. 20: 1563, 1993] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
counsel leads a criminal defendant to plead guilty, the defendant suffers
a constitutional violation giving rise to a claim for relief from the guilty
plea.2 In re Alvernaz' provided the California Supreme Court with the
opportunity to decide whether a defendant, who is improperly advised by
counsel to reject a plea bargain offer more favorable than the result
achieved at an otherwise fair trial, is entitled to challenge the conviction
and sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.4 The su-
preme court held, as have other federal and state courts,6 that when a
requiring more than the mere presence of an attorney at trial). Counsel is charged
with the "duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a
reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932)). See generaly Franz E. Miller, OOPS!: An Analysis of Post-Pope Attor-
ney Incompetency Cases for Trial and Appellate Counsel, 17 W. ST. U. L REv. 257,
260-61 (1990) (discussing what constitutes attorney incompetency and when it will
lead to reversal).
2. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 934, 830 P.2d 747, 753, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 719
(1992) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60 (1985) (analyzing attorney error
leading to defendant's decision to plead guilty under the two-part test set forth in
Strickland)). A defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and
the deficient performance somehow prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687.
3. 2 Cal. 4th 924, 830 P.2d 747, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713 (1992). Justice George wrote
for the majority, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter
concurring. Justice Mosk dissented with Justice Kennard concurring with the dissent.
4. Id at 928, 830 P.2d at 749, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715. Alvernaz resolves the
apparent conflict between two factually similar cases decided on June 25, 1991, by
the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One. Compare In re Alvernaz, 231 Cal.
App. 4th 1059, 1076-77, 282 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611-12 (1991) (finding that a fair trial
remedies pretrial ineffective assistance of counsel) with People v. Pollard, 2 Cal. App.
4th 1090, .1106, 282 Cal. Rptr. 588, 597 (1991) (concluding that ineffectiveness of
counsel which causes prejudice during plea negotiations entitles the defendant to
either accept or reject the original offers subject to the trial court's approval of the
offer, unless the prosecution withdraws the offer upon a showing of good cause). For
an excellent discussion of the issues presented by the contradiction in these two cas-
es, see Todd R. Falzone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. A Plea Bargain Lost, 28
CAL W. L REV. 431 (1991-92).
5. See, e.g., Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
possible ineffective assistance when counsel failed to convey a counteroffer to a plea
offer and inadequately rendered advice regarding the consequences of rejecting the
plea offer); Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205-07 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
an incompetently counseled decision to proceed to trial lies within the range of Sixth
Amendment protection), vacated, 492 U.S. 902 (1989). Accord Johnson v. Duckworth,
793 F.2d 898, 900-02 (7th Cir.) (acknowledging that a criminal defendant has the right
to effective assistance of counsel when deciding whether to accept an offered plea
bargain), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986); United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky,
689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that defendant's decision to reject an offered
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defendant receives erroneous advice, and that advice causes the defen-
dant to either plead guilty or reject an offered plea bargain, a claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel will stand.'
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, John P. Alvernaz, was charged with one count of first
degree robbery,' two counts of second degree robbery,8 one count of
first degree burglary," and one count of kidnapping for the purpose of
robbery.' The indictment also alleged that the defendant used a firearm
during each offense." In addition, there was an allegation that he had a
prior conviction for receiving stolen property.' Before trial, at a plea-
bargaining session, defense counsel led Alvernaz to believe that if he
pled guilty to one count of robbery, the other charges would be
dropped.'" Counsel informed the defendant that the proposed plea
would amount to a maximum of four to five years imprisonment with a
"net" time of approximately two and one-half years after a deduction for
work-time credits." When the defendant questioned his counsel regard-
ing the potential consequences of losing at trial, counsel asserted that the
plea bargain occurs at a critical stage in the criminal proceeding at which the right
to effective assistance of counsel attaches); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262,
267 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant
withdrew a negotiated plea of guilty and decided to go to trial based on counsel's
erroneous advice regarding the available options and possible consequences); Lloyd v.
Georgia, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988) (finding that the rejection of a plea offer without
adequate communication by defense counsel supports an ineffective assistance claim);
People v. Brown, 177 Cal. App. 3d 537, 550, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 74 (1986) (describing
counsel as having a duty to competently pursue any plea negotiations to their conclu-
sion).
6. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 934 & n.5, 830 P.2d at 753-54 & n.5, 8 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 719-20 & n.5. For a treatment of appellate decisions, see 19 CAL JUI 3D Crim-
inal Law § 2169 (1984 & Supp. 1992) (outlining the California standard for constitu-
tionally adequate counsel). However, in the instant case, the defendant was ultimately
denied relief because he could not adequately establish that he would have accepted
the proffered plea if he had received proper advice. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 945,
830 P.2d at 761, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727.
7. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 211, 212.5(a) (West 1988).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211, 212.5(b) (West 1988).
9. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 459-60 (West 1988).
10. CAL PENAL CODE § 209(b) (West 1988).
11. CAL PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West 1992); h re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 929, 830
P.2d at 750, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716. A defendant's sentence will be enhanced when
such an allegation is proven. Id,
12. CAL PENAL CODE § 496(1) (West 1988); In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 929, 830
P.2d at 750, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
13. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 930, 830 P.2d at 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716-17.
14. Id., at 930, 803 P.2d at 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
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maximum penalty was approximately eight years imprisonment with a
"net" sentence of approximately four years after a deduction for
work-time credits. 5 Defense counsel optimistically predicted that there
was a seventy to eighty percent chance of prevailing if the case went to
trial.'" Based on this information, the defendant elected to reject the
plea bargain offer and proceed to trial."
Contrary to his counsel's assertions, the defendant faced a maximum
penalty significantly greater than eight years imprisonment.' The defen-
dant was in fact subject to a sentence of life imprisonment with an actu-
al prison term of approximately sixteen to seventeen years. 9 After a
jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all charges except the burglary
charge.' The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole, plus an additional two years for the en-
hancement charges.2 By the defendant's own estimate, he would have
to serve sixteen years and seven and one-half months before being re-
leased on parole.'
The defendant appealed and the court of appeal affirmed the convic-
tion.' The supreme court denied the defendant's subsequent petition for
review. ' Next, the defendant sought relief in the trial court by writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that counsel's erroneous advice constituted inef-
fective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel.' The trial court acknowledged that the advice was negligent, but
denied the writ on the ground that the defendant had not adequately
demonstrated that he would have accepted the plea bargain.' The de-
fendant renewed his writ on appeal and the appellate court held that
despite an adequate showing of both ineffective assistance of counsel
15. Id
16. Id at 930-31, 830 P.2d at 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
17. Id. at 929, 930-31, 830 P.2d 750-51, 8 Cal Rptr. 2d at 716-17.
18. In re Alvernaz, 2 CaL 4th at 931, 830 P.2d at 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
19. Id.
20. Id at 929, 830 P.2d at 750, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
21. Id.
22. Id. Although the Attorney General disputed the actual method for determining
the term of prison confinement, the Attorney General did not dispute the defendant's
approximation that he faced a potential sentence in the range of 16 to 17 years. In
re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 929 n.3, 830 P.2d at 750 n.3, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716 n.3.
23. Id. at 929, 830 P.2d at 750, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
24. Id.
25. Id at 930, 830 P.2d at 750, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
26. Id.
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and a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the
offered plea bargain, the error was harmless because the defendant re-
ceived a fair trial." The California Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction.'
Ill. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
The supreme court concluded that when erroneous advice causes a
defendant to reject an offered plea bargain and proceed to trial, such
advice is tantamount to a constitutional violation which is not subse-
quently remedied by a fair trial.' The court determined that, under the
circumstances, neither enforcing the originally offered plea bargain, nor
compelling the prosecution to reinstate its offer would be an appropriate
remedy.' In proposing an appropriate remedy, the court suggested that
upon a court's grant of relief, the prosecutor should submit the previous-
ly offered plea bargain to the trial court for approval."' However, if with-
in thirty days the prosecutor decides to retry the defendant, the plea
negotiation process should start over again.'
The supreme court began its analysis by recognizing the importance of
the plea bargaining process within the criminal justice system.' The su-
preme court agreed with the court of appeal's reasoning that it mattered
little whether the ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a guilty
plea or a decision to stand trial because the attorney owes the defendant
the same standard of professional responsibility in either case.'
27. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 932-33, 830 P.2d at 752, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718.
28. Id. at 946, 830 P.2d at 762, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728.
29. Id. at 936, 830 P.2d at 755, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
30. Id. at 944, 830 P.2d at 760, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
31. Id.
32. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 944, 830 P.2d at 760, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
33. Id, at 933, 830 P.2d 752, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718 (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971)). See gen-
erally Judge Harry A. Ackley, Plain Talk About Plea Bargaining, 10 PEPP. L REV. 39,
43-53 (1982) (comparing the benefits of plea bargaining with the attendant costs);
Peter A. Whitman, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 STAN. L REv. 1082, 1088-92 (1967)
(comparing judicial and prosecutorial plea bargaining).
34. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 934 & n.5, 830 P.2d 753-54 & n.5, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d
719-20 & n.5, rev'g, In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1059, 1069, 282 Cal. Rptr. 601,
606 (1991) (citing People v. Brown, 177 Cal. App. 3d 537, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1986)
(finding the right to competent assistance of counsel to exist at the plea bargaining
stage)). See also Gregory G. Sarno, Adequacy Of Defense Counsel's Representations
Of Criminal Client Regarding Guilty Pleas, 10 A.LR. 4th 8, 169-83 (1981) (discussing
cases requiring an effectiveness hearing after finding incompetent representation with
respect to incorrectly advising a criminal defendant regarding possible penal conse-
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However, the supreme court differed with the court of appeal regard-
ing whether a subsequent fair trial would have an effect on the
defendant's rights when pretrial representation was inadequate.' While
the court of appeal held that a fair trial remedied the earlier ineffective
assistance, the supreme court concluded otherwise.' The supreme court
opined that if it adopted the court of appeal's view, the resulting holding
would "undermine" the plea negotiation process.' In addition, the su-
preme court viewed the defendant's right to participate in decisions cen-
tral to the defense as "crucial," and stated that such decisions should not
be entered into with "grave misconceptions. "n
Next, the court employed the two-part "ineffective assistance" test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington' to determine whether the representa-
tion the defendant received was inadequate under the Constitution.'
According to Strickland, the defendant must prove the following: (1)
counsel's representation was deficient," and (2) the deficiency subjected
the defendant to prejudice.' The Alvernaz court devoted little time to
determining whether counsel's performance was "inadequate," instead
quences).
35. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 935-36, 830 P.2d at 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
36. Id. at 936, 830 P.2d at 755, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
37. IdA. at 936, 830 P.2d at 754, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720. See 4 B. WrrmN & N.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings Before Trial §§ 2179, 2180 (2d ed.
1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing an overview of the statutory and judicial authorization
of plea bargaining in California).
38. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 936, 830 P.2d at 755, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721
(citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Beckham v. Wainwright 639 F.2d
262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981)).
39. 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984).
40. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 936-37, 830 P.2d at 755, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's representation must be so deficient or
counsel's errors so material as to fall below the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. Id. See generally Billie Ann Uilani Higa, The Right To Ef-
fective Assistance Of Counsel In California: Adoption Of The Sixth Amendment
"Reasonably Competent Attorney" Standard, 12 Sw. U. L REv. 53, 85 (1981) (finding
effective assistance of counsel to require "quality representation" both during and
prior to the proceedings).
42. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In other words, counsel's errors must be so materi-
al as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result is reliable. Id. 'Te defen-
dant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at
694. See generally 5 B. WTKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIRNA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2785
(2d ed. 1989) (reviewing the development of what action constitutes ineffective as-
sistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage).
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focusing on what the defendant must show to satisfy the second require-
ment of "prejudice."'
The court refused to engage in a lengthy analysis of the "inadequate
representation" element because the defendant failed to show the exis-
tence of any prejudice.' In examining the defendant's claim of preju-
dice, the court listed several factors which would support a defendant's
contention that he would have accepted the plea bargain.' The court
reasoned, however, that because the defendant failed to produce any
objective evidence, protested his innocence at trial, and failed to estab-
lish that the trial court would have -approved the plea bargain, no prej-
udice resulted.' The court concluded that the defendant failed to estab-
43. In re Alvenaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 937-41, 830 P.2d at 755-58, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721-
24. "To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the defendant would have accepted the
proffered plea bargain and that in turn it would have been approved by the trial
court." Id. at 937, 830 P.2d at 756, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. See also People v. Haskett,
52 Cal. 3d 210, 248, 801 P.2d 323, 345-46, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 102-03 (1990). The
Alvernaz court was particularly concerned with the relative ease with which a defen-
dant could manufacture a claim that he or she would have accepted the proffered
plea offer to satisfy the prejudice element. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938, 830 P.2d
at 756, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. In response to this concern, the court proposed a
policy by which the parties to a plea negotiation would memorialize the discussions
in writing prior to trial. Id. at 938 n.7, 830 P.2d at 756 n.7, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722
n.7. This proposed writing would include: (1) the fact that a plea offer was. made, (2)
the fact that the defendant was fully informed of the offer, its terms, and potential
consequences (i.e. minimum and maximum punishment faced by the defendant should
the offer be accepted, or rejected and the case proceed to trial), and (3) the
defendant's response to the offer. Id,
44. Id. at 945-46, 830 P.2d at 760-61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726-27. A court is not re-
quired to decide whether the defendant's representation was inadequate prior to
analyzing the prejudice suffered. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
45. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938, 830 P.2d at 756, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. The
court listed such relevant factors as whether counsel actually and accurately commu-
nicated the plea offer, whether the defendant gave any indication of a willingness to
negotiate a plea, and whether the actual negotiated terms differed substantially from
the consequences of proceeding to trial. Id. The court was unsatisfied with the
defendant's "self serving" statement that he would have accepted the plea bargain if
he had been accurately informed of the consequences of losing at trial. Therefore,
the court required that the defendant's statement be corroborated by some form of
objective evidence. Id.
.46. Id. at 940-41, 830 P.2d at 757-58, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723-24. The defendant suggest-
ed that the trial court's approval of the proffered plea bargain should be considered
a "presumption." Id. at 941, 830 P.2d at 758, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724. The court reject-
ed this suggestion on the ground that trial courts are responsible for protecting and
promoting the public's welfare. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 941, 830 P.2d at 758, 8
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724. Therefore, despite the regularity with which plea bargains are
approved in practice, a trial court's acceptance of a plea bargain should not be
presumed. Id. See also People v. Stringham, 206 Cal. App. 3d 184, 194, 253 Cal. Rptr.
484, 489 (1988); People v. Cardoza, 161 Cal. App. 3d 40, 43-44, 207 Cal. Rptr. 388,
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lish with reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offered
plea bargain if he had been adequately informed by counsel.47
Despite ruling against the defendant, the court fashioned its own reme-
dy for the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel during the plea
negotiation stage.' Although the defendant sought specific performance
of the previously offered plea bargain, the court declined to approve
such a remedy.' The court commented that specific performance was
not constitutionally mandated and was inconsistent with both the trial
court's discretion in determining the defendant's sentence and the
prosecution's discretion in negotiating a plea.' In an attempt to return
the parties to their original bargaining positions, the court held that upon
a trial court or appellate court's grant of relief, the district attorney
should submit the previously offered plea bargain to the trial court for
approval."' In the event that within thirty days the district attorney choos-
es to relitigate the case, the plea negotiation process should start over.'
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the general law on the subject as set forth
by the majority, but differed with the court in respect to whether the
defendant met his burden of establishing prejudice.'3 Specifically, Jus-
tice Mosk argued that the defendant would most likely have accepted the
390-91 (1984). See generally George Nicholson, Victim's Rights, Remedies, and Re-
sources: A Maturing Presence in American Jurisprudence, 23 PAC. U. 815, 840-41(1992) (discussing the judicial and legislative goal of protecting victims' rights as an
attempt to protect and promote the rights of the public at large); Charles F. Gorder,
Jr., Judicial Power To Dismiss Criminal Charges, 64 CAL L REV. 495, 497-502
(1976) (examining the scope of judicial discretion in approving plea bargains).
47. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 946, 830 P.2d at 761, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727.
48. Id. at 942, 830 P.2d at 758-59, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724-25. See generally 6 B.
WrmrI & N. EPsrIN, CALIFORNIA CRMNAL LAW, Reversible Error §§ 3303, 3305 (2d
ed. 1989) (analyzing when impairment of the right to counsel constitutes reversible
error).
49. ld. at 942-43, 830 P.2d at 759, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725. See also United States v.
Osif, 789 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a defendant has no constitu-
tional right to a plea bargain, and the government is under no obligation to reoffer a
previously rejected plea bargain).
50. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 942-43, 830 P.2d at 759, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
51. Id. at 944, 830 P.2d at 760, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
52. Id. The court recognized that while the prosecution might be in a better bar-
gaining position having already obtained a conviction, the defendant obtained the
benefit of knowing the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case. Id.
53. Id. at 9417, 830 P.2d at 762, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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proffered plea bargain if he had been adequately informed by counsel."
While Justice Mosk did not object to the requirement of objective evi-
dence, he questioned the court's strict enforcement of that requirement
when it resulted in an abrogation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.M
Justice Mosk viewed the defendant's assertion of innocence at trial as
a rational response under the given circumstances.' According to the
dissent, a reasonable defendant would be more inclined to negotiate a
plea the greater the maximum penalty, given a constant probability of
acquittal. 7 Justice Mosk reasoned that the disparity between the actual
maximum penalty and the sentence that the defendant would have re-
ceived under the plea bargain was a substantial factor in assessing what
the defendant would have done had he been adequately informed.'
Therefore, the disparity justified the holding of an evidentiary hearing.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In re Alvernaz stands for the proposition that a pretrial violation of a
defendant's constitutional right to competent counsel can not be subse-
quently remedied by a fair trial.' The court affirmed the continuing ap-
plicability of the two-part Strickland test in evaluating ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims and designated the appropriate remedy for such
constitutional violations."' However, it remains unclear whether the de-
fendant faces an undue burden regarding the "prejudice" element be-
54. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 947, 830 P.2d at 762, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id, at 950, 830 P.2d at 764, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Ac-
cording to Justice Mosk, under the court's reasoning, the defendant would be in a
sense required to give up his right to put on a defense to assert his right to compe-
tent counsel. Id, at 952, 830 P.2d at 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mask referred to the majority's reliance on the defendant maintaining his inno-
cence at trial. Id. at 951, 830 P.2d at 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, the majority erroneously concluded that the defendant was unwilling or
reluctant to negotiate a plea with the prosecutor, and his stance contradicted any
claim that he would have accepted the proffered plea bargain. Id. (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
56. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 950-51, 830 P.2d at 764-65, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
730-31 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 950-51, 830 P.2d at 764, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 954, 830 P.2d at 767, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 955, 958, 830 P.2d at 767, 770, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733, 736 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). See Sarno, supra note 34, at 169-83.
60. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 936, 830 P.2d at 755, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
61. See Falzone, supra note 4, at 449 (commenting on the confusion regarding the
proper remedy).
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cause plea negotiations are rarely memorialized in writing.' In response,
the court recommended documenting plea bargains to provide objective
evidence for any future challenges.' What remains clear is that the
defendant's sworn statement alone is insufficient, and a writing formaliz-
ing the plea bargain arrangement would greatly assist the defendant in
sustaining his burden of proof."
JAMES J. MOLONEY
B. Under Penal Code section 12022.7, a jury may conclude that
a victim has s4fered "great bodily injury" even though no
'!permanent, prolonged, or protracted disfigurement,
impairment, or loss of bodily function" resulted: People v.
Escobar.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Escobar,1 the California Supreme Court overturned People
v. Caudillo,2 which held that any harm inflicted on a victim must include
"permanent, prolonged or protracted disfigurement" to justify a finding of
great bodily injury as set forth in section 12022.7 of the California Penal
Code'. In reversing Caudillo, the Escobar court maintained that if the
62. See In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938, 830 P.2d at 756, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722.
63. Id. at 938 n.7, 830 P.2d at 756 n.7, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722 n.7. See also LYNN
M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? TiE PROCESS OF CRUIMNAL-CASE DISPOSITION 8,
50, 56-58 (1979) (describing the plea bargaining process as typically taking place
immediately before court sessions or during a recess, without any formalities).
64. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938, 830 P.2d at 756, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722 ("[A]
defendant's self-serving statement ... is insufficient in and of itself... and must be
corroborated independently by objective evidence.").
1. 3 Cal. 4th 740, 837 P.2d 1100, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586 (1992). Justice Arabian
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas, and
Justices PaneUi, Kennard, Baxter, and George concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a sepa-
rate, concurring opinion.
2. 21 Cal. 3d 562, 580 P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978).
3. Id. at 588, 580 P.2d at 290, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 875. For further discussion of
great bodily injury as defined by California law, see 3 B.E. Wrrim AND N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CR1MINAL LAW Punishment for Crimes, § 1479 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1992); 22 CAL Jum. 3D Criminal Law H9 3363, 3470 (1985 & Supp. 1992); 17 CAL
JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 621 (1984 & Supp. 1992).
4. CAL IENAL CODE § 12022.7 (Deering 1992). See infra note 6 and accompanying
text for text of section 12022.7 before and after its amendment in 1977 (hereinafter,
1619
injury suffered exceeded the inherent aspects of the crime, it may fall
into the ambit of "great bodily injury" under section 12022.7.'
In 1977, the California legislature amended section 12202.7 to exclude
specific references to physical conditions that constitute great bodily
injury.6 The amendment consolidated the definition of great bodily injury
into one concise phrase: "[Gireat bodily injury means a significant or
substantial physical injury." The disparity between the court's decisions
in Escobar and CaudiUo is predicated on the differing interpretations of
the phrase.'
In Escobar, Maria C. was waiting for a bus when she was kidnapped
and raped by Joaquin Escobar.' Escobar told Maria that he had a gun,
forced her into his car, and drove away. At one point, when Escobar had
stopped the car, Maria attempted to escape by jumping out? Escobar
caught her, pulled her hair, and slapped her before throwing her back
into the car. He continued down the freeway and finally stopped on the
all statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise specified).
5. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. The court
couched its analysis in terms of what type of injury is "routinely associated with [the
crime]." Id. When a defendant has exhibited brutality and violence beyond that nec-
essarily associated with the offense, a finding of great bodily injury may be support-
ed. Id.
6. Prior to 1977, section 12202.7 stated in pertinent part-
[G]reat bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition, which
includes any of the following: (a) Prolonged loss of consciousness. (b) Severe
concussion. (c) Protracted loss of any bodily member or organ. (d) Protract-
ed impairment of function of any bodily member or organ or bone. (e) A
wound or wounds requiring extensive suturing. (f) Serious disfigurement. (g)
Severe physical pain inflicted by torture.
CAL PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 1992) (reprinted following the current text of section
12022.7).
After the 1977 amendment, section 12022.7 stated in pertinent part- "[Glreat bodily
irjury means a significant or substantial physical injury." CAL PENAL CODE § 12202.7
(Deering 1992).
7. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 747-48, 837 P.2d at 1104-05, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590-91.
Justice Arabian intimated that the Caudillo court failed to give due deference to the
legislative intent behind the 1977 amendment of section 12202.7 and was, therefore,
misguided in its interpretation of "significant or substantial physical injury." Id.
8. Id. at 743-44, 837 P.2d 1101, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587. For further discussion of
the facts, see Philip Carrizosa, Court Overrules Controversial Rape Decision: Bird
Court Ruling on 'Great Bodily Injury" Rejected on 6-1 Vote: Will Aid Prosecutors,
LA. DAILY J., Oct. 23, 1992, at 1; Harriet Chiang, Court Expands "Bodily Injury"
Standard, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1992, at A30; Philip Hager, Longer Prison Terms For
Some Felons OKd; Jurisprudence: State Justices Abandon a Bird Court Decision
That Limited Additional Prison Time For Criminals Who Inflict Added Injury On
Their Victims, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1992, at A3.
9. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 744, 837 P.2d at 1102, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588. Escobar
had exited the car momentarily to urinate when Maria attempted her escape. Id.
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roadside, where he forced Maria out of his car, dragged her by the hair
to a bridge and raped her. During the course of the rape, Escobar
pressed his knee into Maria's chest; covered her mouth with his hand,
violently jerked her hair, and pushed his finger into her eye socket.'"
For more than a week after the incident, Maria was unable to walk with-
out assistance."
Following a jury trial, Escobar was found guilty of kidnapping, rape,
and assault with a deadly weapon.' In addition, the jury found that
Escobar had inflicted great bodily injury on Maria during the commission
of the offense.'3 As a result, Escobar was sentenced to an eight-year
term for the rape. In light of the great bodily injury inflicted on the vic-
tim, the court added a three-year enhancement 4 to the sentence to run
consecutively.'2
The California Court of Appeal set aside the jury's finding of great
bodily injury, relying on Caudillo. The court held that the victim's inju-
ries "did not meet the test of 'severe' and 'protracted' harm articulated
[in Caudillo]."" Upon review, the California Supreme Court held that a
victim need not suffer "permanent, prolonged, or protracted" disfigure-
ment, instead finding that if the injury resulted from brutality and vio-
lence not commonly associated with the crime, the standard of great
bodily injury as established by section 12022.7 may be satisfied. 7
1I. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by exam-
ining the definition of great bodily injury. The court noted at the outset
that the legislature has provided a clear definition of great bodily inju-
10. Id. at 744, 837 P.2d at 1101, 12 Cal Rptr. 2d at 587. Justice Arabian stated that
a jury could properly find great bodily injury based on "precisely the quantum of evi-
dence presented here." Id. at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
11. Id. at 7,13, 837 P.2d at 1101, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587.
12. Id. at 745, 837 P.2d at 1102, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
13. Id.
14. Id. For a discussion of determinate sentencing and available enhancements, see
22 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3410, 3417 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
15. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 745, 837 P.2d at 1102, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
16. Id. (quoting People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 588-89, 580 P.2d 274, 290, 146
Cal. Rptr. 859, 875 (1978).
17. Id. at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
18. Id. at 745, 837 P.2d at 1102-03, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588-89.
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ry 9 but that the CaudiUo court and its progeny have attached "judicially
created baggage" to the definition.' The court concluded that the Cau-
diUo test for great bodily injury, namely permanent, prolonged, or pro-
tracted disfigurement, should be replaced by the lesser standard of signif-
icant or substantial injury.21
In overruling CaudiUo, the supreme court detailed the legislative histo-
ry behind section 12022.7.' It recognized that the legislature intended
great bodily injury to be found when a "substantial injury beyond that
inherent in the offense" occurred." The court stated, however, that by
amending the specific version of the statute in favor of a more general
one, ' the legislature clearly intended to preclude future courts from
construing the specific examples in section 12022.7 as an exclusive list of
injuries.' The high court concluded that while the CaudiUo language
became the touchstone' in cases concerning issues of great bodily in-
jury, the limitation could no longer stand because section 12022.7 con-
tains no requirement that a victim suffer permanent, prolonged, or pro-
tracted disfigurement.'
19. Id. at 745, 837 P.2d at 1103, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589; see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
22. Id, at 747-50, 837 P.2d at 1104-06, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590-92.
23. Id at 747-48, 837 P.2d at 1103, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589.
24. The version of section 12022.7 finally adopted by the legislature was taken
directly from the applicable jury instruction on the subject, which reads in pertinent
part- "'Great bodily injury' as used in this instruction means a significant or sub-
stantial physical injury." CALIC No. 17.20 (v.2 5th ed. 1988) (emphasis added).
25. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 747, 837 P.2d at 1104, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590. The court
stated that the jurists deciding Caudillo "encountered difficulty" because legislative
history indicates an intent to discard the original detailed definition, and the CaudiUo
court "inexplicably" failed to consider that in its analysis. Id at 748, 837 P.2d at
1104-05, 12 Cal Rptr. 2d at 590-91.
26. Id at 749, 837 P.2d at 1105, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591. Although subsequent
courts have looked at Caudillo as the standard of review for great bodily injury,
none has increased the threshold for what constitutes great bodily injury. See, e.g.,
People v. Johnson, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1137, 1140, 225 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (1986) (hold-
ing transmission of a sexually transmitted disease constitutes great bodily injury);
People v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. App. 3d 718, 732, 182 Cal. Rptr. 671, 733 (1982) (finding
multiple abrasions and lacerations, scratches on the back, and numerous bruises as
well as siveling of the eyes and face to constitute great bodily injury); People v.
Williams, 115 Cal. App. 3d 446, 454-55, 171 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405-06 (1981) (finding evi-
dence of the forcible rape of a virgin, who suffered genital tearing and bleeding,
sufficient to merit a great bodily injury enhancement); People v. Jaramillo, 98 CaL
App. 3d 830, 836, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774-75 (1979) (holding evidence of a child's
being beaten with a wooden dowel, suffering contusions over her body, swelling, and
severe discoloration in places, sufficient to support a finding of great bodily injury).
27. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 747, 837 P.2d at 1104, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
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B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment,'8 but wrote separately be-
cause he saw no reason to reconsider or disapprove any aspect of the
CaudiUo decision.' In response, the majority opinion stated that it was
not purporting to overrule CaudiUo entirely, but instead rejected only the
portion of the opinion that distorted the legislative history behind section
12022.7.' Justice Mosk believed that the amendment to section 12022.7
was "not intended to lessen the magnitude of bodily injury required by
the 1976 detailed definition of great bodily injury."3'
I. CONCLUSION
Escobar stands for the proposition that great bodily injury need not
result .in permanent, prolonged, or protracted disfigurement.2 Rather,
when the injury suffered goes beyond that which is inherent to the
crime, then it constitutes great bodily injury under section 12022.7.' In
addition, the majority recognized that the question of whether a victim
suffered great bodily injury is purely a question of fact, not law.' Thus,
such a decision should be left in the hands of the jury.' It is reasonable
to assume, therefore, that the new, lesser standard adduced by the
Escobar court represents a decisive victory for California state prosecu-
tors.8
28. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 753, 837 .P.2d at 1108, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
29. Interestingly, Justice Mosk is the only justice on the court today who originally
sat on the Caudillo court Carrizosa, supra note 8.
30. Id. at 751, 837 P.2d at 1107, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593 n.5.
31. Id. at 755, 837 P.2d at 1109, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595 (Mosk, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 747-48, 837 P.2d at 1103, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589.
33. Id. at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
34. Id. The opinion stated that -'[i]f there is sufficient evidence to sustain the
jury's finding of great bodily injury, we are bound to accept it, even though the
circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.'" Id. (quoting
People v. Wolcott, 34 Cal. 3d 92, 107, 665 P.2d 520, 530, 192 Cal. Rptr. 748, 758
(1983)).
35. 1d
36. Deputy Attorney General K. Howard Wayne remarked: "We've gotten rid of the
language [in CaudiUo] ... [niow the public will be greater [sic] protected against
acts of gratuitous violence." Hagar, supra note 8.
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It should be noted, however, that while not directly addressed by the
supreme court in Escobar, the question remains whether this new ruling
will open the door for the inclusion of severe psychological injury within
the definition of great bodily injury.Y Taken to its extreme, an argument
could be made that Escobar undermines the Caudillo court's clearly
articulated refusal to equate physical and psychological injuries. At a
minimum, the California practitioner should note that a showing of per-
manent, prolonged, or protracted impairment, or loss of bodily function
is no longer required for a finding of great bodily injury.'
ALAN J. JACKSON
C. Section 1202.1 of the California Penal Code, which requires
a sexual offender to submit to an AIDS test, does not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause on the grounds that an ADS test
does not constitute punishment: People v. McVickers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. McVickers,' the Supreme Court of California considered
whether section 1202.1 of the California Penal Code (hereinafter sec-
tion 1202.1),2 which makes AIDS' blood testing mandatory for certain
37. The Caudillo panel specifically contrasted physical injury with psychological
injWury, stating that they "were aware of no statutory interpretation that would permit
the legislative language-great bodily injury--to be construed as including a...
victim's emotional trauma.n " CaudiUo, 21 Cal. 3d at 582, 580 P.2d at 286, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 870 (emphasis in original).
38. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th at 750, 837 P.2d at 1106, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
1. 4 Cal. 4th 81, 840 P.2d 955, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 850 (1992). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred
In McVickers, the defendant committed certain sexual crimes with a minor
between 1983 and 1989, including lewd and lascivious acts, intercourse, oral copula-
tion, and sodomy. Under § 1202.1 of the California Penal Code, which became effec-
tive January 1, 1989, a defendant convicted of offenses must submit to a blood test
for AIDS. The defendant was convicted and sentenced in 1989, and, pursuant to
§ 1202.1, the trial court ordered him to submit to a blood test. The defendant ap-
pealed, arguing that § 1202.1 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because his crimes
were committed prior to enactment of the statute. The court of appeal agreed and
struck the order for the blood test. Granting review, the Supreme Court of California
reversed, holding that an AIDS blood test was not to be considered punishment for
Ex Post Facto purposes.
2. California Penal Code § 1202.1 states, in pertinent part- "[tihe court shall order
every person convicted of a violation of a sexual offense . . . to submit to a blood
test for evidence of... acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1202.1 (West Supp. 1993). See generally 4 B. WrrKiN & N. EPSTEIN, CAuroR-
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sexual offenders, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.4 The court conclud-
ed that the blood test was not "punishment," and therefore, did not vio-
late the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
I. ANALYSIS
The court reasoned that an AIDS blood test was not punishment for
Ex Post Facto purposes because: (1) the blood test is. a simple procedure
that is relatively painless,8 (2) the test results are revealed only. to the
defendant and his or her attorney,7 and (3) the procedure is consistent
with the legislature's stated goals.'
NIA CRMUMNAL LAW, Introduction to Criminal Procedure § 1821D (2d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1992) (discussing the testing of defendants convicted of sex crimes).
3. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") is a virus that attacks the
body's immune system. AIDS is transmitted by "sexual contact, and also through the
sharing of hypodermic needles, contaminated blood transfusions, and during pregnan-
cy." CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.46 (West 1990).
4. McVickers, 4 Cal. 4th at 83, 840 P.2d at 956, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 851.
Subdivision (d) of § 1202.1 states that the term "sexual offenses" includes rape,
statutory rape, spousal rape, sodomy, and oral copulation. CAL PENAL CODE § 1202.1
(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
5. McVickers, 4 Cal. 4th at 90, 840 P.2d at 961, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. The U.S.
Constitution states in pertinent part that- "no state shall ... pass any... ex post
facto law." U.S. CONST. AlIT. X, § 10, cL 1; see also CAL CONST. ART. I, § 9. The court
determined that the purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause was to prevent retrospec-
tive legislation with punitive effects. Id. at 87, 840 P.2d at 959, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
854. For a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see generally 17 CAL JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 9 (1984) (defining an ex post facto law as one that applies retro-
spectively to crimes committed before the enactment of an applicable statute).
6. McVickers, 4 Cal. 4th at 88, 840 P.2d at 960, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. The court
indicated that the physical invasion involved in drawing blood is not significant. Id.
at 88, 854 P.2d 959-60, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854-55. Therefore, the court concluded that
such a minor discomfort as drawing blood could not be considered punishment. Id.
For an analysis of a recent California Supreme Court decision holding that an AIDS
blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, see Karin Zink, Note, Love v. Superior Court- Mandatory AIDS
Testing and Prostitution, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 795 (1992).
7. McViclwrs, 4 Cal. 4th at 88, 840 P.2d at 960, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. The
prosecution could, however, use a positive test result to enhance a sentence if the
offender were involved in a future criminal offense. Id.
8. Id. at 89, 840 P.2d at 960, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. The court noted that "[t]he
rapidly spreading AIDS epidemic poses an unprecedented major public health cri-
sis .... " Id. (citing CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45 (West 1990)).
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II. CONCLUSION
In McVickers, the court concluded that an AIDS blood test was not
"punishment" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.' This
holding permits a court to order a sexual offender to submit to an AIDS
test, even where the offense was committed prior to enactment of the
statute. The court's holding is reasonable with respect to the policy of
protecting the health of the offender, the victim, and society at large.
Moreover, considering the recent steps that society has taken to cope
with the AIDS virus, the court may have been more willing to overlook
the potential for other forms of punishment that may result from the
AIDS test."
KIMBERLY J. HERMAN
D. A criminal defendant has no right to an arraignment on
charges pending in one county when the defendant has been
caught previously in another county and proceedings are still
pending: Ng v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ng v. Superior Court,' the Supreme Court of California considered
9. Id. at 90, 840 P.2d at 961, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. In addition, § 1202.1 was
"not excessive in relation to the statute's asserted purpose," nor did it "promote a
-traditional aim of punishment-retribution." Id. at 89, 840 P.2d at 960, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 854.
10. One punishment that may result from retrospective application of this test is
an increase in the sentence received for a second conviction. CAL PENAL CODE
§ 12022.85.
1. 4 Cal. 4th 29, 840 P.2d 961, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856 (1992). Justice Arabian wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panel, Kennard,
Baxter, and George concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion, also concur-
ring in the judgment
In Ng, the defendant had two outstanding arrest warrants on murder charges
issued in San Francisco in 1985 and 1986. Sometime thereafter, Canadian officials
incarcerated the defendant. On September 26, 1991, Canada extradited him to Califor-
nia. On September 27, 1991, the defendant was arraigned on unrelated capital charges
in Calaveras County. Prior to commencement of the trial, the defendant sought trans-
fer to San Francisco for arraignment on the previous murder charges. The court of
appeal filed an opinion ordering a peremptory writ of mandamus, stating that "to
facilitate the relief requested this order is final forthwith." Id. at 33, 840 P.2d at 963,
13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at (quoting CAL RULES OF Couirr Rule 24 (d) (West 1992)). Purport-
ing to act pursuant to a peremptory writ of mandamus, the San Francisco Superior
Court issued its own peremptory writ for an arraignment. The supreme court stayed
the orders and granted review, holding that the court of appeal opinion was not a
peremptory writ itself, and therefore, was not effective until it became final as to the
supreme court. Id. at 33, 840 P.2d at 963, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
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whether the court of appeal erred in issuing a peremptory writ of manda-
mus,2 ordering a defendant who had been arraigned in one county on
felony charges to be transferred to another county for arraignment on
other unrelated felony charges.' The supreme court concluded that the
transfer should not have been ordered because the defendant does not
need to be arraigned in the second county until the conclusion of crimi-
nal proceedings in the first county.'
II. ANALYSIS
The court reasoned that the peremptory writ of mandamus should not
have been issued because: (1) the court of appeal lacked authority to
issue a peremptory writ without a prior order directing its issuance;' (2)
this was not one of the "rare" cases requiring an accelerated proce-
dure;' and (3) the defendant would not be harmed by being forced to
await prosecution in the second county until the completion of criminal
proceedings in the first county.8
2. For a discussion on the writ of mandamus, see generally 4 B. W'rrN AND N.
EPSTEIN, CAuFORNIA CRIuMINAL LAW, Extraordinary Writs § 3326 (2d ed. 1989) (writ of
mandamus is directed at courts to compel actions).
3. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 32, 840 P.2d at 962, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
4. Id. at 36, 840 P.2d at 965, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
5. Id. at 33, 840 P.2d at 963, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. The supreme court noted
that the court of appeal relied upon the language in rule 24(d) to accelerate the date
of finality. Rule 24(d) states in pertinent part that "a court of appeal may order that
a decision granting a peremptory writ within its Jurisdiction shall become final as to
that court... immediately if early finality is necessary to prevent mootness or to
prevent frustration of the relief granted." CAL RULES OF COURT Rule 24(d) (West
1992). In holding the writ invalid, the court reasoned that in order to be final pursu-
ant to Rule 24(d) the writ must be final as to the court of appeal and the supreme
court. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 34, 840 P.2d at 963-64, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858-59.
6. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. The court an-
nounced in Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681 P.2d 893, 203
Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984), that the accelerated procedure should be the "exception" to the
normal writ process. Id.
7. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. The court indi-
cated that such "rare" instances are "where such entitlement is conceded or when
there has been clear error under well-settled principles of law and undisputed facts
or when there is an unusual urgency requiring acceleration of the normal process."
Id. The court believed that there was no need to issue a peremptory writ in the first
instance because under the undisputed facts it was unclear whether the defendant
was entitled to multiple arraignments. Id.
8. Id. at 39, 840 P.2d at 967, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862. The court examined the
court of appeal's opinion relying upon California Constitution article I, § 14, which
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I. CONCLUSION
In reversing the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court promot-
ed a policy of efficiency in the criminal judicial system.' The court stated
that because multiple arraignments are costly and cause undue delays,'
it is practical to permit the county which captured the accused first to
arraign the accused." However, the court's reasoning appears to ignore
cases in which the defendant is held on minor charges in one county, but
has much more serious charges pending in another county.2 Thus, the
court's holding may be limited to such instances where the crimes in
competing counties are somewhat similar.
KIMBERLY J. HERMAN
E. The amendment to California Penal Code section 190.2 by
Proposition 115, including the changes in subdivisions (a)
and (b) and the addition of subdivisions (c), (d) and (e), is
not preempted by Proposition 114, which received more
votes, inasmuch as the changes made to section 190.2 by
Proposition 114 were nonsubstantive: Yoshisato v. Superior
Court.
. INTRODUCTION
In Yoshisato v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court deter-
mined whether, under the California Constitution, a statute that is reen-
acted by the voters can be further amended by provisions of other mea-
provides that "a person charged with a felony by complaint subscribed under penalty
of perjury and on file in a court in the county where the felony is triable shall be
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate of that court." CAL CONST. art
I, § 14. The court also noted that the constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
denied if prompt arraignment occurs after completion of the first trial. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th
at 40, 840 P.2d at 968, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
9. Id. at 39, 840 P.2d at 967, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
10. Id. The court pointed out that multiple arraignments would require shuffling
the defendant from county to county and may interfere with constitutionally protected
time limits. Id.
11. Id. at 39, 840 P.2d at 967, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863:
12. Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 41, 840 P.2d at 968, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863-64. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Mosk noted that the sequence of prosecution should not depend
on what county captures the accused first. Id.
1. 2 Cal. 4th 978, 831 P.2d 327, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the opinion of the court in which Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter,
and George concurred Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
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sures which appear on the same ballot.2 This case involved propositions
114 and 115, which were approved by the voters in the June 1990 Pri-
mary Election.' Although both propositions were approved, Proposition
114 received more votes than Proposition 115.' Both propositions provid-
ed for amendments to California Penal Code section 190.2 [hereinafter
section 190.2].' The California Supreme Court held that Proposition 114
does not create a comprehensive scheme and that Proposition 115 is
complementary or supplementary to Proposition 114. Thus, the changes
made by Proposition 115 are operative.'
Proposition 114 began as a "peace officer special circumstance"
amendment to Senate Bill No. 353, which changed the classification and
treatment of peace officers.8 The amendment was presented to the vot-
ers as Proposition 114 pursuant to article II, section 10 of the California
Constitution."0 The only substantive change to section 190.2 presented
by Proposition 114 was to subdivision (a), paragraph (7), which identifies
2. Id. at 990, 831 P.2d at 334-35, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109-10.
3. Id. at 981, 831 P.2d at 328, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. Yoshisato was charged with
first degree murder with the special circumstance of the murder being that it was
committed while engaged in "rape with a foreign instrument." Id. A finding of special
circumstance requires that the sentence be either death or life in prison without
possibility of parole. Id. Under Proposition 114, section 190.2 did not classify "rape
with a foreign instrument" as a special circumstance. Id at 981-82, 831 P.2d at 328-
29, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103-04. Proposition 115, however, amended section 190.2 to
include "rape with a foreign instrument" as a special circumstance. Id. Yoshisato
demurred to the charge claiming that Proposition 115 was superseded by Proposition
114, and therefore, was not operative in amending section 190.2. The trial court
overruled the demurrer. Id. at 982, 831 P.2d at 329, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104. The court
of appeal reversed, finding that Proposition 114 precluded proposition 115. Id. The
California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. Id. at 992,
831 P.2d at 336, 9 CaL Rptr. 2d at 111.
4. Id. at 992-93, 831 P.2d at 336, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 992, 831 P.2d at 336, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
6. Id. at 989-92, 831 P.2d at 333-36, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-11.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 982, 831 P.2d at 329, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
9. Article II, section 10 provides in relevant part-
(b) If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election con-
flict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.
(c) The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It may amend
or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only
when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amend-
ment or repeal without their approval.
CA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
10. Yosh-isato, 2 CaL 4th at 982, 831 P.2d at 329, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
1629
the classifications of peace officers covered by the "special circum-
stance" provision." All other proposed changes to section 190.2 were
nonsubstantive, syntactic changes and substitutions of gender neutral
language.'
2
Proposition 115 was a much broader measure designed to make "com-
prehensive reforms... to our criminal justice system."' It proposed six
constitutional changes and the repeal, amendment, or addition of many
provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Evidence Code, and the
Penal Code." These changes included a number of substantive changes
to section 190.2.' The amendment at issue in this case was the addition
11. Id. at 983, 831 P.2d at 330, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105. The proposed amendment
read as follows:
The victim was a peace officer as defined in [Penal Code] Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32 [school police], 830.33 [transportation police],
830.34 [utility security officers], 830.35, 830.36, 830.37 [fire Investigators],
830.4, 830.5, [repealed by Stat. 1980, ch. 1340, § 14], 830.6, 830.10, 830.11 or
830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her
duties was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance
of his or her duties ....
Id. (citation omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 984, 831 P.2d at 330, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105 (quoting Prop. 115, § l(a)).
14. Id. at 984, 831 P.2d at 330, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
15. Id. at 985, 831 P.2d at 331, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106. The changes to section
190.2 proposed by Proposition 115 are as follows:
1. Amendments to Section 190.2, Subdivision (a)
(I) The opening paragraph of subdivision (a) was amended to delete the
requirement that special circumstances be "charged and specially" found; the
revised version provides that a defendant convicted of first degree murder
shall face the penalty of death, or life in prison without the possibility of pa-
role, if "one or more of the following special circumstances has been eaed
nd sp-elay found under Section 109.4 to be true:... " (Ballot Pamp.,
Prop. 115, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) p. 66.)
(ii) Paragraph (10) (the "witness llling" special circumstance) was
amended to apply to the intentional killing of a witness to prevent his or her
"testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding ... " (Ballot Pamp., Prop.
115, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) p. 66.)
(ill) Paragraphs (11) and (12) (the "prosecutor murder" and "judge mur-
der" special circumstances) were amended to apply only if the murder was
"intentionaUy carried out in retaliation for or to prevent the performance of
the victim's official duties." (Ballot Pamp., Prop. 115, Primary Elec. (June 5,
1990) p. 66.)
(iv) Paragraph (17) (the "felony murder" special circumstance) was
amended to add two death-qualifying felonies: "(x) Mayhem in violation of
Section 203" and "(xi) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289."
(v) The last sentence of paragraph (18) (the "torture murder" special cir-
cumstance) was deleted. The revised section omits the requirement of "proof
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of "[rlape by instrument in violation of Section 289" as a felony-murder
special circumstance under paragraph (17) of subdivision (a).' It is im-
portant to note, however, that no substantive changes were made to
Section 190.2, subdivision (a), paragraph (7) under Proposition 115.'"
of infliction of extreme physical pain," and reads as follows: "The murder
was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. Fer- the purpoc ^4 h-
seefien tarturz requiza preef of the inffietizn of cxtrcrnz physizal pain nza
f.Attea how long its duratizr.." (Ballot Pamp., Prop. 115, Primary Elec. (June
5, 1990) p. 66.)
2. Amendments to Section 190.2, Subdivision (b)
(i) It deleted the first sentence of former subdivision (b) . . . and re-
placed it with the following: "Unless an intent to kill is specifically required
under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an actu-
al killer as to whom such special circumstance has been found to be true
under Section 190.4 need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the
commission of the offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in
order to suffer death or confinement in state prison for a term of life with-
out the possibility of parole."
(ii) It added subdivision (c), as follows: "Every person not the actual
killer who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the
first degree shall suffer death or confinement in state prison for a term of
life without the possibility of parole, in any case in which one or more of
the special circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this section has
been found true under Section 190.4"
(iii) Finally, it added subdivision (d), as follows: "Notwithstanding subdi-
vision (c), every, person not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference
to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumer-
ated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which felony results in the death
of some person or persons, who is found guilty of murder in the first degree
therefor, shall suffer death or confinement in state prison for life without the
possibility of parole, in any case in which a special circumstance enumerated
in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of this section has been found to be
true wider Section 190.4."
Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 985-87, 831 P.2d at 331-32, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106-07 (footnotes
omitted).
Proposition 115 also created subdivision (e), which reiterates the last sentence of
the former section 190.2 which reads: "The penalty shall be determined as provided in
Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5." Id. at 987 rL4, 831 P.2d at 332 n.4, 9
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107 n.4.
16. Id. at 985, 831 P.2d at 331, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
17. Id.
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I. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
Previously, in Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Politi-
cal Practices Commission,8 the California Supreme Court determined
that where the measures "were presented to the voters as 'competing' or
'alternative' measures,""9 article II, section 10, subdivision (b) of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution was to control.5' Application of the California Con-
stitution would require that only the provisions of the measure receiving
the greater affirmative vote be enforced and none of the provisions of
the other measures, whether conflicting or not, could be operative.2
However, where two measures were not competing or alternative mea-
sures, but contained minor provisions that happened to conflict, the
conflicting provisions of the less popular measure- could be excised and
the remainder of the measure given effect if its principal purpose would
not be affected.'
Therefore, the first issue the supreme court addressed was whether
Propositions 114 and 115 were competing or complementary.5' The bal-
lot materials distributed to the voters demonstrated that the propositions
"were not expressly or even impliedly presented to the voters as compet-
ing or alternative measures."'
Pursuant to its decision in Taxpayers, the supreme court also ad-
dressed the issue of whether Propositions 114 and 115 "sought to 'cre-
ate... a comprehensive regulatory scheme related to the same sub-
ject... .'" ' Yoshisato claimed that the two propositions presented com-
peting versions of section 190.2.' He argued that Proposition 114, in
addition to expanding the "peace officer special circumstance" provi-
sions, proposed the affirmation of unamended provisions.' Yoshisato
reasoned that because Proposition 115 proposed amendments to provi-
sions that were unamended in Proposition 114, the two measures were
18. 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
19. Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 986, 831 P.2d at 332, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
20. CAL CONST. art. II, § 10(b) provides: "If provisions of 2 or more measures ap-
proved at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affir-
mative vote shall prevail." Id.
21. Taxpayers, 51 Cal. 3d at 747, 799 P.2d at 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
22. Id. at 771 n.12, 799 P.2d at 1237 n.12, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.12.
23. Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 988, 831 P.2d at 333, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108.
24. Id. at 989, 831 P.2d at 333, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108.
25. Id. (quoting Taxpayers, 51 Cal. 3d at 747, 799 P.2d at 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at
788).
26. Id. at 989, 831 P.2d at 333-34, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-09.
27. Id. at 989, 831 P.2d at 334, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109.
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competing comprehensive schemes, and, therefore, only the provisions of
Proposition 114 should be given effect.'
The California Constitution,' provides that when provisions within a
statute are amended the entire statute must be reenacted as amended.
The court stated that the constitutionally compelled reenactment of an
entire statute when amending any portion of that statute does not create
a presumption that the voters intended the reenactment to be a compre-
hensive scheme. 1 Examining the ballot materials, the supreme court
concluded that the voters intended solely to amend section 190.2 in the
manner specifically provided by Proposition 114 and that the voters did
not intend to create a comprehensive scheme which would render Propo-
sition 115 inoperative.'
After establishing that Propositions 114 and 115 are not competing or
alternative measures, and that Proposition 114 does not create a compre-
hensive scheme, the majority proceeded to determine whether the two
propositions conflicted.' In examining each provision of Proposition 115
as it related to Section 19 0 .2 ,1 the court concluded that the changes
made to the opening paragraph of subdivision (a) and the amendments
to paragraphs (11), (12), and (17) of subdivision (a) were all operative
inasmuch as there were no provisions in Proposition 114 relating to
these areas.'
The court next considered the amendments to section 190.2, consisting
of the nonsubstantive changes made by Proposition 114 and substantive
changes made by Proposition 115.' The nonsubstantive changes of
Proposition 114 to subdivisions (a)(10) and (b) were held not to have
28. Id.
29. CAL CONST. art. IV, § 9 provides:
A statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.
If a statute embraces a subject not expressed in its title, only the part not
expressed is void. A statute may not be amended by reference to its title. A
section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is reenacted as
amended.
Id.
30. Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 989, 831 P.2d at 334, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108.
31. Id. at 990, 831 P.2d at 334-35, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109-10.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 991, 831 P.2d at 335, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
34. Id.
35. Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 991, 831 P.2d at 335, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
36. Id. at 992, 831 P.2d at 335-36, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
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been intended to preclude all other changes.n Furthermore, the provi-
sions of Proposition 115 relating to section 190.2 were found not to be in
"conflict" with Proposition 114 under article I, section 10 of the Califor-
nia Constitution, and thus, are fully operative.' The court reversed the
decision of the court of appeal, holding that Yoshisato was properly
charged with the special circumstance of "rape by instrument" under
section 190.2(a)(17).'
Justice Mosk, expressing his belief that the two propositions conflict-
ed, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Mosk argued that "[i]t is axiom-
atic that two provisions conflict when one authorizes what the other pro-
hibits."' He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "provision" to
mean "paragraph" instead of "section" or "measure.""
Justice Mosk also disagreed with the majority's finding that the two
propositions did not constitute a comprehensive scheme.' He contend-
ed that inasmuch as "Proposition 114's section 190.2 and Proposition
115's section 190.2 each fully and exclusively regulate the subject of
death eligibility for first degree murderers," they each constitute a com-
prehensive scheme.' Justice Mosk further reasoned that because Propo-
sition 115 allows for the death penalty in circumstances that Proposition
114 would not, the two schemes are conflicting and Proposition 114 must
prevai."
III. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision that Proposition 115 is opera-
tive has the effect of drastically broadening both the number and the
types of cases for which the death penalty can be sought. Proposition
115 expands the eligibility for the death penalty. For the first time in
California, an accomplice can be put to death without proof of intent
to kill." In addition, the death penalty is now available for the murder
of a witness in a juvenile proceeding and for any killings occurring dur-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 995, 831 P.2d at 337, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 995, 831 P.2d at 338, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
45. Philip Hager, Expanded Death Penalty Under Prop. 115 Upheld, LA. TIMES,
June 26, 1992, at A3.
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ing the commission of mayhem or rape with a foreign instrument.46 This
decision is a major victory for proponents of the death penalty in Califor-
nia
DAVID C. WRIGHT
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A trial court is required to'give a jury instruction that a
rape defendant's actual and reasonable mistaken belief of
consent is a defense to rape only if there is substantial
evidence of the prosecutrix' equivocal conduct which would
lead a person to reasonably believe she had consented:
People v. Williams.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mayberry instruction (CALJIC No. 10.65) advises the jury that it is a
defense to rape if a defendant reasonably, and in good faith, mistakenly
believes that a person has consented to sexual intercourse.' In People v.
46. Id.
1. People v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354, 360, 841 P.2d 961, 965, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441,
445 (1992). The Mayberry defense was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). The
thrust of the Mayberry defense is that a defendant's reasonable mistake of fact
precludes wrongful intent Williams, 4 CaL 4th at 360, 841 P.2d at 965, 14 Cal. Rptr.
at 445. The defendant in Williams requested an instruction providing in relevant part:
In the crime of forcible rape, general criminal intent must exist at the time
of the commission of forcible rape. There is no general criminal intent if the
defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the other person vol-
untarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse. Therefore, a reasonable
and good faith belief that there was voluntary consent is a defense to such a
charge.
If after a consideration of all of the evidence you have a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had general criminal intent at the time of the sexu-
al intercourse, you must find him not guilty of such crime.
Id, at 359 n.1, 841 P.2d at 964 n1, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444 n.1 (citing CALTIC no. 10.65
(5th ed. 1988 & supp. 1990))(the "Mayberry instruction"). See also, 2 B. WrrMN & N.
EPSTEIN, CAImRNIA CmIMiNAL LAW, Crimes Against Decency and Morals § 774 (2d ed.
1988)(discussing lack of consent as an element of rape generally and the Mayberry de-
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Williams, the California Supreme Court clarified the factors relevant to
determining whether the court must give a requested Mayberry instruc-
tion.' The supreme court held that a trial court need not give a
Mayberry instruction unless there is substantial evidence of equivocal
conduct supporting the defendant's actual and reasonable mistaken belief
that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.'
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority first noted that a rape defendant must satisfy both a sub-
jective and an objective component in order to justify an instruction
regarding a Mayberry defense.' The court stated that the subjective com-
ponent is satisfied when a rape defendant shows that he actually be-
lieved he was engaging in consensual sexual intercourse.' The objective
component is satisfied if the defendant can show that his mistaken belief
was reasonable.' The majority further reasoned that when the
prosecution's evidence is incompatible with consensual sexual inter-
course, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the reasonable-
ness of his belief of consent to justify a Mayberry instruction.8 Finally,
fense). On defending a rape prosecution generally, see 18 A. Jup. TRIALS 341 (1971 &
Supp. 1993).
2. 4 Cal. 4th 354, 841 P.2d 961, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441 (1992). In Williams, the
defendant who was charged with rape relied on a defense that the prosecutrix con-
sented to sexual intercourse. Id. at 359, 841 P.2d at 964, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444. The
trial court provided an instruction regarding rape, but refused to advise the jury of
the defense of actual and reasonable mistaken belief of consent Id. The defendant
was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of false imprisonment. Id. The
court of appeal reversed, holding that a Mayberry instruction was required based on
the defendant's testimony pertaining to consensual sexual intercourse. Id. at 360, 841
P.2d at 964, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444. The California Supreme Court reversed lId at
365, 841 P.2d at 968, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 948. Justice Arabian authored the majority
opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Paneill, Baxter, and George concurring.
Justices Mosk and Kennard each wrote separate concurring opinions. Id.
3. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 356, 841 P.2d at 962, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. For a
survey of the divergent views of California appellate courts regarding the circum-
stances requiring a Mayberry instruction, see 1 B. WTKN & N. EPSREIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAw, Defenses § 225 (2d ed. 1988).
4. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 363, 841 P.2d at 967, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
5. Id. at 360, 841 P.2d at 965, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
6. Id. at 360-61, 841 P.2d at 965, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
7. Id. at 361, 841 P.2d at 965, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
8. Id. (citing People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 157, 542 P.2d 1337, 1346, 125
Cal. Rptr. 745, 754 (1975); People v. Babbit, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 694, 755 P.2d 253, 271-72,
248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 87-88 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989)). The defendant's
burden of production is met if the defendant produces enough evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 361, 841 P.2d at 965, 14 Cal. Rptr 2d at
445. See also, B. WrmUIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Burden of Proof and Presumptions
§ 166 (3d ed. 1986)(defendant's burden in criminal cases generally); 5 B. WrrlN & N.
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the majority concluded that, because a jury must find that the
defendant's belief of consent was in fact mistaken before it can consider
whether the mistake was reasonable, a trial court must give a Mayberry
instruction only when there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct
in support of the defendant's claim of an actual and reasonable mistaken
belief that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.'
Next, the court applied the mandatory Mayberry instruction criteria to
the facts of Williams. The court acknowledged that the evidence intro-
duced by the defendant, if believed, established actual consent which is a
separate defense to a charge of rape."0 However, in regard to the appro-
priateness of a Mayberry instruction, the court stated that if the jury
believed the prosecution's evidence, there could be no reasonable mis-
taken belief of consent." The court concluded that the Mayberry in-
struction was not required because the incompatible testimony regarding
the events that took place could not be harmonized in a manner provid-
ing substantial evidence of equivocal conduct which the defendant could
have reasonably misunderstood.2
EPSTEIN, CILUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial §§ 2655(d), 2656 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing
shifting burden as applied in Mayberry). See also, GRACE LIDIA SuAREZ, ET. AL, CALI-
FORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND PRACICE, C.E.B. § 32.20A (Supp. 1992)(noting
that because the accused's actual mistaken belief is within his knowledge alone,
shifting the burden of production to the defendant is permissible).
9. Wiiams, 4 Cal. 4th at 361, 841 P.2d at 966, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446. The court
emphasized that a Mayberry defense requires a finding by the jury that the
defendant's belief in the victim's consent was in fact mistaken. Id. at 361-62, 841 P.2d
at 966, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
10. Id. at 362, 841 P.2d at 966, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446. The defendant "testified
that [the victim] initiated sexual contact, fondled him to overcome his impotence, and
inserted his penis inside herself." Id.
11. Id The victim "testified that the sexual encounter occurred only after [the
defendant] blocked her attempt to leave, punched her in the eye, pushed her onto
the bed, and ordered her to take her clothes off, warning her that he did not like to
hurt people." Wi//iams, 4 Cal. 4th at 361, 841 P.2d at 966, 14 CaL Rptr. 2d at 446.
12. Id In dicta, the court advised lower courts that when there is evidence that a
threat of "force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the person or another" preceded by the prosecutrix' allegedly equivocal
conduct, the trial court must still give a Mayberry instruction upon introduction of
substantial evidence supporting the defendant's claim. Id. at 364, 841 P.2d at 967-68,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447-48 (citing People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d at 147-48, 542 P.2d
at 1340-41, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49 (1975). However, the supreme court advised that
in such a cAtse the jury should also be instructed "that a reasonable mistake of fact
may not be found if the jury finds that such equivocal conduct on the part of the
victim was the product of 'force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.'" Id. at 364, 841 P.2d at 968, 14 Cal.
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the
majority's analysis of the criteria required for a Mayberry instruction.'
Justice Mosk stated that a jury is entitled to believe or disregard all or
part of the testimony of any witness, including the defendant."' He
pointed out that the defendant's testimony regarding the events that took
place constituted substantial evidence requiring a Mayberry instruction
because, if the jury believed him, a reasonable doubt may have devel-
oped as to guilt as a result of the defendant's actual and reasonable be-
lief that he was engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. 5 Justice
Mosk concluded that the defense of actual consent and the separate
defense of actual and reasonable mistaken belief of consent are compati-
ble defenses, thus entitling the defendant to a jury instruction regarding
both defenses when justified by the evidence.' Justice Mosk concurred
in the decision of the majority because he believed that the trial court's
failure to charge the jury with the Mayberry instruction did not prejudice
the defendant.
7
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority opinion that the defen-
dant. was not entitled to a Mayberry instruction. 8 However, Justice
Kennard asserted that the standard as to the appropriateness of a
Mayberry instruction requires more definition than the "equivocal con-
Rptr. 2d at 448.
13. Id at 365, 841 P.2d at 968, 14 CaL Rptr. 2d at 448.
14. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 369, 841 P.2d at 971, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
15. Id. at 367, 841 P.2d at 970, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450.
16. Id at 370, 841 P.2d at 972, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. But see, 76 C.J.S. Rape
§ 19 (Supp; 1992)(surveying several jurisdictions and concluding that the defense of
consent requires that the defendant Introduce evidence of the victim's equivocal con-
duct); David Haxton, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional
Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 WiS. L REV. 1219, 1240-41 & n.83 (1985)(examining the
mistake of fact defense in rape prosecutions and criticizing the California Supreme
Court's application of the defense to the facts in Mayberry).
17. Williams, at 371-72, 841 P.2d at 972-73, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-53. Justice
Mosk reasoned that the defendant did not suffer prejudice because the jury's guilty
verdict as to the charge of rape implicitly required a finding by the jury that the "de-
fendant intentionally engaged in an act of sexual intercourse that was in fact
unconsented and forcible .... By further implication, [the jury] necessarily found
that [the defendant] acted without a reasonable and honest belief in consent." Id at
371, 841 P.2d at 973, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453.
18. Id. at 372, 841 P.2d at 973, 14 CaL Rptr. 2d at 453.
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duct" test that the majority provided." Justice Kennard identified only
three factual situations which, in her opinion, warrant giving the
Mayberry instruction, all of them having the common elements of a
defendant's threat or use of force and his reasonable and actual belief
that the prosecutrix consented.0 According to Justice Kennard,
Mayberry is appropriate when the defendant uses a small amount of
force,2' the victim is agreeable to the use of force,' or when a sub-
stantial amount of time lapses between the threat or use of force and
sexual intercourse.' Because the facts presented in Williams did not fit
any of these situations, Justice Kennard concurred in the majority's re-
versal of the appellate court.u
1I. CONCLUSION
In People v. Mayberry, the supreme court attempted to settle the dis-
agreement among California appellate courts regarding the factors that
necessitate charging the jury with a Mayberry instruction. The court held
that a Mayberry instruction is required only when there is substantial
evidence of the prosecutrix' equivocal conduct which corroborates the
defendant's reasonable mistaken belief that the prosecutrix consented to
sexual intercourse.' It remains to be seen whether the "equivocal con-
duct" test that the court identified provides sufficient guidance to the
lower courts when determining whether a Mayberry instruction is appro-
priate.
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY
19. Id.
20. Id at 374, 841 P.2d at 974, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454.
21. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 374, 841 P.2d at 974, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. In this
situation, the force is "sufficient to accomplish the sexual intercourse against the
victim's will but not so great as to render unreasonable a belief by the defendant
that the victim consented notwithstanding the use or threat of force." Id.
22. Id. Justice Kennard emphasized that this situation is rare.
23. Id. In this situation, "the defendant could reasonably believe that the victim's
participation in the act of sexual intercourse was not coerced." Id.
24. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th at 374-75, 841 P.2d at 975, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
25. See generally, Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape,
100 YALE LJ. 2687 (1991); Sakthi Murthy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expecta-
tions: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History To Show the Defendant's
Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL L. REV. 541 (1991).
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VIII. EVIDENCE
The psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to statements
made in confidence regardless of whether they are confiden-
tial or later disclosed; only the patient has the power to
waive or invoke the privilege; the "dangerous patient"
exception to the privilege applies when the psychotherapist
has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is dangerous
and disclosure is necessary to prevent harm; no actual
disclosure, however, is required to trigger the exception:
Menendez v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Menendez v. Superior Court,' three audiotape cassettes containing
notes and actual recordings of several therapy sessions were seized from
a psychotherapist's office.2 The California Supreme Court considered
whether the tapes were admissible in light of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege' and the "dangerous patient"' exception.' Justice Mosk stated
1. 3 Cal. 4th 435, 834 P.2d 786, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (1992). Justice Mosk authored
the unanimous opinion of the court.
2. Id. at 440-41, 834 P.2d at 788-89; 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-95.
3. For additional information relating to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see
generally 81 AM. Ju. 2D Witnesses §§ 436-520 (1992); 3 CAL JUn. 3D Evidence,
§§ 426-82 (1976); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 252-314 (1957); STANLEY MOSK, PsychotWra-
pist and Patient in the California Supreme Court: Ground Lost and Ground Re-
gained, 20 PEpP. L REv. 415 (1993).
4. See MOsK, supra note 2, at 415-16.
6. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 446, 834 P.2d at 793, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. On Au-
gust 20, 1989, Jose and Mary Louise Menendez, the parents of Erik and Lyle
Menendez, were killed. A magistrate issued a search warrant authorizing a search of
the offices and home of Leon Oziel, a clinical psychologist. Id. Dr. Oziel was the psy-
chotherapist for Lyle and Erik Menendez. Id. During the search, three audiotape
cassettes pertaining to treatments of Lyle and Erik were seized. Id. at 441, 834 P.2d
at 789, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95. One cassette contained Dr. Oziel's notes from sessions
with Lyle and Erik on October 31 and November 2, 1989; another cassette contained
Dr. Oziel's notes from a session with Erik on November 28, 1989; and a third cas-
sette contained a recording of an actual session with Lyle and Erik on December 11,
1989. Id. Dr. Oziel asserted the psychotherapist-privilege, claiming that the cassettes
were privileged and therefore could not be disclosed. Id. at 44041, 834 P.2d at 789,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95. The tapes were then sealed pending a hearing on their admis-
sibility. Id. at 440-41, 834 P.2d at 789, 11 Cal Rptr. 2d at 95. In the meantime, Lyle
and Erik were each arrested, placed in custody, and charged with the murder of
their parents. Id.
After an in camera hearing regarding the admissibility of the tapes, the superior
court ruled that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not to apply to any of the
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that the superior court erred in its interpretation of People v. Clark' in
deciding that all of the tapes were admissible.7 Instead, the California
Supreme Court relied generally on its decision in People v. Wharton,8
which was issued prior to the judgments of both lower courts in
Menendez." Applying different reasoning than the lower courts, the su-
preme court affirmed the admissibility of the first two tapes, but over-
turned the ruling as to the third cassette on the ground that it was pro-
tected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege."
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
Justice Mosk first examined the findings of fact and conclusions of law
issued by the lower courts.1 The superior court made reference to a
number of detailed findings of fact in reaching its decision to admit the
tapes. First, a relationship existed between Dr. Oziel as a psychotherapist
and Lyle and Erik as patients." Second, the communications made in all
four psychotherapy sessions were confidential as defined in California
Evidence Code Section 1012.13 In addition, the communications on the
three tapes. Id at 443, 834 P.2d at 790, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. The court of appeal
summarily denied the defendants' petition appealing the ruling. Id. at 445, 834 P.2d at
792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98. The supreme court vacated the denial and ordered the
appellate court to consider the issue. Id. at 445-46, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 98. The court of appeal affirmed the superior court's finding that the tapes were
admissible. Id. at 446, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98. The supreme court
then reconsidered the admissibility issue of the tapes and affirmed the court of
appeal's judgment in part and reversed in part. Id. at 457-58, 834 P.2d at 800, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 106.
6. 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990). The court in Clark
held that once a communication between a psychotherapist and a patient is revealed
to a non-privileged third party, the communication loses its confidential status. Id. at
619-20, 789 P.2d at 151, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 423. For a discussion of the holding in
Clark as it relates to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see MOSK, supra note 2, at
416-19.
7. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 447, 834 P.2d at 793, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
8. 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d 290, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991) (expanding the applica-
tion of the "dangerous patient" exception). For a discussion of the holding in Whar-
ton as it applies to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see MOSK, supra note 2, at
415-16.
9. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 447, 834 P.2d at 793, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
10. Id. at 457-58, 834 P.2d at 800, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
11. Id. at 443-46, 834 P.2d at 79092, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96-98.
12. Id at 443-44, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
13. Section 1012 provides in relevant part-
[C]onfidential communications between patient and psychotherapist" means in-
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tapes fell within the psychotherapist-patient privilege under section 1014
of the California Evidence Code. 4 Third, all therapy sessions at issue
were conducted for the sole purpose of therapy; therefore, the "crime or
tort" exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege as defined in
section 1018" was inapplicable." Fourth, Lyle and Erik neither express-
ly nor impliedly waived the privilege relating to any communication,
made at any time. 7 Fifth, the October 31 and November 2 sessions were
covered by the "dangerous patient" exception set forth in section 1024,8
because Lyle and Erik each made threats to Dr. Oziel that collaterally in-
cluded both his wife and lover.9 Sixth, all the sessions were deemed
"one communication."' Lastly, all communications between Dr. Oziel
and the Menendez brothers lost their confidential status when Dr. Oziel's
lover learned of the communications and informed others.'
Further, the superior court issued several conclusions of law.' Specif-
ically, the court held that for a communication to be considered confi-
dential, it must be confidential at the time of its making and must remain
confidential thereafter.' Moreover, the court indicated that confidential
formation... transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the
course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as
the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than
those who are present to further the interest of the patient in the consulta-
tion or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmis-
sion of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
psychotherapist is consulted ....
CAL EvID. CODE § 1012 (West 1992) (emphasis in original).
14. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 444, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97. Section
1014 provides that "the patient ... has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and
psychotherapist. . . ." CAL EvD. CODE. § 1014 (West 1992).
15. Section 1018 states: "There is no privilege under this article if the services of
the psychotherapist were sought or obtained to enable or .aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit a crime or a tort or to escape detection or apprehension after the
commission of a crime or a tort." CAL EvID. CODE § 1018 (West 1992).
16. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 444, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
17. Id.
18. CAL EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1992). Section 1024 states:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as
to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened dan-
ger.
Id.
19. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 444, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
20. Id. at 445, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
21. Id. at 445, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
22. Id. at 443-45, 834 P.2d at 790-92, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96-98.
23. Id. at 444, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
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communications may lose their confidential status by the disclosure of
prior communications of a similar nature.'
The court of appeal affirmed the decision of the superior court.'
While the court agreed with the superior court's analysis of the first two
sessions, it held that the tapes of the third and fourth sessions were
admissible because the sessions were not conducted "'for the purpose of
therapy."n The appellate court reasoned that Dr. Oziel conducted the
last two sessions simply to ensure his own safety.'
Justice Mosk began the court's analysis by restating the supreme
court's interpretation of the law on the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. ' The court held, contrary to the superior court, that the "privilege
can cover a communication that was never... 'confidential.'"' The
court went on to state that provided the "communication... [is made] in
confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses
the information to no 'outside' third person," the privilege may protect
information that is not, in fact, confidential.' Additionally, the privilege
gives the patient the power to "bar testimony by anyone," including
"'outside' third persons."" Relying on Roberts v. Superior Court,' the
court also reiterated that only the patient can waive the privilege.'
Justice Mosk next addressed the "dangerous patient" exception, stating
that the exception applies where "there is reasonable cause for the psy-
chotherapist to believe that; (1) the patient is dangerous and; (2) disclo-
sure of the communication is necessary to prevent any harm."' The su-
preme court held that the exception does not require actual disclosure,
but the psychotherapist must believe that disclosure is necessary to pre-
vent harm.3
24. Id. at 445, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
25. Id. at 446, 834 P.2d at 792, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
26. Id.
27. Id,
28. Id. at 447, 834 P.2d at 793, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
29. Id
30. Id. at 447, 834 P.2d at 793, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
31. Id. at 448, 834 P.2d at 794, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
32. 9 Cal. 3d 330, 341, 508 P.2d 309, 316, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316 (1973) (holding
that only the patient possesses the right to waive the privilege).
33. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 448-49, 834 P.2d at 794, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (1992).
34. Id at 449, 834 P.2d at 794, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (citing People v. Wharton,
53 CaL 3d 522, 548-63, 809 P.2d 304-14, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 645-55 (1991).
35. 1d. at 451, 834 P.2d at 796, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (citing Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d
at 560-61, 809 P.2d at 312-13, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 653-54.
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Having laid down the analytical framework, Justice Mosk turned to the
resolution of the factual issues. The court first considered the portion of
those tapes relating to the October 31 session.' Justice Mosk agreed
with superior court's findings that, initially, the privilege applied to the
communications in this sessionY He disagreed, however, with the lower
court's conclusion that the privilege was destroyed by Dr. Oziel's subse-
quent disclosure to his wife and lover, and his lover's discovery and dis-
semination of the confidential information.' The supreme court af-
firmed, relying upon the "dangerous patient" exception, using as support
the superior court's factual findings.' Thus, the court affirmed the supe-
rior court's ruling of admissibility concerning the November 2 tapes un-
der essentially the same analysis.4
The next tapes considered were those containing notes from the No-
vember 28 session with Erik,4' and the actual recording of the December
11 session with both Erik and Lyle.4 The supreme court agreed with the
superior court that the privilege applied to these sessions, finding the
court of appeal's contrary conclusions to be in error.' The court of ap-
peal held that these sessions were not "for the purpose of therapy"; rath-
er, they were a result of the self-interest of each of the parties, and thus,
not protected by the privilege.44 In dismissing this finding, the supreme
court stated that motive by itself is virtually irrelevant, since psychother-
apy rarely occurs for its own sake.' The court held that "the dispositive
36. Id. at 449, 834 P.2d at 794, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
37. Id. at 449-50, 834 P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
38. Id. at 450, 834 P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
39. Id. at 450-51, 834 P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101. The reasonableness test
is an objective test based on a an average psychotherapist but gives the psycho-
therapist wide discretion. Id. at 451, 834 'P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101. The
court analogized the "dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist's common
law duty, as established in Tarasoff, to warn intended victims of patients who pose a
serious threat of danger. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 452, 834 P.2d at 796, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 102 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)). The court reaffirmed the Tarasoff court's rationale, stating,
"[T]he public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psy-
chotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential
to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril be-
gins.'" Id. (quoting Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27).
For a discussion of the Tarasoff duty to warn, see 6 B. WmN SuMMARY OF CAL-
IFORNIA LAW Torts § 860 (9th ed. 1988).
40. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 452-53, 834 P.2d at 797, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
41. Id. at 453, 834 P.2d at 797, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
42. Id. at 455, 834 P.2d at 798, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
43. Id. at 454, 834 P.2d at 797, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
44. Id. at 453-54, 834 P.2d at 797, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
45. Id. at.44, 834 P.2d at 797, 11 CaL Rptr. 2d at 103.
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fact is what the participants do, not why."'
In doing so, the supreme court departed from the superior court's
reasoning. The superior court held that all the tapes were admissible,
reasoning that the communications in the latter sessions were the same
as those in the first two sessions. Therefore, the communications lost
their privileged status "before the fact" due to prior disclosure of the
earlier sessions.' The superior court concluded that all four sessions
constituted "one communication."s
The supreme court evaluated the "dangerous patient" exception to
determine whether the lower court's ruling could be sustained.' The
court determined, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding of reasonable cause to believe that disclosure was neces-
sary to prevent harm.' Thus, the "dangerous patient" exception did not
apply. Because the superior court had explicitly found that no waiver of
the privilege occurred, the supreme court ruled the November 28 and
December 11 tapes protected under the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
and thus, inadmissible as evidence.5
HLI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the supreme court sustained the ruling of admissibility on
the October 31 and November 2 tapes, and reversed the finding of admis-
sibility with respect to the sessions of November 28 and December 11.'
In its analysis, the court departed from its prior interpretation of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court, however, fell short of ex-
pressly overruling Clark when it held that a communication between a
patient and a psychotherapist need not be nor remain confidential in
order for the privilege to apply.53
In addition, the court modified its decision in Wharton by concluding
that it is the actual communication which the therapist must reasonably
believe needs to be disclosed to prevent harm. Previously, under the
"dangerous patient" exception, it was "any and all communications that
46. Id. at 454, 834 P.2d at 798, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
47. Id. at 454-55, 834 P.2d at 798, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
48. Id. at 455, 834 P.2d at 798, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 456-58, 834 P.2d at 799-800, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06.
52. Id.
53. Mos, spra note 2, at 422.
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may be deemed to trigger reasonable cause for [such] belief."" The su-
preme court's analysis in this case has resulted in the psychotherapist-
patient privilege becoming broader and stronger while the "dangerous pa-
tient" exception has narrowed, resulting in increased protection for pa-
tients.
DAvID C. WRIGHT
IX. LABOR LAW
Under Government Code sections. 20020 and 20020.9,
detention officers may not claim '2ocal safety" status for
purposes of retirement benefits unless the city elects to treat
the officers as local policeman: City of Huntington Beach v.
Board of Administration.
. INTRODUCTION
In City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered whether jailers could rely on Govern-
ment Code section 20020 to claim local safety member status under the
Public Employees' Retirement System for purposes of retirement bene-
54. MOslK supra note 2, at 424.
1. 4 Cal. 4th 462, 841 P.2d 1034, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (1992). In Huntington
Beach, 17 detention officers [hereinafter jailers], entitled to membership in the Public
Employees' Retirement System ("PERS"), sought to change their membership status
from "local miscellaneous" employees to "local safety" employees. Id, at 464-65, 841
P.2d at 1036, 14 Cal. Rptr 2d at 516. Superior retirement benefits afforded to local
safety employees prompted this request I& at 466, 841 P.2d at 1037, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 517. After reviewing the case, the PERS Board granted the change in status to the
jailers. Id at 465, 841 P.2d at 1036, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516. The city petitioned for
writ of administrative mandamus in superior court. Id The court denied the petition,
and the court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court granted review. Id.
at 464, 841 P.2d at 1036, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
2. Justice Baxter delivered the opinion of the court, with Chief Justice Lucas, and
Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and George concurring. Id. at 464-73, 841
P.2d at 1034-41, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614-21.
3. CAL GoV'T CODE § 20020 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993). Note that all statutory
references are to the Government Code.
Section 20020 provides in pertinent part "'Local policeman' means any officer or
employee of a police department of a contracting agency which is a city, except one
whose .. . functions do not clearly fall within the scope of active law enforcement
service ... ." Id.
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fits.' The court held that jailers are precluded from qualifying for local
safety member status unless the city expressly elects to treat them as
"local policemen" under section 20020.9.'
H. ANALYSIS
In deciding that it is within the city's discretion to determine whether
or not jailers are considered local policemen, the court explained that
section 20020 must be read in concert with section 20020.9.6 Under the
rules of statutory construction,' section 20020.9 could include jailers
4. Huntington Beach, 4 Cal. 4th at 464, 841 P.2d at 1036, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
5. Id at 464, 472, 841 P.2d at 1036, 1041, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516, 521.
Section 20020.9 states:
'Local policeman' also includes any employee of a contracting agency
which is a city, who is employed in a jail or a detention or correctional
facility and having as their primary duty and responsibility the supervision
and custody of persons committed to the jail or facility ....
This section shall not apply to the employees of any contracting agency
nor to any contracting agency unless and until the contracting agency elects
to be subject to this section. by amendment to its contract with the
board ....
CAL GoV'T CODE § 20020.9 (West Supp. 1993).
6. Huntington Beach, 4 Cal. 4th at 467-68, 841 P.2d at 1037-38, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 517-18. The court stated that the two sections are in "pari materia" Pari materia
is a Latin phrase meaning "[oif the same matter." BLACK'S LAW DICmioNARY 1115 (6th
ed. 1990). The court explained that §§ 20020 and 20020.9 must be construed together
in order to remain consistent with the intent of the legislature. Id. See also In re
Estate of McDIII, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 836-37, 537 P.2d 874, 877, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757
(1975) (concluding that statutes on the same subject "should be read together and
construed to achieve harmony between seemingly 'conflicting provisions rather than
holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency"); Proctor v. San Francisco Port
Auth., 266 Cal. App. 2d 675, 682, 72 Cal. Rptr. 248, 253 (1968) (holding that statutes
which generally address the same subject matter are in pari materia and must be
"construed together and harmonized whenever possible").
For a comprehensive discussion of relevant statutes on the same subject matter,
see generally 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 366 (1953 & Supp. 1992).
7. Justice Baxter stressed that "[t]he rules governing statutory construction are
well established" in California law. Huntington Beach, 4 Cal. 4th at 468, 841 P.2d at
1038, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Macri, 4 Cal. 4th 318,
326, 842 P.2d 112, 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 817 (1992) (explaining that to gain an
understanding of the legislature's intent behind a statute, the court "must first turn to
the words of the statute itself"); Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202, 208-09, 793 P.2d
524, 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194 (1990) (deciding that to effectuate legislative intent,
the court must "look first to the language of the statute giving effect to its 'plain
meaning'") (quoting Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges, 33 Cal. 3d
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within its definition of local policemen.8 The court concluded, therefore,
that the legislature did not intend section 20020 to represent an alterna-
tive and independent method of classifying jailers.' The court further
concluded that because the city did not decide to define jailers as local
policemen under section 20020.9, the jailers failed to qualify as local
safety members under PERS."°
Ill. CONCLUSION
Huntington Beach established that in order for a detention officer to
receive local safety member retirement benefits, the employing agency
must expressly elect to classify detention officers as local policemen
under section 20020.9."1 Justice Baxter clearly stated that section 20020
will not suffice as an alternative means of defining jailers as local police-
men for purposes of PERS."2
ALAN J. JACKSON
211, 218-19, 655 P.2d 317, 322, 188 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1982)); California Teachers
Ass'n v. San Diego Community College, 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698, 621 P.2d 856, 858-59, 170
Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (1981) (indicating that legislative intent must be afforded due
deference when construing the statutory language); Campbell v. State Farm Mut
Auto. Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 3d 871, 874-75, 257 Cal. Rptr. 542, 543 (1989) (stating
that when statutory language is clear, the court may not engage in liberal interpreta-
tions); DeYoung v. City of San Diego, 147 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17-18, 194 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725-26 (1983) (stressing that every word of a statute should be strictly scrutinized to
ascertain the specific legislative purpose).
For a discussion of statutory construction, see generally 7 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Laws, § 94 (9th ed. 1988); 58 CAL. JUR 3D Stat-
utes §§ 82-133 (1980); 82 CJ.S. Statutes §§ 311, 321 (1953 & Supp. 1992). •
8. Justice Baxter is referring to language in § 20020.9 expressly limiting the
application of the statute to only those agencies that elect to be bound by it. See
supra note 5.
9. Huntington Beach, 4 Cal. 4th at 468, 841 P.2d at 1038, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
Justice Baxter warned that statutory construction which allows § 20020 to be con-
strued as an alternative to § 20020.9 would necessarily render § 20020.9 "superfluous
and irrelevant." Id. Justice Baxter based his concerns on § 20020.9 which specifically
includes the optional expansion in § 20020 to include jailers within the definition of
"local policeman." Id. Justice Baxter concluded, therefore, that the legislature could
not possibly have intended § 20020 to incorporate the same definition that the legisla-
ture enacted in § 20020.9. Id. "[Liegislation must be construed as a whole while
avoiding an interpretation which renders any of its language surplusage." Id. (em-
phasis added) (citing McAlpine v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 32, 35 (1989)).
10. Id. at 472, 841 P.2d at 1041, 14 CaL Rptr. 2d at 521.
11. See generally id. at 464-73, 841 P.2d at 1036-41, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514-21.
12. Id. at 468, 841 P.2d at 1038, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
1648
(Vol. 20: 1563, 1993] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
X. TORT LAW
Under Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, the
operator of a water ski boat owes a duty to avoid
endangering the lives or property of third persons; however,
the vessel operator owes no corresponding duty to a water
skier other than the duty not to engage in conduct that is
either intended to injure or is so reckless as to be outside the
scope of the sport: Ford v. Gouin.
L INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court has historically held that one who
knowingly and voluntarily engages in an activity assumes that activity's
inherent risks and cannot recover for injuries resulting therefrom.' How-
ever, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' the court caused confusion with respect
to the extent that the assumption of risk doctrine survived California's
transformation from a contributory to a comparative negligence state.3
1. Waiters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155 (1977) (affirming the applicability of the fireman's rule under the fundamental
principle that "one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot
recover for injurles sustained thereby"). See also Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Serv., 60
Cal. 2d 266, 272, 383 P.2d 777, 780, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1963) (allowing assump-
tion of risk defense when an individual voluntarily accepts a risk, either expressly or
impliedly, with actual knowledge and appreciation of that risk) (citing Prescott v.
Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 161-62, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954)); W. PAGE
KEETON Er AL, PRoSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TomRr § 68, at 484-85 & n.50
(6th ed. 1984) (describing implied assumption of risk and finding those who partici-
pate in a sport to impliedly assume the known risks of injury); 46 CAL JUR. 3D
Negligence § 145 (1978) (indicating that a person who willingly encounters a danger-
ous situation assumes only those risks that are inherent to that situation).
2. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
3. After more than 100 years of the "all-or-nothing" rule of contributory negli-
gence, the Li court moved California to a more equitable system of pure comparative
negligence. I . at 813, 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1232-33, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65, 875.
See also id at 832, 532 P.2d at 1246, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (Clark, J., dissenting). The
court concluded that the assumption of risk defense is merely a variant of con-
tributory negligence, and thus, merges into the system of assessing liability in propor-
tion to negligence. Id, at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. However,
subsequent decisions at the appellate court level demonstrated the apparent confusion
surrounding the assumption of risk doctrine's continued applicability. Compare
Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1988)
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The supreme court has since attempted to clarify Li's effect on the as-
sumption of risk doctrine both in Ford v. Gouin' and its companion
case, Knight v. Jewett.'
(recognizing the doctrine of "reasonable implied assumption of risk" as meaning that
a plaintiff who reasonably and voluntarily accepts a known risk impliedly agrees to
reduce the defendant's duty of care) with Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App.
3d 162, 164, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1983) (holding that the defense of reasonable
implied assumption of risk serves no function in California's comparative negligence
system).
The supreme court's own indecisiveness possibly spurred further confusion on
the subject See Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 406, 572 P.2d 1155,
1163-64, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 22 (1978) (applying the assumption of risk doctrine in
determining whether a non-experienced patron voluntarily accepted the risk of alcohol
poisoning when an experienced bartender served an excessive amount of alcohol to
that patron); Walters, 20 Cal. 3d at 204, 571 P.2d at 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (de-
scribing the fireman's rule as having Its basis in assumption of risk concepts which
apply broadly to cases involving employee negligence, products liability, and compara-
tive negligence). See also Paul Rosenlund & Paul Kililon, Once a Wicked Sister The
Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20
U.S.F. L Rav. 225, 253-54 (1986) (commenting on the California Supreme Court's
failure to provide adequate guidance on what role assumption of risk should play
under the comparative negligence system).
4. 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992). Justice Armand Arabi-
an authored the court's opinion. Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion in which
Justices Panelli and Baxter joined. Id, at 351, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38
(Kennard, J., concurring). Justice George wrote an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, in which Chief Justice Lucas joined. Id. at 364, 834 P.2d at 741, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47 (George, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk dissented.
Id. at 369, 834 P.2d at 744, 11 Cal Rptr. 2d at 50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
5. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992). In Knight, the court
addressed several post-Li appellate decisions that divided assumption of risk into two
categories: (1) when the plaintiff "reasonably" accepted a risk knowingly and volun-
tarily and (2) when the plaintiff "unreasonably" accepted a known risk that the
defendant's negligence presented. Id. at 306, 834 P.2d at 701-02, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
7-8. Affirming Its earlier determination in Li that assumption of risk was only a vari-
ant of contributory negligence, the court concluded that the assumption of risk doc-
trine, as a complete defense, failed to survive the adoption of comparative negligence.
Id. at 307, 834 P.2d at 702, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
The court explained its interpretation of assumption of risk in Li as containing a
"primary" and "secondary" distinction, rather than a "reasonable" and "unreasonable"
distinction. Id. at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9. The Knight court de-
scribed primary assumption of risk as a case where the defendant owes no duty to
protect the plaintiff against a certain risk and secondary assumption of risk as a case
where the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty, but the plaintiff knowingly accepts the
risk caused by the defendant's breach of duty. Id. In discussing which standard
courts should follow, the Knight court noted the significant disparity between the
two approaches. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 309, 834 P.2d at 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
Under a reasonable/unreasonable approach, a plaintiff who acts reasonably is com-
pletely barred from recovery while a plaintiff who acts unreasonably suffers only a
reduction in recovery. Id. at 306-07, 834 P.2d at 702, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8. Under the
primary/secondary approach, primary assumption of risk bars recovery because no
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In both Knight and Ford, the court faced the complicated task of rec-
onciling the appropriate relationship between assumption of risk and
comparative negligence as espoused in Li.8 The court acknowledged the
common misconception among appellate courts regarding the continued
applicability of the assumption of risk doctrine and set forth the appro-
priate standard that courts should use in future assumption of risk cas-
es.
7
The Knight court noted that in an active sports context, the duty one
participant owes another varies depending upon the activity and the role
each participant assumes.8 Absent any statutory duty, a defendant in an
active sports case will be liable solely for conduct that is either intended
to iruure or is so reckless as to fall completely outside the scope of the activity.9
duty exists. Id. at 309, 834 P.2d at 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 10. However, when a second-
ary assumption of risk situation exists, the defendant's liability flows according to the
duty owed, which varies according to the activity. Id.
6. Id. at 300, 834 P.2d at 697, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3; Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 342, 834
P.2d at 726, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32. See generally Stephanie M. Wildman & John C.
Barker, Time to Abolish Implied Assumption of a Reasonable Risk in California, 25
U.S.F. L REv. 647, 647-50 (1991) (suggesting that the confusion surrounding implied
assumption of risk litigation Justifies abolishing the doctrine to avoid "doctrinal repeti-
tion").
7. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 306-07, 834 P.2d at 701-02, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8 (criti-
cizing those appellate decisions that interpreted Li as distinguishing between reason-
able and unreasonable assumption of risk). See, e.g., Nunez v. R'Bibo, 211 Cal. App.
3d 559, 562-63, 260 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1989) (following Ordway's holding that the adop-
tion of comparative negligence did not abolish reasonable assumption of risk);
Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 107, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 541 (1988)
(interpreting Li as upholding "reasonable implied assumption of risk" as a complete
defense); Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 183, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 615 (1986) (determining that the assumption of risk doctrine applies when
the plaintiff knowingly and reasonably assumes the risk). The Knight court interpret-
ed Li as distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption of risk by deter-.
mining whether the defendant breached a legal duty or not. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at
308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
8. Knight, 3 CaL 4th at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16. See general-
ly 4 HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 21.5, at 238-41 & n.17 (2d ed. 1986) (re-
viewing an exhaustive list of various sports activities and the corresponding duty in
each setting).
9. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16; Ford, 3 Cal..
4th at 345, 834 P.2d at 728, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34 (applying the general rule to non-
competitive, active sports such as watersking). See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRS § 68, at 484 nn.40, 41 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that
public policy considerations disfavor the application of assumption of risk when reck-
less conduct or an intentional tort occurs). See also Neil R. Tucker, Assumption Of
Risk And Vicarious Liability In Personal Injury Actions Brought By Professional
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In Ford, Justice Arabian interpreted Harbors and Navigation Code
section 658(d) ° as imposing upon both a vessel operator and a water
skier the duty not to cause a collision with any third person or proper-
ty." As between vessel operator and water skier, however, Justice Ara-
bian determined that the legislature did not intend a comparable duty of
care. '2 In establishing that a ski boat operator owes no legal duty of
care to a water skier in tow, the Ford court held that the court of appeal
properly barred the water skier's cause of action on a primary assump-
tion of risk theory where the operator was, at most, negligent in direct-
ing the vessel.'"
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Larry Ford, an experienced water skier, was seriously injured when his
head struck an overhanging tree limb while water skiing barefoot and
backward." He sued Jack Gouin, the driver of the ski boat, for negli-
gently directing the vessel too close to shore.'5 It was undisputed that
Ford selected the location, the length of the tow rope, and the method of
skiing." The primary factual dispute in this case, centered on whether
Gouin's navigation was the proximate cause of Ford's injuries."
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gouin,'8 and the
court of appeal affirmed." The court of appeal held that by planning
and engaging in an activity with a slim margin for error, Ford impliedly
Athletes, 1980 DuIKE U. 742, 745-50 (1980) (examining the general duty that one
participant owes another in a sports context and what risks are assumed by volun-
tary participation).
10. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 658(d) (West Supp. 1993). All further statutory
references are to the Harbors and Navigation Code.
11. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 350, 834 P.2d at 731, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
12. Id, at 350, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38. Harbors and Navigation
Code § 658(d) provides in full:
No person shall operate or manipulate any vessel, towrope, or other
device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a
similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis,
aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with or strike
against, any object or person. This subdivision does not apply to collisions of
two or more persons on water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices being
towed by the same vesseL
CAL HARB. & NAV. CODE § 658(d) (West 1978 & Supp. 1993).
13. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 351, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
14. Id at 342-43, 843 P.2d at 726, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
15. Id. at 343, 843 P.2d at 726, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
16. I&
17. Id.
18. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 344, 834 P.2d at 727, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
19. Id.
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assumed the risk that Gouin might veer too close to shore and cause him
to collide with an object.' Thus, the court determined that Ford know-
ingly and reasonably assumed the risk of injury." The California Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating that under the statute, Gouin owed no duty
to Ford, and hence, Gouin did not breach any legal duty of care.'
I. TREATMENT
A. Justice Arabian's Lead Opinion
Justice Arabian, writing the lead opinion, began where Knight v.
Jewett' left off. In Knight, the court held that the assumption of risk
doctrine bars a plaintiff who willingly engages in an active sport from
bringing a negligence action against a coparticipant unless the plaintiff
can show that the coparticipant owed the plaintiff a specific legal duty of
care.' The Knight court described the general duty of care applicable to
a coparticipant in an active sport as the duty to refrain from intentionally
injuring another or from engaging in conduct that is so reckless as to fall
outside the scope of the sport.'
In Ford, Justice Arabian expediently brought water skiing within the
confines of the general rule, which limits the duty of care owed to
coparticipants in an active sport.' Justice Arabian explained that the
20. Id. at 354, 834 P.2d at 734, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40 (Kennard, J., concurring).
See W. PAGE KEETON Err AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 485
(5th ed. 1984) ("By entering freely and voluntarily into any relationship where the
negligence of the defendant is obvious, the defendant may be found to accept it and
consent to it, and to undertake to look out for himself and relieve the defendant of
the duty.").
21. Ford v. Gouin, 6 Cal. App. 4th 379, 393-94, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 879 (1990)
(citing Ford's 15 years of experience as a water skier, extensive preparation prior to
water skiing, and general familiarity with the location where the injury occurred). See
generally 46 CAL Jun. 3D Negligence § 143 (1978) (discussing assumption of risk and
the requisite elements of knowledge and appreciation of the particular risks).
22. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 350-51, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
23. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal, Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
24. Id. at 318, 320, 834 P.2d at 710, 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16, 17. The Knight
court explained that under primary assumption of risk, a defendant owes no duty to
the plaintiff. Id. at 310, 834 P.2d at 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 10. Therefore, a plaintiff
would be completely barred from bringing a cause of action because the defendant
did not breach a legal duty of care. Id.
25. Id. at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. See also Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at
345, 834 P.2d at 727-28, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
26. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 345, 834 P.2d at 728, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. The limited
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reasoning behind the general rule is to avoid any chilling effect on sports
which might otherwise occur if courts imposed liability upon a partici-
pant due to ordinary negligence.'
Next, Justice Arabian addressed the issue of whether the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty of care under section 658(d).' Justice Arabian
interpreted section 658(d) within the context of surrounding subdivisions
and concluded that the legislature provided protection solely for third
parties and their property, and not for the participants themselves.'
Based on his conclusion that the plaintiff was not within the class of
protected persons under the statute, and further that the plaintiff failed
to show that the defendant acted recklessly or with the intent to injure,
Justice Arabian reasoned that the lower court properly barred the
plaintiff's action.'
duty is one of "avoidance of intentional and reckless misconduct" Id. While water
skiing may not be competitive, it is an active sport. Id. For a discussion of how
courts treat the similar sport of snow skiing, seeI Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Ski
Resort's Liability for Skier's Injuries Resulting From Condition of Ski Run or Slope,
55 A.LR. 4TH 632, 642 (1987) (providing a list of cases in which the skier assumed
the risk of injury resulting from the inherent hazards of the sport); Donald X.
Zupanec, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Prom Ski Lift, Ski Tow, or Sim-
Uiar Device, 95 A.LR. 3D 203, 206-07 (1979) (discussing the duty of care owed by the
operator of a ski tow or similar device).
27. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 345, 834 P.2d at 728, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. See Knight, 3
Cal. 4th at 318-19, 834 P.2d at 710-11, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-17 (providing a detailed
history of cases in which courts limited the duty of care owed to a coparticipant in
an active sport under the rationale that the imposition of unlimited liability would
have a chilling effect on the sport).
28. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 346, 834 P.2d at 728, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. It is interest-
ing to note that while neither party raised the issue at trial or on appeal, the Califor-
la Supreme Court looked to § 658 to determine the duty a ski boat operator owes
to a water skier in tow. Id, at 346 & n.2, 834 P.2d at 728 & n.2, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
34 & n.2. Even though the plaintiff in Ford was not wearing water skis, the court
interpreted the statute as "clearly" encompassing barefoot water skiing. Id at 348,
834 P.2d at 730, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36. See CAL HARB. & NAY. CODE § 658 (West
1978 & Supp. i993).
29. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 349-50, 834 P.2d at 730-32, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36-38. Justice
Arabian interpreted § 658(d) as imposing a duty on both the vessel operator and the
water skier to act in a manner consistent with avoiding collisions with any person or
object. Id. at 349, 834 P.2d at 730, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36. However, Justice Arabian
interpreted the second sentence in § 658(d) as suggesting that the legislature did not
intend to impose upon the vessel operator a duty to the water skier. Id, at 349, 834
P.2d at 730-31, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36-37. As a result, Justice Arabian concluded that
the obligation to avoid a collision ran not from the vessel operator to the water
skier, but from each water skiing participant to third parties and their property. Id,
at 350, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
30. Id. at 351, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
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B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with Justice Arabian's opinion that the
water skier should be barred from bringing an action, but did not agree
that section 658 imposed no duty on the vessel operator."' Rather, Jus-
tice Kennard believed that implied assumption of risk, as a complete
defense, survived California's adoption of comparative negligence in
Li.n
Justice Kennard began her analysis with a quick review of the "tradi-
tional" definition of assumption of risk and the critical elements of the
defense.' Justice Kennard stressed the significance of correctly distin-
guishing between contributory negligence and assumption of risk when
determining whether Li bars the latter as a complete defense.' Despite
31. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 351, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38. (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justices Panell and Baxter joined in Justice Kennard's concurrence. Id.
at 364, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47 (Kennard, J., concurring).
32. 1d. at 351-52, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard cited her dissent in Knight to support her decision that implied assump-
tion of risk should continue as a complete defense in a negligence action. Id. at 354,
834 P.2d at 734, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40 (Kennard, J., concurring) (citing Knight v.
Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 324, 834 P.2d 696, 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 20 (1992) (Kennard,
J., dissenting)). See generaily Victor E. Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A
Survey Of California Practice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. LJ. 747, 748-56
(1976) (recognizing the questionable viability of the assumption of risk doctrine short-
ly after the Li decision).
33. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 354-55, 834 P.2d at 734-35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40-41
(Kennard, J., concurring). The affirmative defense of assumption of risk has common-
ly been defined as the voluntary acceptance of a risk with knowledge and apprecia-
tion of that risk. Id. at 355, 834 P.2d at 734, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennard cited a long line of cases establishing assumption of risk
as a defense. Id, at 358, 834 P.2d at 735-36, 11 CaL Rptr. 2d at 41-42 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). See also Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 244, 418
P.2d 153, 155, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1966) (finding the assumption of risk defense
available when a person voluntarily accepts a risk with either express or implied
knowledge of the particular risk); Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266,
271-72, 383 P.2d 777, 780-81, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196-97 (1963) (finding that the plaintiff
must appreciate the magnitude of the risk before assumption of risk can apply);
Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 161-62, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954)
(comparing the contributory negligence defense where a person could have discov-
ered a risk upon the exercise of due care with an assumption of risk defense where
a person voluntarily accepted a risk with knowledge and appreciation of the hazard).
34. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 356-57, 834 P.2d at 735-36, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41-42
(Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard contrasted the two defenses by pointing to
the different theories underlying each defense. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring). In con-
1655
acknowledging the pivotal impact of Li on tort law in California, Justice
Kennard affirmatively decided that assumption of risk survived the adop-
tion of comparative negligence.'
Justice Kennard cited Ordway v. Superior Courtn to support the prop-
osition that assumption of risk survived Li.37 The Ordway court held
that the terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" assumption of risk tend-
ed to confuse courts when attempting to distinguish between a form of
assumption of risk that merged into comparative negligence, and a form
that did not.' The Ordway court viewed assumption of risk not as a
complete defense," but as a method of determining the exact duty owed
by a defendant.'
tributory negligence, a court compares the plaintiffs actions to those of a reasonable
person in similar circumstances, but in assumption of risk, the focus is on the
plaintiffs subjective perspective. Id (Kennard, J., concurring). See generally 46 CAL
Jun. 3D Negligence § 139 (1978 & Supp. 1992) (distinguishing contributory negligence
from assumption of risk doctrine); 4 HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 22.1-.18, at
261 (2d ed. 1986) (contrasting comparative negligence with contributory negligence).
35. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 357, 834 P.2d at 736, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennard cited three post-Li decisions supporting the view that Li
did not abolish all forms of assumption of risk. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring). See
Lpson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 375 n.8, 644 P.2d 822, 830-31 n.8, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 637-38 n.8 (1982) (noting that the assumption of risk doctrine has been
abolished only to the extent that it overlaps with contributory negligence); Ewing v.
Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 406, 572 P.2d 1155, 1163-64, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 22
(1978) (recognizing the continued applicability of the assumption of risk doctrine
post-Li); Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155 (1977) (explaining the continued viability of the fireman's rule under the funda-
mental tenets of the assumption of risk doctrine).
36. 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988).
37. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 359-60, 834 P.2d at 738-39, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-45
(Kennard, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 360, 834 P.2d at 739, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45 (Kennard, J., concurring).
The Ordway court stated that under comparative negligence, it is necessary to con-
sider the risks assumed by the plaintiff before attempting to measure the duty owed
by the defendant. Ordway, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (quoting
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1968)). Although, the court held that
assumption of risk was not an absolute defense, it indicated that the doctrine sur-
vived the adoption of comparative negligence as a measure of the defendant's duty of
care. Id. (quoting Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986)). The Ordway
court concluded that a plaintiffs reasonable implied assumption of risk reduces the
duty of care owed by a defendant and may even result in the defendant owing no
duty at all. Id.
39. Such a concept is inconsistent with a comparative negligence scheme in which
liability is apportioned according to fault. See generally 46 CAL. JUn. 3D Negligence
§§ 117, 118 (1978 & Supp. 1992) (noting that Li superseded the all-or-nothing contrib-
utory negligence approach and adopted a form of recovery proportionate to fault).
40. Ordway, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 541. However, Justice
Kennard may have misplaced reliance upon Ordway as explicitly recognizing the
survival of implied assumption of risk as a complete defense. The Ordway court
1656
[Vol. 20: 1563, 19931 California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Next, Justice Kennard examined the essential elements of assumption
of risk and concluded that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly as-
sumes the risk of injury during a sports activity."' Unlike the lead opin-
ion and dissent, Justice Kennard did not find section 658 dispositive on
whether the plaintiff was barred from bringing an action against the
defendant.' Relying instead on the continued viability of assumption of
interpreted Li as upholding the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of risk as
a viable defense and "where applicable," the doctrine provides a complete defense.
Id. The key words are "where applicable." The court did not state that reasonable
implied assumption of risk was tantamount to a complete defense in all cases. See
id. Rather, the court said that a complete defense arises where the plaintiff reason-
ably assumed a risk sufficient to reduce the defendant's duty of care to no duty at
all. Id.
Here, the reasoning in Ordway is more consistent with the Knight court's inter-
pretation of' assumption of risk than with Justice Kennard's interpretation. In Knight,
the court distinguished between primary and secondary assumption of risk. Knight v.
Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308, 834 P.2d 646, 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 9 (1992). The
Knight court defined primary assumption of risk as when the defendant owed no
duty to the plaintiff. Id. The court defined secondary assumption of risk as when the
defendant owed a duty, but the plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk of injury. Id.
Thus, when applying comparative negligence principles to secondary assumption of
risk, liability is apportioned according to fault Id. at 310-11, 834 P.2d at 704-05, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10-11. This approach is similar to Ordway's analysis in which a
plaintiffs reasonable implied assumption of risk reduces the duty owed by a defen-
dant See Ordway, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
41. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 362, 834 P.2d at 739-40, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45-46 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
42. Id. at, 362, 834 P.2d at 740-41, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard found both parties' conduct to be outside the scope of § 658. Id.
(Kennard, J., concurring). However, she hypothesized that if the court interpreted the
statute to include barefoot water skiers within the protected class of persons, the
defendant would have been barred from asserting the assumption of risk defense. Id.
(Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice George, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, agreed with Justice Arabian on
the duty approach to assumption of risk. Id at 365, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 47 (George, J., concurring and dissenting). However, Justice George reached the
opposite conclusion, finding the water skier in tow as part of the class of persons
protected under the statute. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 365, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 47. (George, J., concurring and dissenting). He believed that § 658 could reason-
ably be interpreted as affording protection for both third parties and water skiers
from any collisions caused by a vessel operator. Id. at 366, 834 P.2d at 743, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 49 (George, J. concurring and dissenting).
Justice Mosk maintained that the doctrine of implied assumption of risk should
be abolished in its entirety. Id. at 369, 834 P.2d at 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). He also expressed concern over Justice Arabian's apparent uncertainty
in discerning the legislative intent behind § 658. Id. at 369, 834 P.2d at 744-45, 11
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risk as a complete defense, Justice Kennard reasoned that the plaintiff
impliedly assumed the risk of injury when he chose to water ski back-
ward and barefoot with knowledge and appreciation of the inherent
risks.' Therefore, Justice Kennard concluded that the plaintiff should be
barred from bringing a negligence action against the defendant."
IV. CONCLUSION
While the California Supreme.Court may have intended to clarify the
correct interpretation of the assumption of risk doctrine, a great amount
of confusion still surrounds the matter.' In Knight, the court recog-
nized primary and secondary assumption of risk as the appropriate terms
under which all assumption of risk cases should be reviewed." Howev-
er, what the court gives in Knight, the court takes away in Ford. In Ford,
three justices supported the primary/secondary approach, three justices
advocated the traditional approach, whereby assumption of risk would
be treated as a complete defense, and one justice called for total abolish-
ment of the doctrine.
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50-51 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 363-64, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
44. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 363-64, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47. See general-
ly Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk And Consent In The Law Of Torts: A
Theory Of Fu/ Preference, 67 B.U. L REv. 213 (1987) (providing an in-depth analysis
of the traditional approach to assumption of risk as advocated by Justice Kennard).
45. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 322, 834 P.2d 696, 712-13, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2,
18-19 (1992) (recognizing the tremendous confusion caused by the many interpre-
tations and definitions of the term "assumption of risk" and advocating complete
elimination of the doctrine) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
46. Id. at 308-09, 834 P.2d at 703-04, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9-10.
47. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 351 n.1, 834 P.2d at 732 n.1, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38 n.1
(Kennard, J., concurring). For a summary of the various approaches taken by the
appellate courts in California, see Ann K Bradley, Knight v. Jewett: Reasonable Im-
plied Assumption of Risk as a Complete Defense in Sports Injury Cases, 28 SAN
DIEGo L REv. 477, 480-85 (1991) (arguing that the California Supreme Court should
find reasonable implied assumption of risk a complete defense separate and apart
from the comparative negligence scheme). See also John L Diamond, Assumption of
Risk After Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine,
52 Omo ST. LJ. 717, 726 (1991) (setting out three basic approaches to assumption of
risk in chart form). Diamond explained the dilemma faced by the California Supreme
Court prior to Its ruling in Knight and Ford. See generally id. at 736-41.
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Arguably, the only issue that Ford clarifies is that even the supreme
court is having difficulty in applying the standards recently established in
Knight.' It is safe to "assume" that the doctrine of assumption of risk
will continue to "bedevil the law" for quite some time.'
JAMES J. MOLONEY
48. The only point which all justices seem to agree on is that when the plaintiff
expressly assumes a risk, the assumption of risk doctrine bars the plaintiffs action
for negligence. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 308 n.4, 834 P.2d at 703 n.4, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
9 n.4 (analogizing express assumption of risk to primary assumption of risk in
which no duty is owed, and thus, the plaintiff is barred from bringing a negligence
cause of action). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF ToRTs § 68, at 482-86 (5th ed. 1984) (indicating the significant burden that the
defendant must meet before a court will recognize an express assumption of risk).
49. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 322, 834 P.2d at 713, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line &R., 318 U.S. 54, 68
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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